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1Abstract
This thesis examines the role of endogenous size processes in the stability and price
setting decisions of cartels. Chapter One analyses how the stability of cartels de-
pends on the level of horizontal product differentiation and on costs of collusion
under the premise that a cartel can consist of less than all firms in an industry. It
is shown that when the size of the cartel is determined endogenously, it is possible
that increased costs of collusion make a cartel more stable.
Chapter Two analyses how the price setting of firms in collusive industries is
affected by three different penalty regimes: i) profits, ii) overcharge, and iii) rev-
enue based penalties. It is found that penalties influence price setting in two ways:
directly, by affecting the industry price for a given cartel size and indirectly by af-
fecting cartel size and thereby the price charged. When the penalties are equally
tough, in the sense that they deter cartels over the same group of products, over-
charge based penalties always lead to the lowest prices, followed by prices computed
under profits based penalties and then revenue based penalties. For very few com-
binations of product differentiation and market size, revenue based penalties lead to
lower prices than profits based penalties.
Finally, Chapter Three presents a model in which collusive stability is analysed in
a dynamic setting of free entry, exit and mergers. Contrary to the previous literature
it shows that stable and profitable collusion is possible under free entry, without
the need for cartels to play entry deterring strategies. Furthermore, the empirical
evidence that a breakdown of collusion can lead to increased merger activity is
replicated. An additional contribution of this model is that it defines a new notion
of a long run sustainable competitive market size under merger and entry.
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1 INTRODUCTION 4
1 Introduction
Collusive practices or cartels are defined by the European Commission (EC) as ”a
group of similar, independent companies which join together to fix prices, to limit
production or to share markets or customers between them”.1 Although collusive
practices are illegal in most developed jurisdictions, multiple cases are detected
each year, ranging from the German automotive industry to UK banks or Canadian
car parts manufacturers. In order to detect and prosecute cartels, competition
authorities (CAs) devote a significant amount of their resources into detecting and
prosecuting cartels. For example, Joaquin Almunia, the then Vice President of the
EC and responsible for Competition Policy, said in a speech on 19th of September
2014: “I have said in many occasions that cartels are my top enforcement priority. In
fact, they have been a priority for the European Commission since the late 90’s(...)”2.
Nevertheless, CAs have limited resources and can therefore only investigate a
limited number of industries and firms. Hence, in order to most effectively use their
resources, CAs need to channel activities into those industries and firms that are
the most prone to collusion. In order for this strategy to succeed, a well-founded
understanding of the characteristics of industries at risk of collusion is crucial. At
the same time, it is important to understand how firms react to actions imposed by
CAs.
This PhD contributes to this understanding by expanding the existing industrial
economics literature on cartels in three chapters. Specifically, this thesis challenges
two standard assumptions that are made in much of the existing literature on cartels.
Firstly, in Chapters One and Two, the standard assumption that all firms in an
industry have to be part of the cartel is confronted. Secondly, in Chapter Three, the
assumption that the number of firms in a collusive industry is fixed is challenged.
In particular, Chapter One analyses the relationship between horizontal product
differentiation and the stability of costly collusion. Whilst there exists a wide range
of academic research on this topic, a typical assumption inherent in the existing
literature is that all firms inside the industry are part of the cartel. In parallel to this,
there are also a series of models that predict that cartels can consist of less than all
firms in the industry. However, none of the existing models explicitly analyse how the
1ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/overview, last access on 07.09.2017
2Speech given at the IBA 18th Annual Competition Conference, text available under http:
//europa.eu/rapid/press-release SPEECH-14-608 en.htm, last access on 07.09.2017
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stability of collusion is affected by the degree of product differentiation, or how costs
of collusion may affect cartel stability. The model presented in Chapter One is the
first to combine the analysis of product differentiation and cartel stability alongside
the assumptions that cartels can consist of less than all firms in the industry and
that collusion may be costly.
In doing so, the model contributes to the existing literature in three specific
ways. Firstly, through a comparison of how the stability of differently sized cartels
depends on the degree of horizontal product differentiation when there are no costs
of collusion, it finds that those cartels which encompass all firms in the industry
tend to become less stable when products become more homogeneous, while for
cartels that contain less than all firms in an industry (small cartels), the opposite
is true. At the same time, it is shown that small cartels are more stable than
their larger counterparts. Secondly, the model demonstrates how fixed costs of
collusion can affect cartel stability when the number of firms inside the cartel is
given exogenously. It is found that the result that small cartels are more stable
than large ones is not upheld when costs are taken into account, but that collusive
stability has to be compared on a case-by-case basis. Finally, the model illustrates
how the stability of cartels depends on fixed costs of collusion when the number of
firms in a cartel is determined endogenously. It is shown that when endogenous size
processes are taken into account, in some cases it is possible for an increase in the
costs of collusion to make a cartel more stable. Overall, the results in Chapter One
demonstrate that decisions about collusive agreements can depend heavily on the
number of firms involved and on the costs imposed on upholding collusion.
The findings from Chapter One motivate Chapter Two, which presents a struc-
tured comparison of how different penalty regimes affect the overall prices charged
in a collusive industry. Three penalty regimes are considered. Those are, penalties
based on overcharges, profits, and revenues. It is shown that penalties imposed by
CAs affect the price setting of cartels in two ways: directly, by changing the price
set by a cartel of a given size, and indirectly, by affecting the incentives to form
a cartel and thereby changing the cartel size and with it, its market power and
ability to raise prices. Both effects have been identified and studied in the previous
literature. ? compare the same penalty regimes under the implicit assumption that
all firms have to be part of the cartel. Their results characterize the direct effects,
but do not include a discussion of possible indirect effects. The indirect effect has
5
1 INTRODUCTION 6
been identified and compared to a direct effect by ?. Their model discusses profits
based penalties only, and thus a comparison of the relative effects of different penalty
regimes is not undertaken. As a result, the model presented in Chapter Two is the
first to compare the direct and indirect effect for different penalty regimes. In a
repeated Bertrand competition model over true substitutes, it finds that the overall
price effect of penalties based on profits is weakly negative, while overcharge based
penalties always decrease the overall price compared to no penalties. Additionally,
it is shown that the price effect of revenue based penalties is ambiguous. When
comparing penalties on the basis that they all deter cartels over the same group
of products, the model predicts that overcharge based penalties always lead to the
lowest average price, followed by profits and revenue based penalties.
Whilst Chapters One and Two discuss how the number of firms inside a cartel
may vary, it is assumed that the number of firms in a given industry is fixed. This
is a typical assumption in traditional collusive models. Those models considering
dynamic processes in a collusive framework commonly argue that any entry into a
collusive industry would break up collusion (compare for example ? ) or that entry
will not occur due to incumbent cartelists playing entry deterring strategies (e.g. ?).
Nevertheless, many industries in the real world are characterized by dynamic pro-
cesses of entry, exit, and merger, which can lead to the number of firms participating
in the cartel changing. This is what motivates Chapter Three. It contributes to the
current literature by providing a framework to analyse how dynamic forces of entry,
exit and merger may influence collusive stability. In contrast to previous literature,
it is found that stable cartels can form in markets with free entry and these cartels
can earn strictly positive profits without playing entry-deterring strategies. Addi-
tionally, the model mimics an empirical observation that the breakdown of collusive
agreements can be followed by increased merger activity and that mergers increase
the risk of an industry turning collusive. Finally, the model predicts a new notion
of a long run stability point under merger and entry in which firms earn positive
profits.
Overall, the three chapters presented in this PhD thesis contribute to the re-
search on cartels by helping to gain a deeper understanding of how endogenous size
processes affect the stability and price setting of cartels. In the first two chapters
it is shown that the number of firms inside a cartel is an important factor to con-
sider when deriving results about collusive stability or the prices charged by cartels.
6
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Chapter Three then shows that collusion, entry, exit, and mergers are not distinct
phenomena but that these dynamic processes can occur in the same industry and
lead it towards a sustainable long run stability point.
7
Cartel Size, Costs of Collusion, and the Stability
of Collusive Agreements with Differentiated
Products
Jonas Kalb1
PhD Thesis: Chapter 1
Abstract
A standard assumption in the analysis of how collusive stability depends on the level
of product differentiation, or on costs associated with collusion, is that all firms in
an industry are inside the cartel. However, there is both empirical and theoretical
evidence that cartels consisting of less than all firms in the industry can form. This
is the first paper to research how the stability of these small cartels depends on
both the level of product differentiation and costs of collusion. Three main results
are identified. Firstly, small cartels tend to become more stable when products are
more homogeneous, whilst cartels encompassing all firms in the industry tend to
become less stable. Secondly, although small cartels are more stable compared to
large cartels when costs are not considered, there is no clear ranking of collusive
stability when positive costs are introduced. The relative stability of a cartel then
needs to be compared on a case by case basis. Finally, when the number of firms
inside a cartel is determined endogenously, higher costs of collusion can make cartels
more stable.
1University of St Andrews, School of Economics and Finance, St Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AR,
United Kingdom, Email: jk99@st-andrews.ac.uk
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1 Introduction
The detection and prosecution of illegal price fixing conspiracies remains an impor-
tant topic for competition authorities (CAs). This is reflected in multiple statements
by top officials from agencies such as the European Commission (EC). For example,
Joaquin Almuni, at the time Vice President of the EC responsible for Competition
Policy, said in a speech on September 19th 2014 that cartels were his ”top enforce-
ment priority”, and furthermore that ”they have been a priority for the European
Commission since the late 90’s(...)”.2 In order to effectively enforce cartel law, it is
vital to gain a deeper understanding of the circumstances required for the formation
of collusive agreements. Only then can CA activity be concentrated towards those
industries which are most prone to collusion. In order to evaluate what market
environments facilitate collusion, the underlying economic forces determining when
a cartel is stable have to be identified first.
The standard economic approach to determining if collusive agreements can be
sustained follows that of a Prisoner’s Dilemma. That means that while coordinated
conduct would increase the firms’ total profits, each cartel member has an incentive
to deviate from the agreed strategy and gain additional profits. Therefore, firms al-
ways have an incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement in a one shot game.
Under the assumption that all firms anticipate the deviation, this means that collu-
sion is not an equilibrium strategy and therefore firms would compete against each
other. However, it follows from Friedman (1971) that playing coordination strate-
gies in Prisoner’s Dilemma style games can be a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium,
when interaction is infinitely repeated, the players use grim trigger strategies against
defectors, and they value future profits sufficiently high.3,4 When applied to cartels,
this holds when the long term profits of being a cartel member outweigh the short
term gains of deviating from the collusive agreement and earning low competitive
profits in the future. A standard result is that this condition holds when the cartel
firms’ discount factor is above some critical value. Any factor increasing the gains
2Speech given at the IBA 18th Annual Competition Conference, text available under http:
//europa.eu/rapid/press-release SPEECH-14-608 en.htm, last access on 07.09.2017
3That is, firms play coordination strategies in the initial period and then continue doing so if
all other firms played coordination strategies in all past periods. If at any point one firm deviates
from playing these strategies, all firms in the cartel revert to playing competition strategies, and
the market returns to a competitive equilibrium.
4Additional to infinitely repeated games, collusion has been shown to be sustainable under finite
horizons, e.g. Benoit and Krishna (1987) or Harrington (1987). Similarly, punishment strategies
other than the grim trigger have been shown to support collusive equilibria, e.g. Porter (1983).
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from collusion relative to the competitive equilibrium decrease this critical value,
and thereby make collusion more stable, ceteris paribus. Contrary to this, any fac-
tor increasing the expected overall profits from deviating also increase the critical
value for the discount factor, which means that cartels become less stable, ceteris
paribus. It is possible to analyse different dimensions of market characteristics, with
respect to the degree in which they influence the profits of staying in the cartel, rel-
ative to the gains from deviating. Two such market characteristics are the degree of
product differentiation, and the level of costs associated with being inside a cartel.
Regarding the degree of product differentiation, CAs mostly expect product ho-
mogeneity to increase collusive stability. For example, in their 2010 Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, the Department of Justice outlines that “coordinated conduct”
is more likely “if products in the relevant market are relatively homogeneous”, (DOJ-
FTC (2010), paragraph 7.2). While there is some empirical evidence linking product
homogeneity and collusion (e.g. Levenstein and Suslow (2006)), there are also exam-
ples of cartels forming over goods with very heterogeneous product characteristics,
such as the European Elevator Cartel.5 Similarly, there is theoretical evidence sup-
porting the two opposing views that that collusion is more likely when products are
more homogeneous and that it is more likely when products are more differentiated.
For example, Raith (1996) argues that the ability of firms to monitor competitor
behaviour is incomplete, but that the correlation between own output and competi-
tor prices is higher when products are closer substitutes. Therefore, defection from
the collusive agreement is more likely to be detected and punished when products
are homogeneous. Thus, defection is less attractive and collusion more stable when
products are more homogeneous.6 On the other hand, in a quadratic utility model,
Deneckere (1983) and Ross (1992) find that collusion is most stable when goods are
either highly differentiated or very close substitutes. At the same time, Ross (1992)
and Chang (1991) show in spatial models that cartels can be more stable when prod-
ucts are more differentiated. All of the aforementioned theoretical models consider
duopoly settings only. In this way, they are somewhat limited in that they don’t
allow for the formation of cartels which don’t include all firms in the industry.
However, empirical and theoretical evidence suggests that cartels can consist of
less than all firms in the industry. For example, d’Aspremont et al. (1983) shows
5EC press release, IP/07/209, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-07-209 en.htm?locale=
en, last accessed 08.09.2017.
6A similar argument is brought forward byPorter (1983).
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that in a price leadership model, small cartels can form which are stable in the sense
that no firm has an incentive to leave the cartel and no firm has an incentive to
join it. Hirth (1999) and Posada (2001) apply the same stability definitions to a
differentiated goods markets and show that some stable cartels can form for different
levels of product differentiation. Whilst the authors show that these cartels can be
smaller than the entire industry, they don’t analyse collusive stability. In a similar
model, Posada (2000) provides the first analysis of how the stability of cartels, with
different exogenously given sizes, varies. He finds that small cartels are more stable
than larger ones, although they earn lower profits. The question of how the stability
of differently sized cartels is affected by product differentiation is not considered.
Additionally, none of the papers mentioned take into account that collusion can be
costly for cartel members.
These costs of collusion represent a second market characteristic which has to
be considered. Thomadsen and Rhee (2007) discuss that cartel agreements can be
associated with organisational and potential legal costs. They argue that the set-
ting up and running of a cartel requires resources. Similarly, collusion is illegal
and therefore members of a cartel are at risk of having to pay penalties if detected
and prosecuted. Assuming that firms are rational profit maximisers implies that
they should take both legal and organisational costs of collusion into account when
considering whether or not to form a cartel. The authors impose fixed costs of collu-
sion on cartels forming in differentiated goods markets. Their findings are twofold.
Firstly, higher costs of collusion decrease cartel stability. Secondly, when costs of col-
lusion are sufficiently high, more product homogeneity always makes cartels more
stable. Similarly, the results of Katsoulacos et al. (2015) in homogeneous goods
markets imply that when expected penalties increase, the stability of collusion de-
creases. Once again, both papers consider only cartels which include all firms in the
industry. However, Bos and Harrington (2015) find that when cartel size is endo-
genised, costs of collusion can alter the incentives of forming a collusive agreement
and thereby change the cartel size. This implies that collusive stability is affected
via two channels when costs are imposed. Firstly, the direct costs of collusion affect
the profitability of collusion relative to competition. Secondly, changes in cartel size
affects both profitability of collusion and the gains from deviating. No literature has
yet analysed how these effects influence collusive stability.
The identified gaps in the literature are what motivates the research presented
12
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here. In summary, the contributions of this paper to the existing literature are
threefold. Firstly, it is the first paper to analyse how the stability of differently
sized cartels changes with respect to the degree of product differentiation. Secondly,
it shows how the stability of cartels is affected when collusion is costly, given that
cartels can be of different, exogenously given, sizes. Finally, it shows how collusive
stability is affected by costs when it is taken into account that the number of firms
inside a cartel is determined endogenously.
Three main results are identified. Firstly, small cartels are likely to become more
stable as products become more homogeneous, while fully cartelised markets tend
to become less stable as products become more homogeneous. Secondly, the result
that small cartels are more stable than large cartels does not hold when costs are
considered. In fact, the relative stability depends heavily on the degree of product
differentiation and the number of firms in the industry. Therefore, there is no clear
ordering of cartel sizes and collusive stability. Finally, when the size of the cartel is
endogenously defined, there are special cases in which introducing costs of collusion
can make cartels more stable.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.1 sets out the general model
assumptions and derives results for exogenously given cartel sizes when costs are
not considered. Section 2.2 then introduces costs into the exogenous cartel size
model and analyses their effects on collusive stability. Section 2.3 endogenises the
number of firms in a cartel and considers the effect that costs of collusion have on
the resulting cartels. Finally, Section 3 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 No Cost, Exogenous Cartel Size
Consider a representative consumer who solves
max
q1,...,qn
u(q1, ..., qn)−
n∑
i=1
piqi, (1)
where ∑ni=1 piqi is the total spending on the bundle of goods (q1, ..., qn) at prices
(p1, ...,pn) and u(q1, ..., qn) is the utility derived from consuming this bundle. The
13
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functional form of the utility is given by
u(q1, ..., qn) =
n∑
i=1
qi− 12
( n∑
i=1
q2i + 2γ
n∑
i 6=j
qiqj) (2)
where γ ∈ (0,1) measures the degree of product substitutability, which can also be
interpreted as the degree of product homogeneity. Larger values of γ correlate with a
higher degree of substitutability or homogeneity. For γ→ 0 goods become perfectly
independent, for γ→ 1 they become perfect substitutes.7
Setting the first order partial derivative of (1) with respect to qi equal to zero
and rearranging slightly results in
qi = 1−pi−γ
∑
i6=j
qj . (3)
Summing this over all firms leads to
n∑
i=1
qi = n−
n∑
i=1
pi−γ(n−1)
n∑
i=1
qi, (4)
After some rearranging and using that from the first order condition it also follows
that ∑j 6=i qj = 1−pi−qiγ , the demand for good i is follows as8
qi(pi,pj 6=i,γ,n) =
(1−γ) +γ∑j 6=i pj− [1 +γ(n−2)]pi
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
) . (5)
This demand function has the properties that demand for good i is decreasing in
its own price pi, but increasing in any competitors price pj , j 6= i. Thus, all goods
j 6= i are substitutes for good i. Furthermore, the own price reaction is stronger than
the combination of competitor price reactions. This means that if all firms were to
increase their price by the same amount, the demand for each good would decrease.
Analytically,
i)
∂qi
∂pi
< 0 ii) ∂qi
∂pj
> 0 iii) |∂qi
∂pi
|>∑
j 6=i
∂qi
∂pj
. (6)
7Both cases are excluded from the analysis as they don’t provide an interesting enough frame-
work for collusive stability. When γ = 0 prices are independent so collusion, as defined in this
paper, is not attractive to firms. When γ = 1, the price setting game becomes the homogeneous
goods Bertrand case. The results close to this corner solution converge to the correct outcomes,
but technically the demand function would need to be redefined. The resulting need for additional
notation and case differentiation doesn’t add to the analysis but increases complexity.
8Step by step derivation of demand function in Section 4
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Assume now that each good is produced by one of n symmetrical firms, who
produce at zero cost and compete in prices. When the firms compete against each
other without coordinating on prices, any firm’s maximisation problem is given by
max
{pi}
pi∗i (pi) = max{pi}
piqi = max{pi}
pi
(1−γ) +γ∑j 6=i pj− [1 +γ(n−2)]pi
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
) . (7)
Solving the first order condition leads to the best price for firm i as a function of
the price vector of competitor prices p−i
pRi =
(1−γ) +γ∑j 6=i pj
2
(
1 +γ(n−2)
) . (8)
As all firms are symmetrical, they all face the same reaction function pRi . Therefore,
pi = pj = p ∀i, j ∈ [1,n]. Thus, the optimal industry price under competition p∗ is
p∗(γ) = 1−γ2 +γ(n−3) . (9)
Substituting this into the demand function, it follows that the equilibrium quantities
q∗ are
q∗(γ) = 1 +γ(n−2)[1 +γ(n−1)][2 +γ(n−3)] . (10)
Finally, the competitive equilibrium profits are given by
pi∗(γ) =
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
[1 +γ(n−1)][2 +γ(n−3)]2 , (11)
which is a decreasing function of γ.9 This confirms the traditional economic intuition
that firms in price competition oligopoly markets earn less when products are closer
substitutes. That is because consumers are more willing to switch consumption from
one good to the other when prices differ. Therefore, when γ is large, high prices
could not be sustained, because any firm would have an incentive to undercut the
competition.
Assume now that of the n firms, the first k ∈ [2,n] decide to coordinate their
price setting behaviour and agree to set one common price pc(k), which maximises
joint profits. Call these firms the cartel firms and the other firms the fringe firms.
9Proof in Section 4.
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Any cartel firm then takes into account in its maximisation problem that (k− 1)
other firms set the same coordinated price as it does. All other firms are expected
to set individual prices pfi . This means, cartel members solve
max
{pc}
pic(k) = max
{pc}
pcqc
= max
{pc}
pc
((1−γ) +γ∑ni=k+1 pfi − [1 +γ(n−k−1)]pc
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
)
,
(12)
where setting the first derivative equal to zero, and solving for the optimal cartel
price as a function of the fringe firms’ prices lead to
pc,R = (1−γ) +γ
∑n
i=k+1 p
f
i
2
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
) . (13)
This is the cartel’s reaction function to the fringe prices. At the same time, the
maximisation problem for fringe firms hasn’t changed as they still compete against
each other, but also against the cartel. Therefore, a fringe firm’s best response to
all prices in the market is given by
pf,Ri =
(1−γ) +γ∑j 6=i pj
2
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
⇒pf,R = (1−γ) +γkp
c
2 +γ(n+k−3)
(14)
where the second line comes from the fact that all fringe firms are symmetrical and
therefore set the same price pf (k) and all firms i ∈ [1,k] set prices pc. As can be
seen, both the cartel’s and the fringe’s reaction function are increasing in the prices
of the other group respectively. This indicates that the price setting game is one of
strategic complements: if the cartel raises prices, it is the best response of the fringe
to raise prices too and vice versa.
The combination of both reaction functions then gives the equilibrium cartel and
fringe prices
pc(k,γ) =
(1−γ)
(
2 +γ(2n−3)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k , and (15)
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pf (k,γ) =
(1−γ)
(
2 +γ(2n−k−2)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k . (16)
Given this, the cartel and fringe quantities are computed by substituting pc(k) and
pf (k) into the demand function:
qc(k,γ) =
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
)(
2 +γ(2n−3)
)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
) (17)
and
qf (k,γ) =
(
2 +γ(2n−k−2)
)(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
) . (18)
Finally, the equilibrium profits for a given cartel size k are given by
pic(k,γ) =
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
)(
2 +γ(2n−3)
)2
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
)2 (19)
and
pif (k,γ) =
(1−γ)
(
2 +γ(2n−k−2)
)2(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
)2 . (20)
As the fringe only exists when not all firms are inside the cartel, the price, quantity
and profit functions for the fringe are only defined for k ∈ [2,(n−1)]. The compar-
ative statics of the prices and profits regarding the cartel size k have the same sign
for the fringe and the cartel: when there are more firms inside the cartel all firms in
the industry set higher prices and earn higher profits.10 Analytically,
i)
∂pf
∂k
> 0 ii) ∂pi
f
∂k
> 0
iii)
∂pc
∂k
> 0 iv) ∂pi
c
∂k
> 0.
(21)
Intuitively, the reason behind this is that when more firms are inside the cartel,
the competitive pressure in the industry decreases. It also reflects the fact that the
price setting game in this model follows a game of strategic complements. That
10Analytical proof in Section 4.
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means that when one firm increases prices, the best response of all other firms is to
raise prices as well. Therefore, when the cartel forms and raises the price, the best
response for the fringe is to raise prices too. When more firms are part of the price
raising cartel, the overall incentive to increase prices is higher.
With respect to the degree of product homogeneity, numerical simulations sug-
gests that the prices and profits of both cartel and fringe are decreasing as products
become more homogeneous. This holds for all cartel sizes.
Finally, it is possible to show11 that both the cartel and the fringe charge prices
above the competitive level, but that the fringe undercuts the cartel. Therefore, the
ranking of prices is such that
pc(k,γ)> pf (k,γ)> p∗(γ). (22)
This leads to the ranking of profits, which show that the fringe firms earn the highest
profits, followed by the cartel firms which earn above the competitive level12:
pif (k,γ)> pic(k,γ)> pi∗(γ). (23)
Thus, for any given cartel size and degree of product homogeneity, firms prefer to be
part of the fringe over being inside the cartel. However, at the same time, each firm
in the market profits from the existence of a cartel. This relationship will become
important again at a later point, when the cartel size is endogenised. For now, as
the cartel size is exogenously given, the focus lays on the fact that pic(k,γ)> pi∗(γ)
and that therefore firms profit from being a member of the cartel, compared to the
competitive outcome.
Given that collusion is illegal in most jurisdictions, it is a common assumption
that firms are not able to set up binding collusive contracts. This implies that
every firm, which agreed to be part of a cartel, can at any point in time begin
setting prices which maximise own profits, without notifying the other members.
The optimal price such a deviator would set follows from maximising profits given
that all other (k−1) cartel members still set collusive prices pc(k,γ) and all (n−k)
fringe firms set prices pf (k). To begin with the analysis of the deviator price setting,
consider in a first step those cases in which negativity constraints on the quantity of
11Proof in Section 4
12Proof in Section 4
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other firms in the market are not relevant. The price derived for these cases is called
pdu. In a second step, the cases in which negativity constraints become relevant will
be analysed. The price derived for these cases is pdc .
To find the optimal price pdu, a deviating firm solves
max
{pdu}
pid(k) = max
{pdu}
pduq
d
= max
{pdu}
pdu
((1−γ) +γ(n−k)pf (k) +γ(k−1)pc(k)− [1 +γ(n−2)]pdu
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
)
,
(24)
where the first order condition leads directly to
pdu(k,γ) =
(1−γ) +γ(n−k)pf (k) +γ(k−1)pc(k)
2[1 +γ(n−2)] . (25)
Combining this with the functional forms of pc(k) and pf (k) it follows that
pdu(k,γ) =
(1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−k−3)][2 +γ(2n−3)]
2[1 +γ(n−2)]
[
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
] , or
= pf (k,γ)− γ
2(1−γ)(k−1)
2[1 +γ(n−2)]
[
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
] ,
(26)
where the second line is only defined for k < n, i.e. for those cases when the fringe
price is defined. This shows that a deviating firm undercuts both cartel and fringe
firms. A direct implication of this is that some consumers will substitute away
from goods produced by the cartel or the fringe and towards those produced by the
deviator. In principle this may also mean that a cartel is left with zero demand in
the defecting period. It can be shown that this is only the case when n= k and when
γ is high.13 In these cases, the cartel sets high prices relative to the competitive
level, leaving the deviating firm a wider range for undercutting its price. At the same
time, when goods are more homogeneous, consumers are more willing to substitute
away from cartel goods and towards deviator goods.
In the next step, the cases with relevant non-negativity constraints, in which
firms set the price pdc , is considered. In these cases, a deviating firm expects to cater
for the entire market demand. As mentioned before, the other firm’s demand given
13Proof in Appendix
19
2 MODEL 20
deviation can only become zero when n = k. Thus, pdc follows from the maximum
price a deviator can set given that the cartel is left with zero demand. It follows
from the cartel’s demand function given that n= k and one firm has defected,
qc(pd) =
1
2 −γ(1−pd)
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)] . (27)
Setting this equal to zero and solving for the deviator price pdc gives
pdc(γ) = 1−
1
2γ . (28)
For any price below this, the cartel quantity becomes negative which is unfeasible.
From this, it follows that in the case of n= k the deviator price is described by the
function pd(n,γ) = max[pdu(n,γ),pdc(γ)], where pdc is as defined above and pdu(n) is
given by
pdu(n,γ) =
2 +γ(n−3)
4[1 +γ(n−2)] . (29)
Finally, the degree of product homogeneity γc above which pdu ≤ pdc is given by
γc =
n−3
3n−5 +
√√√√ n2−1
(3n−5)2 ∈ [
2
3 ,0.732] ∀n≥ 2. (30)
This leads to the overall definition of the deviator pricing function as
pd(k,γ) =

1− 12γ when k = n and γ ≥ γc
(1−γ)[2+γ(2n−k−3)][2+γ(2n−3)]
2[1+γ(n−2)]
[
2[1+γ(n−k−1)][2+γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
] otherwise.
(31)
The resulting deviator profits follow from substituting the relevant prices into the
profit function as
pid(k,γ) =

2γ−1
4γ2 when k = n and γ ≥ γc
(1−γ)
[
[2+γ(2n−k−3)][2+γ(2n−3)]
]2
4[1+γ(n−2)][1+γ(n−1)]
[
2[1+γ(n−k−1)][2+γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
]2 otherwise.
(32)
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It is then straightforward to show that the deviator profits exceed the cartel
profits,14 which brings up a standard result of collusive behaviour: in a one shot
game collusion can’t be sustained because every firm in the cartel has an incentive to
deviate from the collusive agreement. Therefore, collusion is not a Nash Equilibrium
in a one shot game. However, as discussed in the introduction, it has been estab-
lished that playing collusive strategies can be sustained as a Nash Equilibrium when
interaction between firms is repeated, firms value future profits high enough and
the cartel plays a grim trigger strategy against defectors.15 A grim trigger strategy
means that firms set the collusive price in the initial period and then continue doing
so if all other firms played collusive strategies in all past periods. If at any point a
firm deviates, firms revert to setting competitive prices forever from the next period
on.
Under these assumptions, collusion can be sustained if the present value of stay-
ing inside the cartel exceeds the one time profits of deviating, followed by earning
competitive profits for all future periods. Assume that one unit of money received
in the next period is worth δ ∈ (0,1) in this period. Thus, a cartel is called stable if
n∑
t=0
pic(k,γ)δt ≥ pid(k,γ) +
n∑
t=1
pi∗(γ)δt, which simplifies to
pic(k,γ)
1− δ ≥ pi
d(k,γ) + δpi
∗(γ)
1− δ .
(33)
This can be rewritten to
δ ≥ pi
d(k,γ)−pic(k,γ)
pid(k,γ)−pi∗(γ) := δ
∗
0(k,γ), (34)
where δ∗0(k,γ) is the critical discount factor above which setting collusive prices is
a Nash Equilibrium. From this it follows that cartel stability is inversely related to
the value of the critical discount factor. High δ∗0(k,γ) make it less likely that any
given value of δ is above it, while low values of δ∗0(k,γ) make it more likely that
δ ≥ δ∗0(k,γ).
At the same time, for any δ ∈ (0,1) to exist which fulfils δ ≥ δ∗0(k,γ), it has to
14Proof in Appendix
15Compare for example Friedman (1971)
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Figure 1: The graphs plot the critical discount factors as a function of the degree of
product homogeneity for varying cartel sizes.
be that δ∗0(k,γ)< 1. This implies that collusive stability requires
pic(k,γ)> pi∗(γ). (35)
Thus, only cartels which are profitable relative to the competitive outcome can
form for some discount factor δ. For the demand structure defined in this model,
pic(k,γ) > pi∗(γ) has been established as a result. Therefore, it follows directly
that there is some δ ∈ (0,1) for any tuple (k,γ) such that a stable cartel can form.
However, the likelihood that the firms’ δ is high enough to fulfil δ≥ δ∗0(k,γ) is higher
when δ∗0(k,γ) is lower. This is important because it means that it is possible to take
any two cartels, characterised by their size and degree of product homogeneity, and
rank them according to the likelihood that they can be sustained for a given discount
factor.
To do so, the following is defined: consider two tuples (k1,γ1) and (k2,γ2). If
γ∗0(k1,γ1)< γ∗0(k2,γ2) then collusion is more stable for the tuple (k1,γ1) than for the
tuple (k2,γ2).
It is then possible to evaluate the stability of cartels by determining the level of
the critical discount factor for different cartel sizes or levels of product homogene-
ity. To begin with, collusive stability for different cartel sizes is considered. The
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derivative of δ∗0(k,γ) with respect to k is given by
∂δ∗0
∂k
= A
B
[
4[n+k(k−2)]
+ 2γ[(n−2)[3n+ 3k(k−2)] +k(k2−3k+ 3)−1]
+γ2(n−2)[2n(n−2) + (k−2)[(k−3) +n] + 1]−γ2(n2−3)
]
> 0
(36)
where A and B are both positive functions16 of γ, n and k. Each of the components
of the derivative is positive ∀n≥ 2, k ∈ [2,n] and γ(0,1). Thus, collusion is harder to
sustain for larger cartels. This might seem surprising, given that these cartels have
more market power, are able to set higher prices, and earn higher profits. However,
an increased price also implies that any firm considering to deviate has a wider range
of prices to chose from when undercutting the cartel price. In fact, the difference
between the cartel price and the deviator price is increasing in k:17
∂[pc−pdu]
∂k
=
γ(1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−3)]
[
4 + 6γ(n−2) +γ2[2(n−2)2 + (k−1)2− (n−1)]
]
2[1 +γ(n−2)]
[
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
]2 > 0.
(39)
As a result, more consumers switch from buying cartel products to buying deviator
products when k is high. This increases deviating profits relative to cartel profits.
Hence, the overall attractiveness of adhering to the collusive agreement decreases,
rendering the cartel less stable.
Next, the degree of product homogeneity and how it affects δ∗0 is considered.
Fig. 1 plots the critical discount factor as a function of γ for n = 3, n = 5, and
16
A= 4γ[2 +γ(n−3)]2[1 +γ(n−2)][2 +γ(2n−3)]2 > 0 (37)
and
B =
[
16γ[k2 +k(12−7n)−32(k−1) + 6(n−2)]
+ 4γ2[107 +k3−108n+ 26n2 +k2(−23 + 10n) +k(−105 + 128n−36n2)]
+ 4γ3[−105 + 2k3(−2 +n) + 161n−78n2 + 12n3 +k2(44−38n+ 8n2) +k(98−191n+ 111n2−20n3)]
+γ4[4k3(−2 +n)2 + 4k2(−2 +n)2(−7 + 2n) + (−3 +n)2(17−24n+ 8n2)
+γ(370n−129−337n2 + 124n3−16n4)]
]2
> 0
(38)
17The derivative uses the unconstrained price pdu because the constraint price pdc is only defined
for the point n= k. Hence, the derivative of pdc with respect to k is not defined.
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n= 10 exemplarily for varying cartel sizes k. The graphs also show the approximate
supremum and infimum of the critical discount factor for each of these industry
sizes. Three observations stand out. Firstly, when k < n, more homogeneous goods
make collusion easier to sustain. In these cases, any cartel that forms has to take
into account in their price setting that the fringe firms set a lower price than the
cartel to attract more customers. When γ is large and therefore consumers are
very willing to substitute goods for another, a high cartel price could then allow
the fringe firms to gain all market demand because it could undercut the cartel by
more. Taking this into account, any cartel consisting of k < n members will only
increase prices by a small amount compared to competition. The fringe firms then
price below this already relatively low price. For a deviating firm which undercuts
the fringe price, this implies that the gains from deviating are very low because the
price is low. Therefore, more homogeneity decreases the incentive to cheat on the
collusive agreement.
Secondly, consider the case when k = n. In these case, an increase in γ almost
always decreases the stability of collusion. Similarly to the explanation above, this is
due to the gains a potential deviator can earn. When k = n, there is no competitive
pressure on the cartel and therefore it sets the high monopoly price of pc(n) = 1/2.
At the same time, a deviating firm earns more additional demand by undercutting
the cartel when consumers are more willing to substitute away from more expensive
products, i.e. when γ is large. This means that the deviator profits increase relative
to the cartel profits, making it more attractive to deviate. Thus, collusion becomes
less stable. The special case to this argument is when the number of firms in the
industry is very small, which is reflected in the graph for n = 3. In this case, the
critical discount factor is increasing in γ up to some maximum value and then it
decreases slightly again. For these very small markets, the gains of being inside
a cartel are very large compared to the competitive outcome, especially when γ is
high. Therefore, the cartel’s ability to punish deviation by returning to collusion is
high, which increases the incentive to stay inside the cartel.
Finally, the difference between the infimum and the supremum of the discount
factors is increasing in n. Economically, this means that the difference between the
most stable and the least stable cartel, characterised by some (k,γ), is increasing in
the number of firms in the industry. This has two reasons. Firstly, the infimum is
always a point on the γ∗(2) function, as the critical discount factor is increasing in k.
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This implies that k <n as long as n≥ 3 and therefore that a fringe exists. Thus, when
more firms are in the industry, the number of firms that the cartel competes against
increases as well, making it difficult for the cartel to increase prices. As a result,
both the cartel and the fringe firms set prices close to the competitive equilibrium,
making deviation highly unprofitable. Secondly, the supremum is always a point on
γ∗0(n) and will typically be set in a region of relatively homogeneous goods. For any
increase in n, the cartel profits relative to the deviator profits decrease, rendering
collusion less stable.
Overall, this section has discussed the stability of collusive agreements in differ-
entiated goods market for differently sized cartels. In doing so, δ∗0(k,γ) has been
identified as an inverse measure of collusive stability. This means that small values
of δ∗0(k,γ) are associated with relatively stable cartels, while large values of δ∗0(k,γ)
are associated with a relatively low cartel stability. It was found for a given industry
size that, while small cartels become more stable as products become more homoge-
neous, the stability of large cartels decreases. In the next section, costs of collusion
are introduced into the model.
2.2 Costs Included, Exogenous Cartel Size
It is now assumed that being part of a cartel is associated with some periodically
reoccurring fixed costs C > 0. Adding these costs to the model allows for the pos-
sibility that forming a cartel may involve additional organisational or jurisdictional
costs, which is likely in the real world. For example, firms need to monitor the
behaviour of their co-conspirators, produce reports, hold secretive meetings and risk
being fined for colluding. While these costs are not relevant for firms competing
against each other, they are relevant for both firms inside the cartel and devia-
tors.18 The resulting cartel and deviator profits are denoted by picc(k,γ) and pidc (k,γ)
18It is assumed here that a deviating firm cannot forgo the costs of collusion. That is because
deviating from the collusive agreement results in the highest pay-off when no other firms inside the
cartel anticipate deviation. Terminating visible efforts into the running of the cartel may spark
suspicion about a possible deviation and thus render it unprofitable. As a result, it is expected that
any firm aiming to deviate will continue to partake in organisational activities for the cartel and
incur the resulting costs. Similarly, being prosecuted and fined for being part of a cartel continues
to be a risk in a deviation period.
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respectively. They follows as
picc(k,γ) = pic(k,γ)−C
=
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
)(
2 +γ(2n−3)
)2
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
)2 −C,
(40)
and
pidc (k,γ) = pid(k,γ)−C
=

2γ−1
4γ2 −C when k = n and γ ≥ γc
(1−γ)
[
[2+γ(2n−k−3)][2+γ(2n−3)]
]2
4[1+γ(n−2)][1+γ(n−1)]
[
2[1+γ(n−k−1)][2+γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
]2 −C otherwise.
(41)
Thus, a deviating firm continues to earn profits above those they can earn in a cartel:
pidc (k,γ)−picc(k,γ) = pid(k,γ)−pic(k,γ) > 0. The fringe profits and the competitive
profits are the same as defined in the previous section.
Applying these profits to the cartel stability condition defined in (34) leads to
the critical discount factor δ∗c (k,γ) above which costly collusion can be sustained.
It is given by
δ∗c (k,γ) =
pidc (k,γ)−picc(k,γ)
pidc (k,γ)−pi∗(γ)
= pi
d(k,γ)−pic(k,γ)
pid(k,γ)−C−pi∗(γ) (42)
A cartel can then be called stable when
δ ≥ δ∗c (k,γ). (43)
Similarly to before, and higher value of δ∗c (k,γ) corresponds with lower cartel
stability, while lower values imply more stable cartels. Three results immediately
follow. Firstly, given an exogenous cartel size k, collusion is harder to sustain when
collusion is more costly. This is a direct implication of
∂δ∗c (k,γ)
∂C
= pi
d(k,γ)−pic(k,γ)
[pid(k,γ)−C−pi∗(γ)]2 > 0. (44)
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Figure 2: The graphs plot the critical discount factors as a function of the degree of
product homogeneity for varying cartel sizes and different cost levels.
This also implies that δ∗c (k,γ)>δ∗0(k,γ) ∀ C > 0. Intuitively, the result is clear: costs
of collusion don’t influence the gains of defecting relative to the cartel profits. At
the same time, they make collusion less profitable compared to competition. Thus,
the cartel’s ability to punish defectors by returning to the competitive equilibrium
is decreased. As a result, defection becomes more attractive.
Secondly, as cartel stability requires δ ≥ δ∗c (k,γ) and δ ∈ (0,1), it must be that
δ∗c (k,γ)< 1. This implies that when costs are sufficiently high, some cartel sizes are
not stable any more. Specifically, collusion can only be sustained for some cartel
size k when the costs C are such that
δ∗c (k,γ)< 1
⇐⇒ C < pic(k,γ)−pi∗(γ),
(45)
i.e. when the costs of collusion are smaller than the gains of collusion relative to
competition. If this inequality wasn’t fulfilled, firms would be better off reverting
to the competitive equilibrium instead of colluding.
Thirdly, the result that cartels need to be profitable compared to competition
is combined with the result that larger cartels earn higher profits: for any given
discount factor and level of costs, it is more likely that a large cartel is stable than
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that a small cartel is stable. Analytically, that follows from the comparative statics
of the inequality in (45) in which the right hand side is increasing in k, while the
left hand side is constant. This means that larger cartels are more likely to earn
profits which make up for the costs of collusion. Fig. 2 gives a graphic example
of this. It plots the critical discount factor as a function of γ for three different
market sizes (n= 3,n= 5, and n= 10) and varying levels of costs of collusion. It can
be seen that when costs are included, there are ranges of γ for which the discount
factor is not within the defined range of γ ∈ (0,1) any more. In all of these cases,
δ∗c ≥ 1 and therefore, collusion is not sustainable. As an example, consider the case
of n = 3 and C = 0.008. One can see that the critical discount factor for the cartel
size k = n = 3 is not in the graph for small γ. Furthermore, a cartel with k = 2
members is only stable for a small range of relatively homogeneous, but not very
homogeneous products.
However, this result only describes the general possibility of a cartel emerging for
a given level of costs and does not have a direct carry over on the level of stability.
To make inferences about the level of stability, the values of the critical discount
factor need to be compared. For the same example, i.e. n= 3, C = 0.008, and k = 2
or k = 3, one can see that given a cartel forms, the larger cartel is always more
stable than the smaller one. This is not a general result, though. For example,
when n= 5 and C = 0.005, it can be seen that for very small γ, no cartel is stable.
As γ increases, the first cartel to become stable is the one consisting of all firms
in the market. For slightly larger γ, k = 4 also becomes stable. There is then a
range of γ for which δ∗c (5) < δ∗c (4) and therefore the larger cartel is more stable.
At some point the two critical discount factors cross and the smaller of the two
cartels becomes more stable. For very large γ, this is reversed again. Additionally,
there is some mid range of γ for which k = 3 is also stable, but less stable than the
other two cartel sizes. This observation stresses that the relative stability of large
and small cartels cannot be generalised, but that it depends on the individual case.
That is because a fixed level of costs of collusion decrease a small cartel’s profits
by a higher percentage, compared to a larger cartel. At the same time, it doesn’t
influence the one shot gains of deviation compared to collusion. This means that the
critical discount factor of small cartels increases quicker in the level of costs than
that of large cartels. Therefore, smaller cartels become less stable quicker when
costs increase. In some cases this may mean that collusion for smaller cartels is less
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stable than for large cartels. In others it may not.
Furthermore, the relationship between product differentiation and collusive sta-
bility is considered. Without costs, it was seen that, while smaller cartels become
more stable as products become more homogeneous, larger cartels become less sta-
ble. For small cartels, this relationship can’t be replicated in the presence of costs at
all. Instead, one can see that the critical discount factor is a strictly convex function
of the degree of homogeneity which lies above 1 for both very homogeneous and very
differentiated goods. This implies that, when costs are taken into account, small
cartels are the most stable when products are characterized by moderate homogene-
ity, and that both more differentiation and more homogeneity decrease collusive
stability. When cartels consist of all firms in the market and costs are considered,
collusion is not sustainable for very differentiated goods. As γ increases, collusion
first becomes more stable before the critical discount factor increases again. For
further increases in γ the critical discount factor function turns concave. In the
cases displayed, it does not cross unity again as γ converges towards one.
To summarize, including costs into the model has three main effects on collusive
stability. Firstly, collusion is always harder to sustain for a given industry size, which
can imply that some cartels can’t form at all. Secondly, the result that smaller cartels
are generally more stable than larger ones can’t be supported any more. Depending
on the level of costs and the degree of product differentiation, the relative stability
of differently sized cartels has to be analysed on a case by case basis. Finally, the
relationship between product differentiation and collusive stability for small cartels
becomes non-monotonic when costs are considered. It is observed that in most cases,
collusion is most stable for some moderate level of product differentiation, but that
both extreme differentiation and homogeneity make collusion unstable. For cartels
that include the whole market, collusion is the most stable for an intermediate value
of product differentiation and becomes harder to sustain for more similar products.
However, these cartels will also be stable for very differentiated products, given that
the costs of collusion allow for any cartels in the market.
The discussion in this section then implies that when costs are taken into account,
some collusion which would have been stable without costs, is not stable any more.
Furthermore, the relative stability of collusive agreements compared with others
changes when costs are considered. One can then ask the question, if cartels react
to changes in costs either by including or excluding new members and what effect
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this has on the cartel’s stability. This is done in the next section.
2.3 Costs Included, Endogenous Cartel Size
While the number of firms in collusive agreements was exogenously given in the pre-
vious sections, this section explores the effects of costly collusion when the number
of firms inside the cartel is endogenously derived. To do so, cartel stability condi-
tions following the work of d’Aspremont et al. (1983), are defined and applied to the
firms in this model. The authors point out that while all firms would prefer being
part of the fringe over being inside the cartel, larger cartels also imply higher profits
for every firm in the industry. Therefore, for a given distribution of firms into fringe
and cartel firms it could be beneficial for each firm to stay in their assigned roles.
That is because, if a firm left the cartel to earn fringe profits, the number of firms
inside the cartel would decrease which would also decrease the fringe profits that the
leaving firm would earn. Contrary, it could pay off for fringe firms to join the cartel
when an additional member would increase the cartel profits enough. Following this
logic, a cartel size k∗ is called the membership stable size when two conditions are
fulfilled.
Firstly, it is inside stable. This means that no firms should have an incentive to
openly leave the cartel and join the fringe, where openly means that the other firms
are given the chance to reevaluate their price setting. Formally, an inside stable
cartel (ISC) fulfils the condition
pic(k,γ)−C ≥ pif (k−1,γ) ∀k ≥ 3, and (46)
pic(2,γ)−C ≥ pi∗(2,γ) for k = 2, where the differentiation in cases is due to the
fact that when a firm leaves a cartel with 2 members, the cartel dissolves and the
industry returns to competition.
Secondly, a collusive agreement needs to be outside stable. This means that no
fringe firm should have an incentive to join the cartel. Formally, an outside stable
cartel (OSC) fulfils the condition
pif (k,γ)≥ pic(k+ 1,γ)−C ∀k ≤ (n−1), and (47)
for k = n the condition is always fulfilled because there are no firms on the outside
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Figure 3: The graphs plot the critical discount factors as a function of the degree of
product homogeneity for the case of n = 3 and two different costs levels, assuming
that the cartel size is determined endogenously.
which could join the cartel.
While both conditions need to be fulfilled for the membership stable cartel size,
they both serve a different purpose. Inside stability is required for the existence of
stable cartels. That is because if there is no cartel size for which firms want to stay
inside the cartel, all firms would leave collusive agreements and the cartel couldn’t
sustain. Outside stability on the other hand is important to determine the size of
a collusive agreement. To see this in detail, a brief discussion of membership stable
cartel sizes follows.
In this case of zero costs of collusion, it is easy to see that each industry has
some inside stable cartel. This follows directly from the results that pic(2,γ)>pi∗(γ)
and ∂pi
c(k,γ)
∂k > 0. A direct implication of this is that any industry has a membership
stable cartel size when C = 0. That is because, given the smallest inside stable cartel
k = 2, there are two possible outcomes. Either, it doesn’t pay off for a fringe firm
to join the cartel. This would mean the membership stable cartel size is k∗ = 2.
Alternatively, when the cartel is not an OSC, another firm joins, thereby increasing
the cartel size to k = 3. As it was profitable for the firm to join the cartel, it can’t
be profitable to leave it again. Thus, the k = 3 is definitely inside stable. Again,
two outcomes are possible: either another firm joins or the cartel is already outside
stable. This mechanism will repeat until either no firm wants to join, or all firms
are inside the cartel.
Taking costs of collusion into account affects the incentives to both join or leave
the cartel. From (46) it follows that for positive costs, some industries may not
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Figure 4: The graphs plot the critical discount factors as a function of the degree of
product homogeneity for the case of n = 5 and two different costs levels, assuming
that the cartel size is determined endogenously.
have inside stable cartels any more. Therefore, it is possible that no cartel forms.
Furthermore, for higher C it is more likely that a cartel becomes OSC. This follows
directly from the fact that the RHS of (47) is decreasing in C, making the condition
more likely to hold when C is large.
In summary, without costs of collusion, any industry has some membership stable
cartel size. Imposing fixed costs of collusion may mean that in some industries no
cartel can form. In those industries in which a cartel can form, the incentives to
join it are lower. This implies that the membership stable cartel size is likely to be
lower when costs increase.
It is then possible to numerically determine the resulting membership stable
cartel size k∗ for any given market size, degree of product substitutability and level of
costs. Given k∗, one can then determine the condition under which no cartel member
has an incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement by using the critical discount
factor. Similar to the case of exogenous cartel sizes, any cartel with a membership
stable size k∗ is then called stable if
δ ≥ pi
d(k∗,γ)−pic(k∗,γ)
pid(k∗,γ)−C−pi∗(γ) := δ
∗
e(γ), (48)
where the subscript e denotes that the critical discount factor is determined for
endogenously determined membership stable cartel sizes.
To see the effects of endogenising the cartel size and imposing costs on the
stability of collusion, consider two examples. Firstly, Fig. 3 shows the case of
n = 3. For this market size, when costs are equal to zero, the membership stable
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cartel will always consist of all firms in the industry. When C = 0.0005, cartels
over very differentiated goods (γ ≤ 0.0943) cannot be sustained, because they are
not profitable. For γ ∈ (0.0943,0.14073) the membership stable cartel size is k∗ = 2.
This shows that k∗ can decrease when costs are introduced. In this product range,
collusion is harder to sustain than in the no cost case. For γ ∈ [0.1473,1), k∗ = 3 and
the critical discount factor is marginally greater than in the no cost case. Similarly,
when C = 0.005 there are no stable cartels for γ < 0.3282. When γ ∈ [0.3282,1), the
membership stable cartel size is equal to k∗ = 3 and the critical discount factor is
above the one computed under the no cost case. These two examples show cases in
which introducing costs of collusion make collusion harder to sustain. Furthermore,
cartels over some differentiated products can’t be sustained any more.
Secondly, consider the case of n = 5 which is depicted in Fig. 4. When costs
are equal to zero, the membership stable cartel sizes k∗ are such that k∗ = 3
∀γ ∈ (0,0.2188]. When γ ∈ (0.2188,0.47662] the cartel size is k∗ = 4 and when
γ ∈ (0.4766,1) it is k∗ = 5. Introducing a cost level of C = 0.001 leads to no car-
tels being stable for γ ≤ 0.1791. When γ ∈ (0.1791,0.3022), the membership stable
cartel size is k∗ = 3. Comparing this range with the no cost case shows that for
all γ ∈ (0.2188,0.3022) the membership stable cartel size is lower when costs are in-
cluded. Furthermore, the critical discount factor is higher in the no costs industry.
This implies that including costs into the model has made collusion easier to sustain
in this product range. That is because for these cartels, the decrease in size from
4 to 3 has decreased the relative gains of deviating more than the introduction of
costs has decreased the profitability of collusion. When γ increases further and is
in the interval γ ∈ [0.3022,0.4994), the membership stable cartel size with costs is
k∗ = 4 and finally for γ ∈ [0.4994,1), it is k∗ = 5. For these ranges, the inclusion of
costs increases the critical discount factor and therefore makes collusion harder to
sustain, compared to the no costs case.
Overall, this section has provided conditions to determine the membership stable
cartel size. It was then shown for two exemplary market sizes, how cartel stability
changes when costs are introduced into the model. While for the most part, taking
into account that collusion is costly makes collusion harder to sustain, it is possi-
ble that in special cases, costs make collusion easier to sustain. That is because
the incentives to join a cartel are lower when collusion is costly and therefore, the
membership stable cartel size can decrease. This can lower the potential gains of
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deviating more than the profitability of collusion, thereby rendering a cartel more
stable. This contrasts the results defined by Thomadsen and Rhee (2007) and Kat-
soulacos et al. (2015) who find that larger costs of collusion always decrease collusive
stability.
3 Conclusion
This paper has discussed how the stability of collusive agreements depend on two
dimensions: the degree of product differentiation and the costs associated with
forming a cartel. While both dimensions have previously received attention in the
academic literature, a standard assumption within this literature is that all firms
of the industry are inside the cartel. However, empirical and theoretical evidence
suggest that cartels can consist of less than all firms in the industry. Nonetheless,
there is no previous research linking this finding to the question of how collusive
stability depends on product differentiation or on the costs of collusion.
This gap in the literature was addressed in this paper. In a first step, how the
stability of cartels with an exogenously given number of firms depends on the de-
gree of product differentiation was analysed. The stability of small cartels, i.e. those
which consist of less than all firms in the industry, was compared to the stability of
large cartels, i.e. those which encompass all firms in the industry. Two results were
derived. Firstly, small cartels are more stable than large cartels. Secondly, it was
found that large cartels tend to become less stable as products become more homo-
geneous. Contrary to this, small cartels tend to become more stable when products
become more homogeneous. The intuitive reason behind this is that when prod-
ucts are relatively homogeneous, small cartels are forced to set low prices because
they compete against fringe firms. Therefore, deviating from the cartel agreement
doesn’t pay off as it requires undercutting the already low cartel price. Contrary
to this, large cartels set monopoly prices which implies that firms considering to
deviate from the agreed on price can gain high profits.
In a second step, costs of collusion were introduced into the model. It was found
that larger cartels are no longer strictly less stable than small cartels. In fact,
introducing costs means that ranking the stability of cartels with respect to their
size is not possible and that the relative stability of differently sized cartels needs to
be compared on a case by case basis. As such, it can be the case that either smaller
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cartels are more stable than larger ones or vice versa. Furthermore, it was shown
that the introduction of costs renders some cartel sizes unprofitable and that it is
possible that no cartel size can be profitable for some levels of product differentiation.
As unprofitable cartels cannot be sustained, this means that introducing costs into
the model deters some cartels.
Finally, the number of firms inside the cartel was endogenised. A given cartel
size was defined as membership stable when no firm has an incentive to leave or to
join the cartel. It was then shown that when costs are not included in the model,
there is a membership stable cartel size in any industry. Contrary to this, when
costs of collusion were taken into account, there are some industries in which there
is no membership stable cartel size. Furthermore, it was discussed that higher costs
of collusion can decrease the number of firms in a given cartel because larger costs
decrease the incentive to join a collusive agreement. In special cases, this can mean
collusion is rendered more stable when costs are increased. That is because in a
smaller cartel, the incentive to deviate is lower than in larger cartels. When then
the incentives to deviate decrease more than the cartel profits, collusion can become
more stable through an increase in costs.
Overall, this paper is the first to undertake an analysis of how cartel stability
depends on the degree of product differentiation and the level of costs associated
with collusion, given that a cartel can consist of less than all firms in the industry.
While this paper provides a first intuition regarding these questions, further research
into the topic is necessary. Some possible areas for this could be to introduce a more
elaborate notion of the costs associated with collusion. For example, costs could be
linked to the size of collusive agreements, or to the actual expected penalties that
firms operating in regulated markets face. Another possible direction of research
could be the question of how the costs of collusion depend on the degree of product
differentiation.
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4 Appendix Chapter 1: Proofs
4.1 Denominator of cartel and fringe price positive
The denominator is equal to
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
=4 + 2γ(3n−k−5) + 2g2[(n−k−1)(n−3)−k] +γ2(n−k)k
(49)
which is a negatively signed quadratic function of k with a maximum at k =
γ(4−n)−2
2γ < 0 ∀n ≥ 3 and hence is decreasing in k. Therefore, the function will be
at its lowest when k is the highest value possible. For k = (n−1), the denominator
takes the value
4[1 +γ(n−2)]−γ2(n−1)> 0 ∀n≥ 2 and γ ∈ (0,1) (50)
4.2 Functional form of demand function
max
{qi}i=1,2,...,n
n∑
i=1
qi− 12
( n∑
i=1
q2i + 2γ
∑
i 6=j
qiqj) + I
such that I+
n∑
i=1
piqi ≤m.
(51)
Combining budget constraint and utility function, setting the first order partial
derivative with respect to qi equal to zero and rearranging slightly results in
qi = 1−pi−γ
∑
i 6=j
qj . (52)
Summing this over all firms leads to
n∑
i=1
qi = n−
n∑
i=1
pi−γ(n−1)
n∑
i=1
qi, and hence
⇒[1 +γ(n−1)]
n∑
i=1
qi = n−
n∑
i=1
pi.
(53)
Using that ∑ni=1 qi = qi+∑j 6=i qj it follows then that
[1 +γ(n−1)]qi = n−
n∑
i=1
pi− [1 +γ(n−1)]
∑
j 6=i
qj . (54)
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combining this with
∑
j 6=i
qj =
1−pi− qi
γ
. (55)
from the first order condition above, it follows after some rearranging that
qi(pi,pj 6=i,γ,n) =
(1−γ) +γ∑j 6=i pj− [1 +γ(n−2)]pi
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
) . (56)
4.3 Competitive profits decreasing in degree of product homogeneity
The derivative of the price function with respect to δ is given by
∂pi∗
∂γ
=−
(n−1)
[
2 +γ(4n−10) + 2γ2[(n−3)(n−2) + 1]−γ3(n−3)(n−2)
]
[1 +γ(n−1)]2[2 +γ(n−3)]3 , (57)
where of the fraction, the denominator is positive ∀n≥ 2. The numerator is clearly
positive ∀n ≥ 3 because 2 > γ. Therefore, the derivative is negative when n ≥ 3.
When n= 2, the whole expression becomes − 2[1−γ(1−γ)](1−γ)2(2+γ)3 , which is negative because
γ ∈ (0,1). Thus, ∂pi∗∂γ < 0 ∀n≥ 2.
4.4 Prices increasing in number of cartel firms
The first order derivative of the cartel price with respect to the cartel size is given
by
∂pc
∂k
= (1−γ)γ[2 +γ(n+ 2k−4)][2 +γ(2n−3)](2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)2 > 0, (58)
where the denominator is always positive. As n≥ k ≥ 2, and γ is positive but below
one, the derivative is positive.
The first order derivative of the fringe price with respect to the cartel size is
given by
∂pf
∂k
=
(1−γ)γ2[4k−2 +γ
[
(4k−2)(n−1)−k2
]
(2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)2 > 0, (59)
where the denominator is always positive. The only way the numerator can be
negative is, when k grows and the negative squared cartel size outweighs the rest.
The highest value of k for which the function is defined is k = (n−1). For this cartel
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size, the numerator is still positive. Hence, overall both cartel and fringe price are
increasing in k.
4.5 Profits increasing in number of cartel firms
The first order derivative of the cartel profits with respect to the cartel size is given
by
∂pic
∂k
= (1−γ)γ
2[2 +γ(2n−3)]2[2(k−1) +γ(3k[n−k]−2[n−1])]
[1 +γ(n−1)](2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)3 > 0, (60)
where the only term that could make this negative is the last term of the numerator
[2(k−1)+γ(3k[n−k]−2[n−1])]. This term is at its lowest when the second part of
the term is the most negative. That is when (3k[n−k]−2[n−1]) = −2[n−1] < 0,
i.e. when n = k. For this, the whole term is positive though [2(k− 1) + γ(3k[n−
k]−2[n−1])]|n=k= (2n−1)−γ(2n−1)> 0 because γ ∈ (0,1). Therefore ∂pi
c
∂k > 0 is
true.
For the fringe profits, it is already known that the price is increasing in k. The
first order derivative of the fringe quantity is given by
∂qf
∂k
=
γ2[1 +γ(n−2)]
[
2(2k−1) +γ[k(n−k) + 2k(n−2)n(k−2) + 2]
]
[1 +γ(n−1)](2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)2 > 0. (61)
Thus, both quantity and price are increasing in k. Therefore, the fringe profits are
also increasing in k.
4.6 Ranking of prices
It is to be shown that pc(k)> pf (k)> p∗. Start with showing that pc(k)> pf (k).
pc(k) = (1−γ)[2 + 2γn−3γ]2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
pf (k) = (1−γ)[2 + 2γ(n−1)−γk]2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
(62)
pc(k)−pf (k) = (1−γ)γ(k−1)2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
> 0 ∀ 2≤ k ≤ (n−1)
(63)
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because both numerator and denominator are always positive for these values of k
and n.
Now show that pf (k)> p∗.
pf (k)> p∗ = (1−γ)γ
2(k−1)k
[2 +γ(n−3)][2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k] > 0,
(64)
because the numerator is clearly positive ∀k > 2 and the denominator is clearly
positive ∀n≥ 2.
4.7 Ranking of Profits
The ranking of the profits is
pif (k)> pid(k)> pic(k)> pi∗. (65)
Firstly, pic(k) > pi∗ is shown. As it is known that pic(k) is increasing in k, this
inequality only has to be shown for k = 2. For all k > 2 it will then also hold.
pic(2)−pi∗= (1−γ)γ
2[4 + 16γ(n−2) +γ2(17n2−70n+ 69) +γ3(5n3−33n2 + 67n−43)]
4[2 +γ(n−3)]2[1 +γ(n−1)][2 +γ(3n−7) +γ2(n2−5n+ 5)]2
(66)
Where all parts of this fraction are weakly positive for n≥ 2 apart from γ2(17n2−
70n+ 69) which is only positive for n ≥ 3 and γ3(5n3− 33n2 + 67n− 43)] which is
only positive for n ≥ 4. This means that for all n ≥ 4, all parts of the fraction
are positive and therefore pic(k)−pi∗ > 0 for n ≥ 4. It then has to be shown that
pic(2)−pi∗ > 0 for n= 2 and n= 3.
For n= 2 it follows that
pic(2)−pi∗ = γ
2
4(2−γ)2(1 +γ) > 0 (67)
For n= 3 it follows that
pic(3)−pi∗ = (1−γ)γ
2[1−γ3 + 4γ+ 3γ2]
4[1 + 2γ][2(1−γ)−γ2]2 > 0 (68)
Hence, pic(k)> pi∗.
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Secondly, pif (k)> pic(k) is shown.
pif (k)−pic(k) = (1−γ)(k−1)[k+ 1 +γ(n−1 +k(n−2))][1 +γ(n−1)][2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k]2 > 0∀n≥ k≥ 2
(69)
Hence, pif (k)> pic(k) holds.
Thirdly, pif (k)> pid(k) is shown.
pif (k)−pid(k) =
γ2(1−γ)(k−1)
[
8 + 4γ[(n−k) + (3n−6)] +γ2[8(n−1)(n−2) + 1−k(4n−7)]
]
[1 +γ(n−1)][2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k]2 > 0
(70)
which is greater than zero because the denominator is positive and the only term that
can be negative for high k in the numerator could be [8(n−1)(n−2)+1−k(4n−7)].
For the highest possible k, k = (n−1), this is still positive though.
Finally, pid(k,γ)> pic(k,γ) is shown. Two cases have to be differentiated.
• The unrestricted profits when k < n or k = n and γ < γc. In this case:
pid(k)−pic(k) = γ
2(1−γ)(k−1)2[2 +γ(2n−3)]
4[1 +γ(n−2)][1 +γ(n−1)]
[
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
]2 > 0,
(71)
where both the numerator and the denominator are clearly positive ∀ n ≥ 2
and γ ∈ (0,1).
• The restricted case when k = n and γ ≥ γc. Then:
pid(n)−pic(n) = γ
2(2n−1) +γ(n−1)−1
γ2[1 +γ(n−1)] , (72)
where the denominator is always positive and the numerator increasing in γ
and negative for very small γ but positive for large γ. Therefore, if this fraction
is positive for γ = γc it is also positive ∀ γ > γc. Evaluating the fraction at the
point γ = γc leads to
pid(n)−pic(n)|γ=γc=
3(n−1)(n−2) +n−1
8[(n2−2) +n(√n2−1−1)−√n2−1] > 0 ∀n≥ 2 (73)
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Therefore, firms always earn more when they deviate compared to when they set
the collusive price.
4.8 Cartel demand in case of defection
Call the demand of any given cartel firm, given that one firm has defected qc,−d.
It follows from the demand for a cartel firm, evaluated for the case that one of the
cartel firms has defected and prices at pd(k), (n−k) firms set the fringe price pf (k)
and the firm in question as well as (k−2) remaining firms set the cartel price pc(k).
qc,−d = [2 +γ(2n−3)][2 + 2γ(2n−k−3) +γ
2[5−k(2n−3) + 2n(n−3)]]
2[1 +γ(n−2)][1 +γ(n−1)]
[
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
] .
(74)
It has to be shown that this is positive ∀ γ ∈ (0,1), as long as k < n. Setting qc,−d = 0
and solving for g ∈ (0,1) under the restrictions that n ≥ 2 and k ∈ [2,n], the only
potential root is given by
γˆ = 2n−3−k+
√
k2−1
(3n−5)− (2n−3)(n−k) . (75)
It will be shown that there is no k < n for which γˆ ∈ (0,1) and therefore, there the
cartel quantity is never equal to zero when k < n.
• The numerator of γˆ is always weakly positive when k ∈ [2,(n−1)].
• The denominator is negative when (3n−5)< (2n−3)(n−k), which is the least
likely for the highest possible k= (n−1). For this value, γˆ = (n−2)]
√
n(n−2)
(n−2) > 1.
For any k larger than this, the denominator is negative while the numerator
is positive and therefore γˆ < 0.
• Hence γˆ /∈ (0,1) for k < n.
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Abstract
This article analyses the effect of three different penalty regimes on the price setting
in collusive industries. The regimes analysed are i) profits, ii) overcharge, and iii) revenue
based penalties. In this model, firms compete in prices over true substitutes in an infinitely
repeated market. It is shown that penalties influence prices in two ways. Firstly, directly
by changing the price for a given cartel size and secondly, indirectly by influencing the
cartel size and thereby the price charged. The direct effect of these different regimes has
been studied previously by Katsoulacos et al. (2015) for perfectly homogeneous goods.
The indirect effect has been identified as ambiguous for profit based penalties in a capacity
constraint homogeneous goods model by Bos and Harrington (2015). However, this is the
first paper which analyses and compares these effects for different penalty regimes when
goods are differentiated. It is found that the total price effect of profit based penalties is
weakly negative. Overcharge based penalties always lead to a lower price compared to no
penalties. However, increasing the penalty toughness may in some cases slightly increase
prices. Finally, when penalties are based on revenue, the total price effect is ambiguous.
When the penalties are set such that they deter cartels over the same products, overcharge
based penalties always lead to the lowest price, followed by prices computed under the
profit based penalties and then revenue based penalties. For very few levels of product
differentiation and market size, profit based penalties lead to the highest prices.
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1 Introduction
In 2012 the European Commission (EC) imposed a record fine of 1.49 billion EUR on
a group of banks.2 Although collusion is illegal in most jurisdictions,3 the convicted
parties had formed a cartel to manipulate interest rates in their favour. Multiple cases
of illegal collusive agreements are detected each year in all sectors and industries. For
example, in January 2014 the German competition authority (CA) Bundeskartellamt
fined 5 breweries. In the same year, Apple settled in a case of price fixing for e-books.
The company had to pay a total of 450 million USD.4 Further cases range from canned
fruits, to car glass and candle wax. These recent examples show that forming a cartel
is still a common business practice and it raises the question of how a CA can define a
regulatory framework in which firms obey the laws imposed.
Most CAs base their penalties on the revenue gains with cartelised goods. Consider as
an example both the US and the EU, where the CAs set out in their sentencing guidelines
the affected volume of commerce will be used to calculate base penalties, which can then
be adjusted upwards or downwards.5 While the revenue earned by a cartel is a widely
used measure to calculate penalties, some recent academic work sees evidence that it
is not an optimal practice. Bageri et al. (2013) show that cartels have an incentive to
set higher prices when revenue based penalties are imposed. Furthermore, the authors
show that cartels with a higher revenue to profit ratio face higher penalties than cartels
with a lower revenue to profit ratio, even if the harm induced is the same. Katsoulacos
and Ulph (2013) analyse a Bertrand competition model over homogeneous goods with
constant and symmetrical marginal cost in which collusion is detected with a constant
probability. They too find that the cartel price can be increasing in the toughness of the
revenue based regime and can even exceed the monopoly price.
Katsoulacos et al. (2015) elaborate on this idea and perform a structured comparison
of four different penalty regimes (profits, revenue and overcharge based as well as fixed
penalties) in terms of their effect on cartel price, cartel formation and their welfare ef-
fects. They define an infinitely repeated Bertrand competition model over homogeneous
2http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-13-1090 en.htm, last accessed on 13.03.2018
3For example, at the moment price fixing activities are classified as illegal under article 101 TFEU
(Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union) in the EU and under the Sherman Act 1890 section
1 in the US.
4https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-ebooks/supreme-court-rejects-apple-e-books-price-fixing-appeal-idUSKCN0W91LQ,
last accessed 18.03.2018
5Compare United States Sentencing Commission Guideline Manual (DoJ (2005)) and European Com-
mission Sentencing Guidelines (Commisson (2006))
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goods with constant, symmetrical marginal costs. This has two important implications.
Firstly, the non-cooperative outcome is that firms set the price equal to marginal cost.
Secondly, any cartel that wants to sustain prices above marginal cost has to contain all
members of the market. The authors show that the different penalty regimes produce
cartel prices which can be ranked from the highest to lowest. Revenue based regimes
produce higher prices than profit based regimes, which produce higher prices than over-
charge based regimes. Furthermore, they show that when penalties have the same effect
on cartel deterrence, overcharge based penalties lead to lower average prices and a higher
total consumer welfare than profit based and revenue based penalties. Overall, they show
that overcharge based penalty regimes welfare dominate profit based penalty regimes,
which in turn welfare dominate revenue based penalty regimes. The authors conclude
that CAs should switch to an overcharge based approach when calculating penalties. In
an extension of this model, Katsoulacos et al. (2016) define a penalty regime based on
revenues, but with a penalty rate based on overcharges. This regime can result in similar
welfare improvements as the overcharged based penalty regime and requires less effort in
implementing.
In both the aforementioned papers, the authors’ assumptions imply that all firms in
a market have to be inside the cartel to sustain prices above marginal costs. However,
there are many cases in the real world where this is not fulfilled and cartels comprise
of only a few firms in the market. Some academic work models this feature of firm
behaviour. For example, Posada (2000), Hans et al. (1999), Posada (2001) and Eaton and
Eswaran (1998)replicate it in differentiated goods markets with Bertrand competition,
while Escrihuela-Villar et al. (2011) use homogeneous goods in a Cournot framework.
This literature consistently finds that larger cartels charge higher prices.
However, none of this literature includes penalties in the model. This is done by Bos
and Harrington (2015), who analyse the effect that profit based penalties have on cartel
size. In a homogeneous goods market with price competition and capacity constraints
they also show that bigger cartels set higher prices. The authors also show that the profit
based penalties can either increase or decrease the cartel size. Contrary to the findings
of Katsoulacos et al. (2015), this implies that a profit based penalty regime can have an
ambiguous effect on the price charged in the market instead of having no effect.
Overall, the academic evidence suggests that the cartel size positively influences the
price set by a cartel, but that the penalty regime can also influence the cartel size. This
suggests that penalties have two effects on the cartel price. Firstly, the direct price effect,
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which is the change in price for a given cartel size. While this effect has been studied in the
literature for different penalty regimes, the analysis was concentrated on the homogeneous
goods case. Secondly, the indirect price effect, which comes through influencing the cartel
size by alternating the incentive to form a cartel. This effect has been considered for
profit based penalties by Bos and Harrington (2015), but no comparison to other penalty
regimes has been made.
This paper aims to bridge the gap in the existing literature by analysing the price
effect of different penalty regimes in the differentiated goods case, with endogenous cartel
size. The novelty of the research is twofold. Firstly, this is the first paper comparing the
direct price effect of different penalty regimes in differentiated goods industries. Secondly,
this is the first paper which analyses how the different penalty regimes influence cartel
size and thereby the indirect price effect. Both of these steps are important in evaluating
the effects of penalty regimes because it is possible that the overall effect is ambiguous.
Specifically, a penalty could directly decrease the cartel price and indirectly increase it, or
the other way around. If this was the case, it is possible that the findings in the previous
literature regarding the direct price effects cannot be generalised for markets in which
indirect price effects are possible.
The model in this paper defines a market in which firms compete in prices over sub-
stitutable goods. Three penalty regimes are analysed: profits, overcharge, and revenue
based penalties. For each of these regimes, the direct, indirect and overall price effects
are derived. It is shown that, while the direct effect of profit based penalties is zero, the
indirect effect can decrease the cartel price by decreasing the cartel size. With respect
to overcharge based penalties it is found that they have a negative direct effect, but am-
biguous indirect price effect. Moreover, compared to no penalties, the overall price effect
is negative. The results for revenue based penalties are that they directly increase the
market price but lead to weakly smaller cartels, which implies a weakly negative indirect
price effect. In contrast to Katsoulacos et al. (2015), it is shown that the overall effect of
revenue based penalties is ambiguous and that it can be the case that the overall price
effect is negative. Further analysis is carried out to compare the penalties with each
other. It is found that when all penalty regimes deter cartels over the same group of
products, overcharge based penalties lead to significantly lower prices than profit based
penalties, which in turn lead to slightly lower prices than revenue based penalties in most
cases. Some exceptions exist in which profit based penalties lead to prices just above
those computed under the revenue based penalty regime.
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The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.1, the general framework of the model
is explained and in Section 2.2 a competitive baseline outcome is defined. In Section 2.3
firms are allowed to collude without having to face law enforcement. Following this, law
enforcement is introduced into the model and penalties based on profits, overcharges, and
revenue are analysed in Section 2.4, Section 2.5, and Section 2.6. Section 3 compares
the penalty regimes. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 General Set Up
Suppose a market in which consumers choose to buy horizontally differentiated goods
which are supplied by n≥ 2 firms. A consumer’s maximisation problem takes the form
max
q1,...,qn
u(q1, ..., qn)−
n∑
i=1
piqi, (1)
where ∑ni=1 piqi is the total spending on the bundle of goods (q1, ..., qn) at prices (p1, ...,pn)
and u(q1, ..., qn) is the utility derived from consuming this bundle. The functional form of
the utility is given by
u(q1, ..., qn) =
n∑
i=1
qi− 12
( n∑
i=1
q2i + 2γ
n∑
i 6=j
qiqj) (2)
where γ ∈ (0,1) measures the degree of product substitutability, which can also be inter-
preted as the degree of product homogeneity. As γ goes closer to zero, goods become more
independent of one another, if γ is closer to one, goods become more substitutable. The
cases of perfect substitutes (γ = 1) and perfectly independent goods (γ = 0) are excluded
in the analysis. The former has been analysed by Katsoulacos et al. (2015) already and
the latter is the case in which firms pricing strategies are independent of each other and
therefore price fixing is not of concern.6
From the first order conditions of the consumer’s maximisation problem and some
rearranging it is easily shown that the demand for good i is
qi(pi,pj 6=i,γ,n) =
(1−γ) +γ∑j 6=i pj− [1 +γ(n−2)]pi
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
) (3)
6Technically, it is possible that γ is negative, where γ < 0 corresponds to the case of complements. This
paper however focuses on substitutes and therefore the degree of product substitutability is restricted to
positive values.
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This implies that the demand for firm i is decreasing in its own price pi and increasing in
the price of any competitor firm j 6= i.
i)
∂qi
∂pi
< 0 ii) ∂qi
∂pj
> 0 (4)
This demand function ensures the existence of meaningful results as the own price effect
on demand is stronger than the cross price effects on demand. In essence, this means that
the demand for good i depends more on its own price than it depends on the sum of price
changes in the market. If that wasn’t the case, an increase in the price of all goods at
the same time would lead to more demand and higher profits, which is not economically
sensible. 7
In this market n ≥ 2 firms compete in prices and produce products i at constant
marginal cost c. Firm decisions follow a two stage decision process. In the first stage,
firms decide to either engage in collusion or in competition against each other. In the
second stage, firms simultaneously set prices. When all firms choose to compete against
each other, the outcome is the competitive equilibrium. Otherwise, the outcome is the
collusive equilibrium. To solve for an equilibrium, the outcomes for the competitive and
collusive case for a given number of firms n should be characterized. This is done in the
following section.
2.2 Competition
This section discusses the outcome that emerges when no collusion takes place and firms
maximise individual competitive profits pi∗i . Each firm solves
max
{pi}
pi∗i (pi) = max{pi}
(pi− c)qi = max{pi} (pi− c)
(1−γ) +γ∑j 6=i pj− [1 +γ(n−2)]pi
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
) (6)
From the first order conditions price reaction functions directly follow. These determine
for each firm i how it will set its price, given the prices of the other (n−1) firms j 6= i in
7Technically, this holds because
|∂qi
∂pi
|> (n−1) ∂qi
∂pj
(5)
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the market:
pRi =
1
2c+
(1−γ) +γ∑j 6=i pj
2
(
1 +γ(n−2)
) (7)
As all firms are symmetrical, they have the same reaction function. Hence, the sum of
prices can be rewritten as ∑j 6=i pj = (n−1)p−i., where the notation p−i denotes all prices
except the price of firm i.
pRi =
1
2c+
(1−γ) +γ(n−1)p−i
2
(
1 +γ(n−2)
) (8)
Given that all firms are symmetrical and therefore pi = p∗ ∀ i = 1,2, ...,n, the optimal
prices in the competitive market are
p∗ = 1 +γ(n−2)2 +γ(n−3)c+
1−γ
2 +γ(n−3) (9)
which, in combination with the demand function leads to competitive quantities
q∗ = 1 +γ(n−2)[1 +γ(n−1)][2 +γ(n−3)] . (10)
Finally, competitive equilibrium profits follow as
pi∗ =
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
[1 +γ(n−1)][2 +γ(n−3)]2 (1− c)
2 (11)
In terms of directional comparative statics, the optimal firm prices and profits have the
same results and very similar intuition. They are decreasing in both the degree of product
substitutability γ and market size n.8 Specifically, very low values of γ, firms have close
to monopoly power in their demand and set a price close to the monopoly price. In
these cases, the firms profits will also be close to the monopoly profits. For higher γ,
products become closer substitutes which means that any firm can increase demand by
a higher amount when undercutting the price of the other firms in the market. As a
result, competitive pressure on firms increases and prices decrease. This means that for
high values of γ, the competitive price is closer to marginal costs and hence the profits
are closer to zero. In term of market size, for small n, few firms compete against each
other and prices, as well as profits, are high. For larger n, the competitive pressure on
8Follows directly from first order partial derivatives with respect to n and γ respectively
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firms increases and prices and profits decrease. These are standard results of Bertrand
competition with horizontally differentiated goods and symmetrical costs.
When marginal costs increase, firms partially pass the cost on to consumers by raising
the price. As firms don’t pass on all changes in costs, profits are decreasing in cost. When
c ≥ 1, the market price is above the cut-off price where demand is zero. It is therefore
assumed that 0< c < 1.
To establish the effects of penalty regimes on the cartel formation process and the
prices charged by the market firms, it is necessary to firstly outline the process of cartel
formation without any penalties in place. This is carried out in the following sections.
2.3 Collusion: No Penalties
This section discusses the collusive outcome in the absence of penalties. Before endo-
genising the number of firms that choose to collude, assume that of the n firms in the
market, the first exogenously chosen k ∈ [2,n] firms decide to collude will maximise their
joint profits. Call these firms the cartel. The remaining (n− k) firms will continue to
compete against each other and against the cartel firms. Call these firms the fringe.
As the fringe firms maximise individual profits, they have the same general maximisa-
tion approach as outlined in (6) so that from the first order condition of a fringe firm the
reaction will be equivalent to (12). The sum of competitor prices ∑j 6=i pj can be rewritten
to account for the fact that the first k firms are inside the cartel, setting a joint price, and
the other (n−k− 1) fringe firms set prices individually. Denote the cartel price with pc
and the fringe price as pf . As fringe firms are symmetrical and hence in equilibrium set
the same price pj = pf ∀j = (k+ 1),(k+ 2), ...,n. A fringe firm’s optimal reaction to the
cartel price then follows as
pf,R =
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
c+ (1−γ) +γkpc
2 +γ(n+k−3) . (12)
The cartel firms set the price such that it maximises the overall profits of its members.
This means that cartel firms take into account that they set a combined price when
maximising profits. Therefore, substituting pj = pc ∀j = 1,2, ...,k and pj = pf ∀j = (k+
1),(k+2), ...,n into the demand functions for the cartel, leads to the maximisation problem
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pic(k) = max
{pc}
(pc− c)qc
= max
{pc}
(pc− c)
((1−γ) +γ(n−k)pf − [1 +γ(n−k−1)]pc
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
) (13)
From the first order condition and the symmetry of all firms, the cartels reaction function
to the fringe price follows as
pc,R = 12c+
(1−γ) +γ(n−k)pf
2
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
) , (14)
Both the fringe’s and the cartel’s price reaction function are increasing in the competitor’s
price which implies that price setting in this model follows a game of strategic comple-
ments. When a competitor raises the price, the best response is to follow and raise the
price as well, but less than the competitor did. This follows directly from the derivative
of the reaction functions with respect to the competitor’s price, where in both cases the
derivative is positive but smaller than one.
Using the reaction functions computed, equilibrium prices as well as profits can be
computed for a given cartel size k. For the prices, it follows that
pc(k) =
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
)(
2 +γ(n+k−3)
)
+γ(n−k)
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k c
+
(1−γ)
(
2 +γ(2n−3)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k ,
(15)
and
pf (k) =
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
)(
2 +γ(2n+k−4)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)kc
+
(1−γ)
(
2 +γ(2n−k−2)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k ,
(16)
where the denominator 2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k > 0 ∀ n≥ k > 2.
9. From this, quantities are
qc(k) =
(1− c)(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
)(
2 +γ(2n−3)
)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
) (17)
9Analytical proof is in Appendix A
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and
qf (k) =
(1− c)
(
2 +γ(2n−k−2)
)(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
) , (18)
which leads directly to profits
pic(k) = (pc− c)qc(pc,pf )
=
(1− c)2(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
)(
2 +γ(2n−3)
)2
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
)2 (19)
and
pif (k) = (pf − c)qf
=
(1− c)2(1−γ)
(
2 +γ(2n−k−2)
)2(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
)2 . (20)
In the special case in which the cartel consists of all firms in the market, and hence
k = n, the fringe doesn’t exist and the above defined functional forms for the fringe are
meaningless. For k = n the cartel sets monopoly prices and earns monopoly profits.10
However, as long as k < n, one can compare the fringe and the cartel prices and profits.
This comparison reveals that the fringe undercuts the cartel but still sets a price above
the competitive level. Therefore, both the cartel and the fringe prices are strictly higher
than the competitive equilibrium price. Furthermore, the cartel price is strictly higher
than the fringe price.11 Formally, this means:
pc(k)> pf (k)> p∗. (21)
For profits, it can be shown that the cartel profits exceed the competitive profits, but that
the fringe firms earn more than cartel firms. Formally:
pif (k)> pic(k)> pi∗. (22)
At this point, it is important to note that the analysis of stable collusive agreements
usually requires the definition of deviating profits. That is, given that collusive agreements
10pc(k = n) = c+12 and pic(k = n) =
(1−c)2
4
(
1+γ(n−1)
) respectively
11Analytical proof in Appendix A
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are non-binding contracts, they cannot be enforced and therefore some firm inside the
cartel could have an incentive to deviate from the agreement to gain additional profits.
This paper focusses on the price setting behaviour of cartel and fringe firms and therefore
no formal analysis of deviating behaviour is carried out. However, deviator profits have
been shown to exceed the collusive profits in previous papers, for example Posada (2000)
who use a similar demand structure. Therefore, in order to ensure consistency with the
literature, pid(k) is defined as the deviator profits given k firms are inside the industry
and assume that pid(k)> pic(k) ∀k.
Having defined the relevant profits, two fundamental problems for firms who contem-
plate forming a cartel are identified.
1. Given that a cartel forms and there is a fringe, the fringe firms earn higher profits
than the cartel firms. This implies that even though all firms profit from the exis-
tence of a cartel, no firm wants to be inside the cartel and would rather be part of
the fringe. This follows from pif (k)> pic(k).
2. Given that a cartel forms, any firm inside it has an incentive to deviate from the
agreed price in a one shot game. This follows from pid(k)> pic(k).
In order to derive solutions for these fundamental problems, its necessary to investigate
the conditions under which collusion is sustainable.
The intuitive solution for the first problem follows from the comparative statics of the
price and profit functions for the cartel and fringe respectively.12 Here, it can be shown
that both fringe and cartel prices and profits are increasing in the number of firms in the
cartel:13
i)
∂pf
∂k
> 0 ii) ∂pi
f
∂k
> 0
iii)
∂pc
∂k
> 0 iv) ∂pi
c
∂k
> 0.
(23)
This means that any firm, which has been assigned the role of a cartel firm exogenously,
contemplates leaving the cartel, it has to take into account that by leaving the cartel it
decreases k. As a result, all profits earned in the industry decrease. This is especially true
for the profits of the fringe firms that it wants to join. Formally, instead of comparing its
12The definitions on cartel stability follow directly from d’Aspremont et al. (1983) and have been used
in the academic literature in this, or in a very similar form. Some examples include, but are not limited
to Posada (2000), Bos and Harrington (2015), Eaton and Eswaran (1998)
13Analytical proof in Appendix A
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current profits pic(k) to the current fringe profits pif (k), the firm has to compare them to
pif (k− 1) < pif (k). Therefore, it is possible that the switch from cartel to fringe doesn’t
pay off when pic(k)≥ pif (k−1). This leads to the following definition
Inside Stable Cartel (ISC): A cartel is said to be inside stable, when
pic(k)≥ pif (k−1) for k ≥ 3, (24)
and for k = 2, the condition is pic(k)≥ pi∗ because if any firm left a cartel with k = 2 firms,
the cartel would not exist and the industry would return to competition.
This definition then leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1: In a model with no law enforcement, (24) is always fulfilled for some value
of k = 2.
This follows directly from the application of the ordering of profits in (22) to the (24). As
pic(k)> pi∗ ∀k ≥ 2, any cartel with k = 2 firms is inside stable.
At the same time, there is the possibility that firms currently outside of the cartel want
to join it. The reason behind this is the inverted argument to the inside stability: firms
have to compare the current fringe profits pif (k) to pic(k+1) instead of pic(k) because by
joining the cartel they increase its size. Given that larger cartels earn more money, the
additional gain from having more firms in a cartel could outweigh the loss of changing
from being a fringe firm to being a cartel firm. That is the case, when pif (k)≤ pic(k+1).
This implies that a cartel will only stop growing when either there are no more firms in
the fringe that can join, i.e. when k = n, or when joining the cartel doesn’t pay off, i.e.
when pif (k)≥ pic(k+ 1). This leads to the following definition:
Outside Stable Cartel (OSC): A cartel is said to be outside stable, when
pif (k)≥ pic(k+ 1) for 2≤ k ≤ (n−1). (25)
By definition, any cartel with k = n is outside stable.
If a cartel is both inside and outside stable for some cartel size k it means that no firm has
an incentive to either leave or join the cartel openly. Call a cartel like this membership
stable. The question that remains to answer is: is there some cartel size k∗ for which a
cartel is membership stable? To answer this, consider both conditions.
It follows directly from the comparison of (24) and (25) that any firm joining the cartel
wants to stay inside of it. That is, because if a firm joins a cartel with k˜ firms, it means
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that (25) was not fulfilled for k˜ and therefore it is clear that pif (k˜) < pic(k˜+ 1). After
the firm joined, the cartel size is then (k˜+ 1). The condition for a cartel to be an ISC at
this size is pic(k˜+ 1)≥ pif (k˜), which is fulfilled because pif (k˜)< pic(k˜+ 1). This has some
important implications.
Lemma 2: If for a given k a cartel is not an OSC, it will be an ISC for (k+ 1).
Proposition 1: In the case where no CA is active, every market has some cartel size
k∗ for which no firm has an incentive to change from being in the cartel to being in the
fringe and vice versa.
Proposition 1 follows directly from the combination of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Consider
the smallest possible cartel size k = 2. For this size, any cartel is inside stable (Lemma 1).
This means that no firm has an incentive to leave the cartel. Two possible scenarios arise
at this point: either the cartel is outside stable and hence k∗ = 2, or (25) is not fulfilled.
In the latter case, a firm will join the cartel increasing its size to k = 3. From Lemma 2 it
then follows that after the firm has joined, the cartel is inside stable. Again, this means
that there are two scenarios: either k = 3 is the stable cartel size k∗, or more firms will
join. This mechanism works until (25) is fulfilled for some k. The largest possible cartel
is k = n. Overall, this shows that there is always some cartel size k∗ for which a cartel is
both inside and outside stable. Call k∗ the membership stable cartel size.
However, from the second fundamental cartel problem, it is known that any firm
inside a cartel might have an incentive to cheat on the collusive agreement to earn higher
profits. Therefore, being inside a cartel cannot be a Nash Equilibrium in any one shot
game even if the inside and outside stability conditions are fulfilled. While this is true
in non-repeated games, the majority of firm interactions take place repeatedly and it has
long been established that collusion might be sustained in repeated games.14 Therefore,
assume that the price setting game is infinitely repeated and that a unit of profits earned
in the next period is worth δ ∈ (0,1) units of profit today. From this it follows that the
present value of sustaining collusion for all future periods is equal to ∑∞t=0 δtpic(k) = pic(k)1−δ .
Furthermore, assume that firms inside the cartel play a grim trigger strategy against
defecting firms. This means that if one firm ever deviated from the collusive agreement,
the industry would return to the competitive equilibrium for all future periods. For
a firm considering to deviate, the present value of doing so is then pid(k) +∑∞t=1 δtpi∗ =
pid(k)+δ pi
∗
1−δ . If the present value of staying inside the cartel outweighs those of deviating,
14This argument follows directly from Friedman (1971) and is featured in much of the academic liter-
ature on collusive agreements.
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it is optimal for all cartel firms to not deviate. Formally, the condition is given by
pic(k)
1− δ ≥ pi
d(k) + δ pi
∗
1− δ (26)
Solving this for δ leads to the following definition.
Stable Cartel (SC): A cartel size is said to be stable when setting the cartel price
is a Nash Equilibrium. That is the case when:
δ ≥ pi
d(k)−pic(k)
pid(k)−pi∗ := δ
∗(k). (27)
Call δ∗(k) the critical discount factor above which collusion can be sustained. As long
as the firms’ discount factor is above δ∗(k), the cartel size k can be sustained as a Nash
Equilibrium. For this to be possible, it must be that δ∗(k)< 1 because otherwise δ≥ δ∗(k)
is not feasible. This implies that
δ∗(k)< 1, which means that
pic(k)> pi∗
(28)
is necessary for a cartel to be stable. Therefore, any cartel that is stable must earn more
than it would under competition. This also implies that any cartel size for which the cartel
is profitable relative to the competitive outcome can be sustained as a Nash Equilibrium
if the discount factor is sufficiently high. This argument will be used in the following to
determine if a given membership stable cartel size can be called stable.
Lemma 3: For any cartel that is profitable relative to the competitive outcome, there
is some δ such that staying inside the cartel is a Nash Equilibrium.
In the no CA case, the ordering of profits is such that pid(k)>pic(k)>pi∗ and therefore
it follows that δ∗(k) < 1 can be established as a result. This directly implies that in the
no CA case any cartel size k can be sustained for some discount factor δ.
Proposition 2: Given there is no law enforcement, any membership stable cartel size
k∗ can be sustained as a Nash Equilibrium for some discount factor δ ∈ (0.1). Thus, any
membership stable cartel is also a stable cartel in the sense that no cartel member has an
incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement.
In summary, this discussion has provided three conditions that have to be fulfilled for
the existence of a collusive agreement. Firstly, firms inside the cartel should not have
an incentive to leave. Secondly, firms outside the cartel should not have an incentive to
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Table 1: Membership stable cartel sizes in the no penalty case
γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
n stable cartel size
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
7 3 4 4 5 5 6 7 7 7
9 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 6 ∗ 9
∗ indicates that the membership stable cartel size is
non-unique and that k = n is also membership stable.
join. Finally, given that the first two conditions are fulfilled, the industry’s valuation of
future profits has to be high enough so that setting the cartel price is a Nash Equilibrium
strategy. In this discussion it has become clear that the existence of a cartel is crucially
related to the inside stability condition. If there was no k for which firms want to stay
inside a cartel, there will never be a membership stable cartel. Furthermore, the outside
stability condition has been linked to the cartel size: given any cartel size is inside stable,
it will grow until it is also outside stable. Once a membership stable cartel is reached,
it will also be stable in the sense that collusion can be sustained as a Nash Equilibrium
if future profits are valued high enough. The outcomes of numerically determining these
stable cartel sizes and market prices are reported in Table 1.
Table 1 shows the stable cartel sizes for ranges of γ = 0.1 to γ = 0.9, in steps of 0.1,
and for some industry sizes between n = 3 and n = 9. Marginal costs have no effect on
the stable cartel sizes, therefore they are not reported. Those cases in which all firms are
inside the cartel (k∗ = n) are highlighted in yellow. One can see that this is the case when
the degree of product substitutability γ is high or when the industry is small. When γ
is high, the competitive price level is close to marginal costs and competitive profits are
low. In these cases, any cartel not consisting of all firms in the industry could raise prices
only by a very small margin. That is because as long as there are firms outside the cartel,
they would gain a large portion of the overall demand in the industry. However, when all
firms are in the cartel they can set monopoly prices and share monopoly profits. When
n is low, any firm joining or leaving the cartel has a large effect on the cartel’s market
power and thereby on the ability to raise prices. Therefore, it is more likely to pay off to
join the cartel and increase the profits up to the monopoly level.
Table 2 shows the resulting cartel and market prices when costs are c = 0.25. While
costs don’t affect the stable cartel size, they positively affect the prices charged. Through-
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Table 2: Average market prices in the no penalt case (c= 0.25).
γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
n Average market price
3 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625
4 0.597 0.568 0.537 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625
5 0.575 0.529 0.531 0.501 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625
7 0.542 0.496 0.432 0.431 0.403 0.452 0.625 0.625 0.625
9 0.524 0.456 0.421 0.381 0.349 0.338 0.312 0.289* 0.625
∗ indicates that stable cartel size is non unique and that k = n is an additional stable
cartel. In these cases, both the market and the cartel price are 0.625.
out the numerical calculations in this paper, it is therefore assumed that c= 0.25 to ensure
comparability. The market price p¯(k∗)) is defined as the average per firm price charged
in the industry and is calculated as
p¯(k∗)) = k
∗pc(k∗) + (n−k∗)pf (k∗)
n
. (29)
For example, take the case of γ = 0.4 and n= 5. In this case, the stable cartel size is equal
to k∗= 4 and hence, four firms set the cartel price pc(4) while one firm sets the fringe price
pf (4). The average price is then computed as (4pc(4) + pf (4))/5. Trivially, for the case
n = k, the cartel and market price are equivalent and are equal to the monopoly price.
All cases where n= k are highlighted in yellow. It can be seen that the degree of product
substitutability affects the cartel price in two ways. Firstly, for higher values of γ the
competitive pressure between cartel and fringe firms leads to decreasing prices. Secondly,
the cartel size increases when γ goes up as only large cartels are stable under the increased
competitive pressure. This leads to higher prices. Overall, the prices firstly decrease in
γ and then for higher values of γ increase again. In most cases, this increase comes from
the fact that the cartel size increased to the maximum size k∗ = n and therefore firms can
charge the monopoly price.
Overall, this section has provided the baseline framework to determine (membership)
stable cartel sizes and the resulting market prices. It has been shown that in the absence
of CA, every market has some stable cartel size which is also profitable relative to the
competitive case and therefore sustainable for some discount factor. The cartel sizes
and market prices determined in this section will be used as a reference in the following
sections and to determine the sign of the direct and indirect price effects of the penalty
regimes.
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2.4 Collusion: Profit Based Penalties
Now assume the presence of a competition authority (CA) which detects and fines cartels.
It cannot perfectly monitor cartel behaviour but instead detects and penalises a cartel
with probability β ∈ (0,1). The penalty will be based on some penalty function F (•) which
is the same for each cartel. The CA doesn’t fine firms which have not been colluding and
does not impose negative penalties. It does penalise deviating firms if they are detected
during the deviation period. All of this is common knowledge in the market.
Assume the CA bases the cartel penalties on the profits earned by the cartel members.
In this case, the penalty function takes the form F (pic) = φpic where φ > 0 is the penalty
rate. In this case, any firm associated with the cartel faces the expected penalty of
βφpic = τpipic where τpi = βφ is the expected share of profit that is taken away from a cartel
member. Parallel to Katsoulacos et al. (2015), τpi can be interpreted as the toughness of
the penalty regime. Throughout this section, the subscript pi will denote that a variable
is determined under a profit based penalty regime.
Similarly to the no CA case, cartel firms aim to maximise the overall profits of all
cartel members. To achieve this, they take into account the price effect on the combined
cartel demand. For each individual firm inside the cartel profits are given by picpi(k) =
(1− τpi)[pcpi(k)− c]qcpi(k). So for any given cartel size k, the cartel firms solve
max
{pcpi}
picpi(k) = max{pcpi}
(1− τpi)(pcpi− c)qcpi = max{pcpi} (1− τpi)pi
c
pi (30)
Compared to a situation with no penalties, the profits are lowered by a fraction τpi. When
τpi ≥ 1 the expected penalty exceeds the profits and a cartel makes negative expected
profits. In this case, it would never form. For the analysis to be meaningful and interesting
it will therefore be assumed that τpi ∈ (0,1). Given these parameter restrictions, (30) is
a positive monotonic transformation of (13) and hence, the optimal price set by a cartel
in the profit based penalty regime is the same as in the no law-enforcement case, given
k. In contrast to the cartel, fringe firms are not subject to penalisation and therefore,
their maximisation problem is the same as in the no penalty case. Furthermore, fringe
profits will not change. However, the defector price and profits follow the same logic as
the cartel: as the profit function is a monotonous transformation of the no CA case, the
price and quantity traded are the same as in the no CA case, given k. The cartel and
deviator profits are then equal to the optimal profits computed in the no penalty case
minus the expected penalty τpipic and τpipid respectively. Given the cartel size k, it follows
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that:
ii) pfpi(k) = pf (k) ii)pifpi(k) = pif (k)
iii) pcpi(k) = pc(k) iv)picpi(k) = (1− τpi)pic(k)
v) pdpi(k) = pd(k) vi)pidpi(k) = (1− τpi)pid(k),
(31)
where the comparative statics regarding k hold as outlined in the no penalty case, i.e. all
prices and profits are increasing in k.
In the following, the effect of the penalty regime on prices charged in the industry are
analysed. To do so, two dimensions will be differentiated. Firstly, the direct price effect
which is the penalty’s price effect for a given cartel size k. Secondly, the indirect price
effect (or size effect) which is the change in price that is due to the change in cartel size,
incentivised by imposing a penalty. The direct effects are considered first. As follows
directly from (31), the profit based penalty does not lead to a different price setting
strategy for firms in the industry, given any cartel size k.
Proposition 1pi: The profit based penalty regime does not have a direct price effect.
This finding is in line with the findings of Katsoulacos et al. (2015) in the homogeneous
goods case. Furthermore, a direct implication of it is that if profit based penalties have
any impact on equilibrium prices it would have to be through the cartel size. Therefore,
the indirect effects are determined by finding the stable and sustainable cartel sizes and
comparing them to the no CA case. As discussed before, for any cartel to form it must
overcome two problems. Firstly, a cartel size needs to be stable in the sense that no firm
has an incentive to change its status from cartel to fringe and vice versa. Secondly, a
stable cartel size needs to be sustainable in the sense that no firm has an incentive to
deviate from the collusive agreement.
To begin with, a membership stable cartel is found by analysing how profit based
penalties influence the inside stability of cartel. To do so, picpi(k) and pifpi(k) are substituted
into (24).
ISC: Under the profit based penalty regime, a cartel is inside stable for k ≥ 3, when
(1− τpi)pic(k)≥ pif (k−1), (32)
and for k = 2 when (1− τpi)pic ≥ pi∗. Here, for any τpi > 0, the LHS of the expression
is strictly lower than in the case with no CA. That is because cartel profits are strictly
decreasing in the penalty toughness while fringe profits are unaffected. This implies that
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the condition is less likely to hold when profit based penalties are imposed and that
therefore firms inside the cartel have a higher incentive to leave the cartel and join the
fringe when penalties get tougher. Furthermore, it is now possible that a cartel with k= 2
firms is not inside stable any more. That is the case when (1− τpi)pic(2) < pi∗, i.e. when
the expected profits of forming a small cartel are lower than the competitive profits. This
implies that the strict existence result for cartels from the no CA case doesn’t hold any
more and that therefore, it can be possible that in some given industry no cartel can form.
This will be discussed again with cartel sustainability further below.
Consider now the cases in which at least one cartel size k is an ISC. In these cases, the
outside stability determines the actual cartel size. Applying picpi = (1− τpi)pic and pifpi = pif
to (25) leads to
OSC: A cartel is said to be outside stable for any k ∈ [2,(n−1)] when
pif (k)≥ (1− τpi)pic(k+ 1), (33)
while any cartel with k = n is outside stable.
In this case, it is clear that the RHS is decreasing in τpi, which directly implies that for
any τpi > 0, the condition is more likely to hold than in the no penalty case. By penalising
only the cartel firms without altering the price setting incentives and thereby leaving
fringe profits unaffected, the CA disincentivises joining the cartel. For a fringe firm, the
potential gains of being part of a cartel with one additional member are traded off against
the risk of paying a penalty. For high penalties that trade off is more likely to be decided
in favour of staying outside the cartel. As a result, less firms want to join the cartel,
which means that the cartel is more likely to be outside stable.
Combining the analysis of the latter two conditions, it is possible to state that when
penalties are imposed on profits, firms are more likely to leave a collusive agreement and
are less likely to join it. Numerical examples suggest that this means that profit based
penalties lead to weakly smaller membership stable cartel sizes k∗pi, compared to the no
penalty case.15 As the cartel price is a decreasing function of k, this implies that profit
based penalties have a weakly negative price effect on the cartel and market price.
Proposition 2pi: Profit based penalty regimes have weakly negative price effects on
15The reason for the effect to be weakly and not strictly is twofold. Firstly, when either n small or γ
high, the fundamental reason to form a cartel with k = n is that if any firm was to form a fringe, this
would reduce cartel profits by too much for a cartel to remain stable. In these cases, the optimal cartel
size remains k = n. Secondly, it is assumed that k is an integer. An incremental change in τpi might then
not be big enough to change k from one integer to the next.
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Table 3: Membership stable cartel sizes under the profit based penalty regime.
γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 τpi
n Stable cartel size
3
− − 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0.015
− − 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0.03
− − − − 3 3 3 3 3 0.09
4
− − 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.015
− − − 3 4 4 4 4 4 0.03
− − − − − 4 4 4 4 0.09
5
− − 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 0.015
− − − 3 4 5 5 5 5 0.03
− − − − − 4 5 5 5 0.09
7
− − 3 4 5 5 7 7 7 0.015
− − − − 4 5 7 7 7 0.03
− − − − − − 7 7 7 0.09
9
− − − 4 5 5 5 6 ∗ 9 0.015
− − − − − − 4∗ 5 ∗ 5 ∗ 0.03
− − − − − − − 9 9 0.09
∗ indicates that membership stable cartel size is non unique and that
k = n is an additional membership stable cartel to the one displayed.
the cartel price.
The combination of Proposition 1pi and 2pi lead to the overall price effect of profit based
penalties.
Result 1pi: The overall price effect of profit based penalties is weakly negative.
As the direct effect on the price is neutral but the indirect effect is weakly negative,
the imposition of profit based penalties can decrease the price set in an industry. In those
cases in which an increase of τpi actually decreases k, the stable cartel consists of less firms
and therefore, it sets a lower price.
Having found a membership stable cartel, it is crucial to determine if that cartel is
actually sustainable as a Nash Equilibrium. From applying the profit functions for this
penalty regime to the Stable Cartel condition it follows that any cartel size k is sustainable
when
δ ≥ pi
d(k)−pic(k)
pid(k)− pi∗(1−τpi)
:= δ∗pi(k), (34)
where δ∗pi is the critical discount factor above which collusion can be sustained under a
profit based penalty regime. It follows immediately that δ∗pi is strictly increasing ∀τ(0,1)
which implies that collusion is harder to sustain for higher penalties. Therefore, the
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penalty regime has two channels through which it deters collusion. Firstly, for any cartel
to be sustainable it must be that δ∗pi < 1 and therefore (1−τpi)pic(k)>pi∗. This means that
only cartels which are profitable compared to the competitive outcome can form. This
reflects the findings from analysing (32) for the case of k = 2, but generalises it for the
case of k ∈ [2,n]. Therefore collusion is deterred especially in those industries in which
products are more differentiated, as for in these industries the cartel’s ability to raise the
price compared to the competitive price is limited. Secondly, as δ∗pi(k)< δ∗(k) ∀ τ ∈ (0,1)
cartels now require a higher discount factor to sustain. That means that some cartel sizes
which would have been sustainable under a no penalty regime are no longer sustainable.
Proposition 3pi: The profit based penalty regime has a deterrence effect through
two channels. Firstly, it makes some cartels unprofitable compared to the competitive
outcome and therefore unsustainable. Secondly, cartels require a higher discount factor
compared to the no penalty case.
To illustrate the overall effect of the profit based penalty regime, Table 3 and Table 4
depict the membership stable cartel size and average market prices for three arbitrarily
chosen toughness level τpi = {0.015,0.03,0.09}. Given an estimate of the detection rate16
of β = 0.15, these toughness levels correspond to 10,20 and 60 percent respectively.17
Market sizes and degrees of product substitutability are the same as in the forgone tables
to allow for comparison.
From the comparison of Table 3 and Table 1 one can see that k∗pi ≤ k∗. This is high-
lighted by the colour coding in Table 3, which indicates that a cartel size has decreased
compared to the no CA case if the cell is green. Yellow cells indicate that the stable cartel
consists of all firms in the market. A dash indicates that no cartel could form for the
given parameter combination of n, γ and τpi. One can see that cartels over very differenti-
ated goods are deterred first. This follows from the intuition that underlines Proposition
3pi: because these are the industries in which the cartel’s ability to raise prices compared
to the competitive level is limited, the additional gains from collusion are low. When
collusion becomes costly, cartels in these industries are the first to become unprofitable.
Similarly, more cartels are being deterred when n goes up. That is because the relative
gains of collusion compared to competition are lower when n is large, often because the
16An estimated detection rate around the level of β = 0.15 is widely used in the academic literature on
cartel law enforcement. Bryant and Eckard (1991) provides an estimate of 13 to 17 percent for the US
while Combe et al. (2008) estimates a detection rate around 13 percent in the EU.
17In the US the maximum fine is set at ’no more than twice the gross gain’ of collusion.(18 U.S. Code
§ 3571 (d))
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Table 4: Average market prices under the profit based penalty regime (c= 0.25).
γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 τpi
n Average market price
3
− − 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.015
− − − 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.03
− − − − 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.09
4
− − 0.537 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.015
− − − 0.504 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.03
− − − − − 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.09
5
− − 0.487 0.501 0.467 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.015
− − − 0.447 0.467 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.03
− − − − − 0.430 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.09
7
− − 0.429 0.408 0.403 0.368 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.015
− − − − 0.372 0.368 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.03
− − − − − − 0.625 0.625 0.625 0.09
9
− − − 0.368 0.349 0.323 0.300 0.289∗ 0.625 0.015
− − − − − − 0.294∗ 0.281∗ 0.265∗ 0.03
− − − − − − − 0.625 0.625 0.09
∗ indicates that stable cartel size is non unique and that k = n is an additional stable
cartel. In these cases, both the market and the cartel price are 0.625.
stable cartel size doesn’t include all firms of the industry. Therefore, for a given level of
penalties, it is more likely that collusion doesn’t pay off. In smaller industries, the stable
cartel size is likely to be such that k∗pi = n and hence firms set monopoly prices. In these
cases, cartels can sustain higher penalties and are less likely to be deterred.
Table 4 shows the overall price effect of the profit based penalty regime on the average
price charged in the market, where the definition of the average market price is equivalent
to the no CA case:
p¯pi =
k∗pipc(k∗pi) + (n−k∗pi)pf (k∗pi)
n
. (35)
The colour code in this table is the same as in Table 3: those cases in which the indirect
effect is negative are highlighted in green and blue respectively. Comparing the table to
Table 2 reveals that the profit based penalty can effectively decrease the average market
price in those cases in which it leads to smaller cartel sizes.
Overall, the discussion of the profit based penalty regime has resulted in two main
findings. Firstly, the result that the overall price effect on cartels that do form is weakly
negative. That is because although the direct price effect is neutral, it can be that the
penalty results in smaller stable cartels. As these charge lower prices, the overall penalty
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effect on cartels is negative. Secondly, it was found that the penalty regime can deter
collusion either by making it unprofitable to collude or by raising the discount factor
necessary to sustain collusion. While this latter finding is in line with the results of
Katsoulacos et al. (2015), their homogeneous goods model does not capture the negative
indirect price effect found in this model.
2.5 Collusion: Overcharge Based Penalties
This section discusses the case when CAs base penalties on overcharges, which are defined
as the amount by which a cartel price exceeds the competitive price. Apart from the
change in penalty base, the CA operates equivalently to the profit based penalty case.
That means it detects and fines collusion with probability β ∈ (0,1), does not impose
negative penalties when the penalty base becomes negative18 and does not convict non-
offenders wrongfully. Define formally the overcharge as O= (pco−p∗), where the subscript
O denotes that a variable is determined under the overcharge based penalty regime. To
determine the level of penalty, the CA multiplies the overcharge O by the penalty rate
ϕ > 0. To overcome that in this set up the penalty would be computed in different units
to the profits, the CA then multiplies Oϕ with the competitive equilibrium units q∗ to get
the final penalty.19 This means that the final fining function is F (O) = ϕOq∗.20 Define
the toughness of the penalty regime as τ0 = βϕ and substitute
∑n
j=k+1 pj = (n−k)pfo , the
maximisation problem of a cartel firm follows as
max
{pco}
pico = max{pco}
(
(pco− c)qco− τoq∗(pco−p∗)
)
= max
{pco}
(
(pco− c)
[(1−γ) +γ(n−k)pfo − [1 +γ(n−k−1)]pco
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
]
− τoq∗(pco−p∗)
) (36)
18While it might seem trivial to mention this, there are situations in which this distinction as to whether
a penalty is positive or negative makes a clear difference in the equilibrium outcome.
19As has been discussed in KMU (2015) this leads to the profits and the penalty being computed in
the same unit: while the profits are denoted in monetary units, price multiplied with penalty rate results
in a penalty denoted in monetary units per unit of a good. This is technically unfeasible.
20Previous private damage actions have applied the actual cartel quantity traded to the overcharge
instead of using the competitive quantity. However, using the competitive quantity q∗ greatly simplifies
the analysis and does not change the direction of the results. A small difference in outcomes between
the two approaches would be that the negative price effects derived later in this chapter would be weaker
when the actual cartel quantity traded was used. That is because the cartel quantity is a decreasing
function of the cartel price. In this case, if a cartel increased the price over the competitive level that
would decrease the cartel quantity, thereby making the penalty relatively less severe than in the case
when the competitive quantity was used.
67
2 MODEL 68
The first order condition then follows as
∂pcoq
c
o
∂pco
= c∂q
c
o
∂pco
+ τoq∗, (37)
where the left hand side is the marginal revenue of increasing the cartel price (MR) and
the right hand side denotes the marginal cost of increasing the cartel price (MC). The
MC of increasing the cartel price are increasing in τo. Intuitively that is because the
expected penalty increases linearly in the price charged by the cartel. Therefore, when
τo > 0 the cartel needs to reduce the price charged compared to the no CA case to achieve
the optimality condition MC =MR.
Solving the first order condition for the cartel price gives the cartels best response
function to fringe prices as
pc,Ro (pf ) =
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
)(
2 +γ(n+k−3)
)
+γ(n−k)
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k c
+
(1−γ)
(
2 +γ(2n−3)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
− τoq∗
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)
2
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
) ,
(38)
which can be rewritten to
pc,Ro (pf ) = pc,R(pf )− τoq∗
(1−γ)
(
1 +γ(n−1)
)
2
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
) (39)
This shows that compared to the no CA case, cartel firms set a lower price for any given
fringe price. At the same time, the fringe firms’ maximisation problem remains the same
as it is without a CA. Hence, their reaction function is equivalent to before:
pf,Ro (pco) = pf,R(pc) =
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
c+ (1−γ) +γkpco
2 +γ(n+k−3) . (40)
Combining both reaction functions leads to optimal cartel prices
pco(k) = pc(k)− τoq∗
(1−γ)[2 +γ(n+k−3)][1 +γ(n−1)]
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
= pc(k)− τop˜co(k)
(41)
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and for the fringe
pfo (k) = pf (k)− τoq∗
kg(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
= pf (k)− τop˜fo (k)
(42)
where [−τop˜io(k)] < 0, i ∈ {c,f} is the direct price effect of the penalty on the cartel and
fringe respectively.21 22
Proposition 1o: Overcharge based penalties have a negative direct price effect on
both the cartel and the fringe.
This follows directly from the pricing functions. Intuitively, the overcharge based penalty
increases the MC of raising the price. To achieve the optimality condition that MC=MR,
cartel firms have to increase the MR which they do by decreasing the price. Fringe firms
then evaluate their reaction function at lower cartel prices which leads them to decrease
their prices as well.
The functional form of pco(k) shows that the cartel price is linearly decreasing in
the toughness of the penalty regime τo. This implies that for some maximum penalty
toughness τmaxo the cartel price is pushed below the competitive equilibrium price p∗.
For these values of τo ≥ τmaxo , the cartel would not form as profits would not exceed
competitive profits. τmaxo follows from pco(k) = p∗ as
τmaxo =
γ(k−1)
1 +γ(n−2) (43)
Assume therefore in the following that τo < τmaxo to derive the functional forms.23
With the given prices, it is then possible to determine the quantities traded as
qfo (k) = qf (k)− τoq˜fo (k) (44)
and
qco(k) = qc(k) + τoq˜co(k), (45)
21Proof that [−τop˜i,∗(k)]< 0 in Appendix B.
22For all cases in which the cartel forms, both the cartel and the fringe price are above the competitive
price level p∗. This follows directly from the discussion of (43).
23It follows directly that pfo (k)> p∗ holds ∀ τo < τmaxo .
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where
[τoq˜co(k)] = τoq∗
[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k > 0
and
[−τoq˜fo (k)] = [−τoq∗]
kγ[1 +γ(n−2)]
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k < 0,
(46)
are the quantity effects of the overcharge based penalty regime on the fringe and cartel
respectively. As can be seen, the quantity effect is positive for the cartel and negative
for the fringe. This difference in sign follows from the relative magnitude of the price
effects. It can be shown that the cartel’s price reaction to overcharge based penalties
is stronger than the fringe’s24, i.e. | −τop˜co(k) |>| −τop˜fo (k) |. This means that for any
increase in τo the cartel decreases their price more than the fringe firms do, meaning that
some purchases will move to cartel products. Compared to a situation without penalties
a cartel therefore sells more units and the fringe sells less units. In the direct comparison
though, the fringe quantity still exceeds the cartel quantity: qfo (k)> qco(k).25
The cartel profits are computed as
pico(k) =
(
pco(k)− c
)
qco(k)− τoq∗(pco−p∗)
=
(
pc− τop˜co− c
)(
qc+ τoq˜co
)
− τoq∗(pc− τop˜co−p∗)
= pic− τo
(
[pc−p∗]q∗+ q˜coqc− [pc− c]q˜cO
)
+ τ2o q˜co(q∗− q˜co)
(47)
which is shown to be a decreasing function of toughness parameter τo ∀ τo ∈ [0, τmaxo ) in
Appendix B. The fringe profits are given by
pifo (k) =
(
pfo − c
)
qfo (k)
=
(
pf − τop˜fo − c
)(
qf − τoq˜fo
)
,
(48)
which is decreasing in τo ∈ [0, τmaxo ) because both quantity and price are decreasing func-
tions of τo.
Similarly to before, some firms inside the cartel have an incentive to break the cartel
agreement and maximise individual profits instead. As a structured analysis of the devi-
ator behaviour is not part of this paper, define the deviator profits under the overcharge
based regime as pido(k). It is assumed that pido(k)> pico(k) ∀k, which would render collusion
24Proof in Appendix B
25Proof in Appendix B
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unstable for any one shot game.
However, as discussed before, collusion can be sustained when interaction is repeated.
Therefore, the profits calculated under the overcharge based regime are applied to the
Stable Cartel condition defined in (27). This leads to
δ ≥ pi
d
o(k)−pico(k)
pido(k)−pi∗
:= δ∗o , (49)
where δ∗o is the critical discount factor above which collusion can be sustained. For all
δ ≥ δ∗o , setting the collusive prices is a Nash Equilibrium. For δ < δ∗o collusion is unstable.
A direct implication of this is that there is some level of penalties for which collusion
can’t be sustained. Specifically, for the Stable Cartel condition to hold for some δ ∈ (0,1),
it must be that δ∗o < 1. This only holds when the cartel is profitable relative to the
competitive outcome: pico(k)> pi∗.
Proposition 2o: When penalties are high enough, the overcharge based penalty
regime can deter collusion. This is the case for τo > τmaxo .
Consider now how the membership stable cartel size k∗o is affected by the penalty
regime. Firstly, inside stability is analysed. Applying pico(k) and pico(k) to (24) leads to the
following.
ISC: Under an overcharge based penalty regime, a cartel is inside stable when
pico(k)≥ pifo (k−1) for k ≥ 3, (50)
and pico(2)≥ pi∗ for k = 2.
As was established, the functions on both sides of the inequality are decreasing in
τo. When penalties increase, there are two forces in opposite directions at work. Firstly,
relative to the fringe, the cartel is affected more by an increase in the penalty. That is
because it decreases the optimal price set and at the same time increases the expected
penalty, ceteris paribus. Contrary to this, the fringe does not pay a penalty and it
decreases its price less than the cartel. These effects increase the fringe profit relative
to the cartel profits and make it less profitable to be inside a cartel. However, secondly,
the cartel reacts more to changes in τo than the fringe. Therefore, the cartel quantity
increases, while the fringe decreases. This makes it more profitable to be inside a cartel.
Depending on the relative strength of these two forces, a cartel might then be more or less
stable relative to the no CA case. This makes a comparison to the no CA case ambiguous
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and highly dependent on the degree of product substitutability and market size.
However, it is possible to conduct an intuitive comparison to the profit based penalty
regime. While a formal approach of this would require some equivalence rule to ensure
that both penalties are equally tough, a comparison of the general underlying intuition
of argument does not require this. On the one hand, in the profit based penalty regime
any increase in toughness τpi decreases only the cartel profits, making it less attractive to
stay inside a cartel. On the other, in the overcharge based penalty regime, an increase in
τo affects both the cartel and the fringe negatively. This indicates that compared to the
profit based penalties, it is more attractive to be inside a cartel when penalties are based
on overcharges.
Consider now, how outside stability is affected. Similar to above, applying the corre-
sponding profit functions to (25) leads to a new formulation of an OSC.
OSC: Under an overcharge based penalty regime, a cartel is outside stable when
pifo (k)≥ pico(k+ 1) for (n−1)≥ k ≥ 2, (51)
while a cartel with k = n is always outside stable.
The outside stability condition has an analogous, though reverse, analysis to the inside
stability condition. Hence, it is expected that relative to the profit based penalties more
firms are willing to join the cartel when penalties are imposed on overcharges. In relation
to the no CA case, the outcomes are expected to be ambiguous.
Overall, it is then expected from the intuitive comparison that the overcharge based
penalty regime leads to more inside stable, and less outside stable cartels than the profit
based penalty regime. This implies that the membership stable cartel size k∗o is weakly
larger than k∗pi. Finally, the expected ambiguity in the comparison with the no penalty
stable cartel size k∗ can be confirmed numerically.
Table 5 shows the membership stable cartel sizes that follow for the same cartel sizes n
and degrees of products substitutability γ as used before. The penalty toughness is tested
for τo = {0.1,0.2,0.3}. Given a detection rate of β = 0.15, these levels of τo correspond to
penalty rates of 66, 133 and 200 percent of the penalty base q∗(pco−p∗). In the US, the
maximum public penalty applicable on a cartel is 200 percent of the illegal gains from
collusion. While the overcharge multiplied with the competitive quantity can only be
taken as a very rough estimate of these illegal gains, they can nevertheless function as an
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Table 5: Membership stable cartel sizes under the overcharge based penalty regime.
γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 t
n stable cartel size
3
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0.1
− 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0.2
− 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 0.3
4
3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.1
4 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.2
− 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.3
5
3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 0.1
4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 0.2
5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 0.3
7
4 4 4 4 5 5 7 7 7 0.1
5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 ∗ 7 0.2
6 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 7 0.3
9
4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 ∗ 6 ∗ 0.1
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 ∗ 5 ∗ 0.2
7 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 ∗ 5 ∗ 0.3
∗ in these cases k = n is also a membership stable cartel size.
upper boundary.26 Those cases in which the stable cartel size is above the stable cartel
size in the no CA, i.e. k∗o > k∗, case are highlighted in green, while k∗o < k∗ is highlighted
in light blue. One can see that for products that are relatively differentiated, the cartel
size is bigger under the overcharged based penalty regime than without penalties. In
these cases, the cartel’s ability to set prices far above competitive level is limited as the
competitive prices are already close to the monopoly level. Therefore, expected penalties
are relatively low and being inside a cartel is not too costly. When products are moderate
or close substitutes, the penalty either doesn’t influence cartel size or it reduces it. In the
latter cases, the imposition of the penalty makes smaller cartels more stable because they
set lower prices and therefore expect lower penalties. Thus, it can be said that the size
effect of the penalty relative to the no CA case are very ambiguous and depend on the
degree of product substitutability.
Proposition 3o: The indirect price effect of the overcharge based penalty regime
is ambiguous and depends on the market size n, as well as on the degree of product
substitutability γ.
The reaction to different levels of toughness can also be analysed. One can see that
the stable cartel size is increasing in the toughness parameter τo as long as products are
26The illegal gains under any penalty regime are given by (pco− c)qco− (p∗− c)q∗ which is below the
penalty basis (pco−p∗)q∗. This follows from (pco− c)qco− (p∗− c)q∗ < (pco−p∗)q∗ ∀ pco > c
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Table 6: Market prices in the overcharge based penalty regime
γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 τo
n stable cartel size
3
0.604 0.603 0.601 0.599 0.597 0.595 0.593 0.591 0.589 0.1
− 0.580 0.576 0.573 0.569 0.565 0.561 0.558 0.554 0.2
− 0.558 0.552 0.546 0.541 0.535 0.529 0.524 0.518 0.3
4
0.582 0.552 0.521 0.597 0.595 0.593 0.592 0.590 0.589 0.1
0.582 0.536 0.506 0.569 0.565 0.562 0.558 0.555 0.553 0.2
− 0.553 0.547 0.541 0.535 0.530 0.525 0.521 0.516 0.3
5
0.563 0.518 0.517 0.485 0.451 0.592 0.591 0.590 0.588 0.1
0.562 0.531 0.499 0.468 0.436 0.559 0.557 0.554 0.552 0.2
0.559 0.513 0.482 0.452 0.421 0.527 0.522 0.519 0.515 0.3
7
0.543 0.486 0.439 0.399 0.392 0.360 0.590 0.589 0.588 0.1
0.541 0.475 0.429 0.391 0.382 0.352 0.323 0.553 0.551 0.2
(0.555) 0.2
0.538 0.479 0.439 0.403 0.372 0.343 0.317 0.517 0.515 0.3
9
0.516 0.449 0.400 0.374 0.344 0.319 0.297 0.286 0.267 0.1
(0.589) (0.588) 0.1
0.513 0.451 0.404 0.368 0.338 0.314 0.294 0.277 0.263 0.2
(0.552) (0.551) 0.2
0.519 0.453 0.396 0.361 0.333 0.310 0.291 0.276 0.262 0.3
(0.516) (0.514) 0.2
Number is brackets show prices for the case of k∗o = n when k∗o is non-unique.
relatively differentiated. For example, when the industry size is n = 9 and γ = 0.2, the
stable cartel size goes from k∗o = 4 at τo = 0.1, to k∗o = 5 at τo = 0.2, and finally to k∗o = 6
at τo = 0.3. When products are relatively homogeneous, the stable cartel size is mostly
independent of penalty toughness. Two special cases require mentioning. Firstly, when
n= 7 and γ = 0.7 an increase in τo from 0.1 to 0.2, or to 0.3 leads to a lower stable cartel
size. Secondly, there are three combinations of γ and n where for some τo two cartels are
stable ((n,γ) = {(7,0.8),(9,0.8),(9,0.9)}). In these cases, some small cartel k∗o < n and a
big cartel with k∗o = n are stable, and the smaller cartel size is decreasing in τo.27 That
is because small cartels sets lower prices. In this parameter range this means that they
can sustain higher penalties. However, the most frequent observation regarding cartel size
and penalty toughness is, that k∗o is increasing in τo.
The question left to answer is what the overall effect of the overcharge based penalty
is on the prices charged in the market. Table 6 shows the market prices as calculated in
the no CA and the profit based penalty case. The cases in which all firms in the market
27In the case (n,γ) = (7,0.8) an increase from τ = 0.1 to 0.2 leads to k∗o = 5. This remains the stable
cartel size when τo = 0.3.
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collude (k∗o = n) are highlighted in yellow and are the best example to see the direct price
effect of overcharge based penalties. In these cases, the average market price in the no CA
case would be equal to the monopoly price pc(n) = 0.625 for c= 0.25. However, it can be
seen that when penalties are imposed on overcharges, the cartel price is below the price
set in the no CA case. Furthermore, it is decreasing in τo as well as in γ. That is because,
ceteris paribus, higher levels of τo increase the expected penalty, which incentivises the
cartel to set a lower price. Additionally, when γ is high the competitive price level is
low, which implies a higher relative overcharge for the same cartel price. Thus, given any
cartel price, the expected penalty is higher. Again, this incentivises the cartel to set a
lower price. The indirect price effect is best observed in the case of n= 4 and γ = 0.3. In
this case, the average price is increasing in τo because the cartel size k∗o went from 3 to 4.
However, compared to the no penalty case, the direct price effect outweighs the indirect
price effect. In fact, for all cases analysed and displayed in this paper, the average market
price in the overcharge based penalty regime is lower than in the no CA case. This leads
to the following:
Result 1o: When penalties are based on overcharges, the average price charged in the
industry is lower than in the case of no penalties. Therefore, compared to no penalties,
the overall price effect of the overcharge based penalty regime is negative. However, it
is possible that tougher penalties lead to an increase of the average market price when
products are relatively differentiated.
Overall, the analysis of the overcharge based penalty regime has lead to two main
findings. Firstly, the overall price effect of the penalty is negative if compared to the
no CA case. This comes from a strong negative direct price effect and an ambiguous
but relatively weak indirect effect. When products are relatively differentiated, there are
special cases in which an increase of the toughness τo results in an increase in price that
is not sufficient to elevate the price above the no CA case. Secondly, for significantly high
penalty rates τo > τmaxo collusion cannot be sustained and hence the penalty regime has
a deterrence effect. However, for a penalty rate which corresponds roughly to the highest
penalty currently allowed under US law this deterrence effect is small. A structured
comparison with other penalty regimes follows in Section 3.
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2.6 Collusion: Revenue Based Penalties
Assume now that the CA imposes penalties based on the revenue earned by the cartel
firms. As discussed in the introduction, this is the current status quo for most CAs. The
fining function then takes the form F (R) = κqcrpcr, where κ > 0 is the penalty rate and the
subscript r denotes that a variable is determined under the revenue based penalty regime.
All other CA action is the same as before. Define τr = βκ as the toughness of the penalty
regime. Taking into account that ∑nj=k+1 pj = (n−k)pf , the cartel firm’s maximisation
problem then follows as
max
{pcr}
picr = max{pcr}
[
(pcr− c)qcr− τrpcrqcr
]
= max
{pcr}
[
(1− τr)pcr− c)
]
qcr
= max
{pcr}
[
(1− τr)pcr− c)
][(1−γ) + (n−k)pf − [1 +γ(n−k−1)]pcr
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
]
.
(52)
The first order condition equating marginal revenue and marginal costs follows as
(1− τr)∂p
c
rq
c
r
∂pcr
= c∂q
c
r
∂pcr
, (53)
where it follows directly from the right hand side that in optimum both sides are negative.
Therefore, any increase in the penalty toughness τr effectively increases the marginal
revenue of raising the cartel price for any given price-output combination. To achieve the
MR=MC condition again, the cartel firms need to raise the price, thereby decreasing the
MR. From an intuitive perspective, the revenue based penalty regime incentivises firms to
have lower revenues in order to keep potential penalties low. At the same time, optimal
prices are increased to ensure high per unit profits.
To then derive the cartel’s optimal price setting as a function of the fringe prices, the
demand functions are applied to the first order condition and the resulting equation is
solved for the cartel price.
pR,cr (pfr ) =
c
2(1− τr) +
(1−γ) + (n−k)γpfr
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)] . (54)
Comparing this to the reaction function in the no CA case confirms the above intuition
that cartels set higher prices: For any fringe price the cartel sets a higher price in this
regime than in the no CA case as long as τr ∈ (0,1). Similar to the other penalty regimes,
the fringe firms’ general maximisation problem and hence, the best response function
doesn’t change. Therefore, it is given by (12). Combining both functions leads to optimal
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cartel and fringe prices
pcr(k) =
(
1 +γ(n−k−1)
)(
2 +γ(n+k−3)
)
+ (1− τr)γ(n−k)
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
c
1− τr
+
(1−γ)
(
2 +γ(2n−3)
)
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
(55)
and
pfr (k) =
[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(2n−4) + gk(1−τr) ]
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)kc+
(1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−k−2)]
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k .
(56)
The comparative statics regarding k follow the same direction as for the other penalty
regimes. Furthermore, it is easy to see that both prices are non-linearly increasing in the
toughness of the penalty regime ∀τr ∈ (0,1).28 As the cartel reacts to the penalty regime
by increasing its price, the fringe firms’ best response is to raise its price as well. This
leads to the first proposition for this penalty base.
Proposition 1r: The revenue based penalty regime has a positive direct price effect
on the cartel and the fringe.
From this it follows immediately that under this regime, a cartel comprising of all
firms in the industry, i.e. k = n, sets a price above the monopoly level. Furthermore,
given that the cartel price is increasing in τr, there is some maximum value of penalty
toughness τmaxr for which the cartel price is equal to the choke price. That is the price
above which the cartel demand is equal to zero and therefore, the cartel would earn zero
profits. Before computing the functional form of τmaxr it is then necessary to define the
functional form for the cartel quantity demanded:
qcr(k) =
[1 +γ(n−k−1)](1−γ)(1− τr)[2 +γ(2n−3)]
(1− τr)(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
)
− c [1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ
(
2n−5 + τr(n−k)
)
−γ2[2n−3 + τr(n−k)(2−n)]
(1− τr)(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
) ,
28For the fringe price it is trivial to see that ∂p
f
r
∂τr
> 0. For the proof that the cartel price is increasing
in τ follows from the fact that
∂pcr−pfr
∂τr
=
(
[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n−3)])(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)c > 0.
Given that pcr−pfr is increasing in τr, it must be that pcr increases more than pfr .
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(57)
The maximum penalty toughness τmaxr then follows from qcr(k) = 0 as
τmaxr =
(1−γ)(1− c)[2 +γ(2n−3)]
(1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−3)] + cγ(n−k)[1 +γ(n−2)] . (58)
For all τ ≥ τmaxr the cartel would earn zero profits and therefore wouldn’t form. Hence,
it is assumed in the definition of the prices, quantities and profits that τ < τmaxr . The
fringe quantity is given by
qfr (k) =
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)
(1−γ)(1− τr)[2 +γ(2n−k−2)]
(1− τr)(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
)
− c
(
1 +γ(n−2)
)[
2[1−γ2(n−1)](1− τr) +γ[2(n−2)(1− τr)−k] +γ2[k+ τrk(k−n)]
]
(1− τr)(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
) ,
(59)
which is increasing in τr.29 Comparing both optimal quantities to the no CA case, it
follows that cartel sells less units when penalties are imposed on revenue while the fringe
sells more. That is because for any increase in the penalty toughness τr, the fringe
increases its price less than the cartel. This leads to some consumers substituting cartel
products for fringe products.
The cartel profits follow as
picr(k) =D
(A− τrB)2
1− τr , (60)
where30
A= (1− c)(1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−3)] > 0
B =
(
(1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−3)] + cg(n−k)[1 +γ(n−2)]
)
≥ A
D = 1 +γ(n−2)
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
)2 > 0.
(61)
29Follows directly from
∂qfr
∂τr
= cγk[1 +γ(n−k−1)][1 +γ(n−2)]
(1− τr)2(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
[
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k] > 0
30A≤B follows from c ∈ [0,1) and cg(n−k)[1 +γ(n−2)]≥ 0.
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The comparative statics regarding k are the same as before: larger cartels earn higher
profits. Furthermore, an increase in the penalty toughness τr decreases cartel profits
∀τr < τmaxr .31 The fringe profits are given by
pifr (k) =D
((1− τr)E+γc[1−γ+γτr(n−k)]k
(1− τr)
)2
, (62)
where D is defined as above and
E = (1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−k−2)]− c
(
(1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−1)]−γ
)
. (63)
Contrary to the cartel, the fringe profits are increasing in the toughness τr. That is
because for fringe firms both the quantity and the price are increasing in τ .
Finally, a firm inside the cartel that aims to deviate from the collusive agreement
earns profits pido(k). Similarly to the previous cases, it is assumed that pido(k) > pic(k)
which means that collusion can only be sustained when the price setting game is played
repeatedly. More specifically, collusion can be sustained if setting the collusive price is a
Nash Equilibrium.
As discussed before, this is the case when the cartel firms play grim trigger strategies
against defectors and when they value future profits high enough. Applying the profit
functions to (27), the Stable Cartel condition in the revenue based penalty regime is then
δ ≥ pi
d
r (k)−picr(k)
pidr (k)−pi∗
:= δ∗r . (64)
For this to hold for any δ it must be that δ∗r < 1 which only holds as long as picr(k)>pi∗.
From the partial derivative of picr(k) with respect to τr and the result that picr|τr=τmaxr = 0, it
is clear that there will be some value of τr ∈ (0, τmaxr ) for which cartels are not profitable,
compared to the competitive outcome. In these cases, a cartel could not sustain. This
implies that when the penalty regime gets tougher firms need a higher discount factor.
Therefore, some cartels, which could have been stable for lower toughness parameters, are
unstable. Hence, the revenue based penalty regime has a deterrence effect.
Proposition 2r: When penalties are tough enough, the revenue based penalty can
deter collusion by making cartels unprofitable.
The condition in (64) also implies that for any profitable cartel size k, there is some
31Proof in Appendix C
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Table 7: Membership stable cartel sizes under the revenue based penalty regime.
γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 τr
n stable cartel size
3
− − − 3 3 3 3 3 3 0.015
− − − − 3 3 3 3 3 0.03
− − − − 3 3 3 3 3 0.045
4
− − − 3 4 4 4 4 4 0.015
− − − − 4 4 4 4 4 0.03
− − − − − 4 4 4 4 0.045
5
− − − 3 4 5 5 5 5 0.015
− − − − − 5 5 5 5 0.03
− − − − − − 5 5 5 0.045
7
− − − − − − 7 7 7 0.015
− − − − − − − 7 7 0.03
− − − − − − − 7 7 0.045
9
− − − − − − − 9 9 0.015
− − − − − − − 9 9 0.03
− − − − − − − 9 9 0.045
discount factor δ≥ δ∗r such that collusion is in fact sustainable. Therefore, any membership
stable cartel size k∗r which leads to a profitable cartel can be sustained for some firms. To
find k∗r , the inside and outside stability conditions are considered again. To begin with,
the profit functions derived under the revenue based penalty regime are applied to the
definition of inside stable cartels.
ISC: A cartel is said to be inside stable, if no cartel firm has an incentive to leave the
cartel and join the fringe, i.e. when
picr(k)≥ pifr (k−1) ∀ k ≥ 3 (65)
and picr(2)≥ pi∗ for k = 2.
In this condition, the cartel profits on the left hand side are decreasing in the toughness
parameter. At the same time, the fringe profits are increasing in τr. That is because price
setting follows a game of strategic (imperfect) complements: when the cartel raises its
price, the optimal reaction of the fringe firms is to raise their price too, but to a lesser
extend. Therefore, the fringe firms increase the demand for their products when the
penalty increases. Thus, the fringe sells more units to a higher price compared to the
no CA case. For (65) this means that for any increase in τr, the LHS decreases while
the RHS increases. This makes it less likely that the condition holds. Economically, this
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means that cartels earn less while fringe firms earn more. Therefore, it is less attractive
to be inside a cartel. As the inside stability condition is fundamental in the existence of
a cartel, this also suggests that the deterrence effect of the penalty is strong.
While inside stability is required for the existence of any cartels, the outside stability
condition is fundamental in determining cartel size. Applying the profit functions to the
definition of an outside stable cartel results in:
OSC: A cartel is said to be outside stable, if no fringe firm has an incentive to join
the cartel. That is when
pifr (k)≥ picr(k+ 1) ∀ 2≤ k ≤ (n−1), (66)
and for k = n every cartel is outside stable.
The comparative statics regarding τr of this equation follow the same explanation as
for the inside stability, but inverted. This means that when penalties get tougher, fringe
profits on the LHS increase while cartel profits on the RHS decrease. This implies that it
is less attractive to join a cartel. Therefore, the condition is more likely to be fulfilled for
a given k.
To summarise, the revenue based penalty regime then makes cartels less inside and
more outside stable, while at the same time having strong deterrence effects. The former
effect is expected to result in weakly smaller cartel sizes and thereby in a weakly negative
indirect price effect.
Proposition 3r: The revenue based penalty regime has a weakly negative indirect
price effect.
A numerical example of the indirect price effect is given in Table 7, which shows the
membership stable cartel size k∗r for c= 0.25 and the same (γ,n)-tuples that were used in
previous examples. The toughness is set at three different levels τr = {0.015,0.03,0.045}.
This corresponds to penalty rates of 10,20 and 30 percent, assuming a detection rate of
β = 0.15. While a penalty rate of 30 percent of affected sales is the suggested maximum
penalty rate in the EU fining guidelines.32 At the same time, the fining guidelines also
specify a maximum penalty rate of 10 percent of annual worldwide turnover. As the model
presented here doesn’t take into account that a firm may produce other goods, it doesn’t
differentiate between overall revenue and affected revenue. Because of this, the numerical
32Compare Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation
No 1/2003, Section B.21
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Table 8: Market prices under the revenue based penalty regime.
γ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 t
n stable cartel size
3
− − − 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.015
− − − − 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.03
− − − − 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.045
4
− − − 0.506 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.015
− − − − 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.03
− − − − − 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.045
5
− − − 0.448 0.469 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.015
− − − − − 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.629 0.03
− − − − − − 0.631 0.631 0.631 0.045
7
− − − − − − 0.627 0.627 0.627 0.015
− − − − − − − 0.629 0.629 0.03
− − − − − − − 0.631 0.631 0.045
9
− − − − − − − 0.627 0.627 0.015
− − − − − − − 0.629 0.629 0.03
− − − − − − − 0.631 0.631 0.045
tests are conducted for the two maximum rates 10 and 30 percent and the arbitrarily
chosen middle value of 20 percent. The table shows that compared to the no CA case,
the stable cartel size k∗r is lower in three cases: (γ,n) = {(0.4,4),(0.4,5),(0.5,5)}. For all
other cases in which a cartel forms, the cartel size is equal to k∗r = n. This is the same
outcome as in the no CA case. These cases are highlighted in yellow. Furthermore, it is
likely that no cartel can form when either n or τr are high or when γ is low.
The combination of a weakly negative indirect, with a direct positive price effect
imply that the overall price effect of the revenue based penalty regime is ambiguous for
the general case. Numerical testing suggests that in the three cases in which the indirect
effect is strong enough and the cartel size decreases, this outweighs the positive direct
price effect. Therefore, in these cases the overall price effect of the penalty is negative.
However, when the indirect price effect is neutral, the direct price effect increases prices.
To illustrate this, Table 8 shows the average market prices for the same parameters as
Table 7. The displayed average market price is computed equivalently to the other penalty
regimes: p¯r = [k ∗pcr(k) + (n−k)pfr (k)]/n. In the direct comparison to Table 2, one can
see that the three cases with k∗r < k∗ also have average market prices below the ones in
the no penalty regime. When k∗r = n the cartel sets a price above the monopoly price of
0.625 in all cases. This leads to the following.
Result 1r: The overall price effect of the revenue based penalty regime is ambiguous.
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In those cases in which the indirect price effect is strictly negative the penalty leads to
decreasing prices. In those cases in which the indirect price effect is neutral the penalty
leads to higher market prices.
Overall, this section has provided three main findings. Firstly, the indirect and direct
price effect of the penalty have different signs. While the direct effect increases the cartel
price and can elevate it above the monopoly level, the indirect or size effect decrease the
cartel price. Secondly, the combination of the two effects lead to an ambiguous overall
effect of the penalty. Numerically it is shown that whenever the cartel size is effectively
reduced, the price charged in the market is lower compared to the no CA case. However,
when the industry size remains at the same level as in the no CA case, the price charged
under revenue based penalties is higher. Finally, the regime has a strong deterrence effect
as it decreases cartel and increases fringe profits. Therefore, joining a collusive agreement
or staying inside one becomes less attractive. A comparison to the other penalty regimes
is undertaken in the next section.
3 Penalty Comparison
In this section, the size and overall price effect of the profits, overcharge and revenue
based penalty regimes are compared. To do so, the results regarding price effects of the
three regimes are considered again. The results of the previous sections suggested that
relative to the prices that were computed in the absence of a CA,
• profit based penalties result in weakly lower prices;
• overcharge based penalties result in strictly lower prices; and
• revenue based penalties can result in higher or in lower prices.
This could imply that out of the three penalty regimes discussed, the overcharge based
penalties lead to the most favourable outcomes. However, this approach lacks in substance
for two reasons. Firstly, it doesn’t take into account that the penalties have different
deterrence effects. For example, from the cases considered before, one might come to the
conclusion that while the overcharge based penalty regime leads to the lowest average
prices, its deterrence effect appeared to be much lower than those of the revenue based
penalty regime. This would follow from comparing Table 6 and Table 8. For the
toughness parameters tested, the overcharge based penalty regime only deters all cartels
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Table 9: Membership stable cartel sizes under penalty regimes deterring all cartels over
γ ≤ 0.3.
γ 0.301 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
n Stable cartel size τi, i= {r,pi,o}
2 3 3 3 3 3 3 τr = 0.0146
2 3 3 3 3 3 3 τpi = 0.02613
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 τo = 0.4165
3 3 4 4 4 4 4 τr = 0.0124
3 3 4 4 4 4 4 τpi = 0.02514
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 τo = 0.5625
3 4 4 5 5 5 5 τr = 0.0103
3 4 4 5 5 5 5 τpi = 0.02235
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 τo = 0.6316
3 4 5 5 7 7 7 τr = 0.0066
3 4 5 5 7 7 7 τpi = 0.01627
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 τo = 0.7200
3 4 4 4 4 9 9 τr = 0.0044
3 4 5 5 6 6 ∗ 9 τpi = 0.01199
9 9 9 8 8 8 9 τo = 0.7742
∗ a cartel with k = n is also membership stable.
for three combinations of (γ,n,τo), while the revenue based penalty deters cartels over
almost half the analysed range. However, it is possible that in the example provided,
the only reason the overcharge based regime deters less cartels is because the toughness
is lower relative to the revenue based penalties analysed. This leads to the next reason:
the comparison doesn’t take into account the penalty’s relative toughness. How can a
penalty rate of 10 percent of profits be compared to a penalty rate of 50 percent of
quantity adjusted overcharges? Without a measure to make penalties equally tough in
some sense, there is no way of ensuring comparability.
This issue is addressed at depth by Katsoulacos et al. (2015), who use two methods to
equalise penalties. Firstly, they set the toughness in each regime such that it generates
the same average penalty payments by cartels. Secondly, they set penalties such that
they deter the same fraction of cartels in each regime. Under both equivalence rules, the
authors find that the overcharge based penalties lead to the lowest average prices, followed
by profit based penalties. Revenue based penalties lead to the highest average prices.
The method used in this paper to ensure that penalties are equally tough is inspired
by the deterrence equivalence rule used by Katsoulacos et al. (2015). Similar to their
paper, penalties are set such that they deter the same fraction of cartels. However, the
approach differs in the following way. In their paper, the fraction of deterred firms is
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Table 10: Average market prices under penalty regimes deterring all cartels over γ ≤ 0.3.
γ 0.301 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
n Average market price τi, i= {r,pi,o}
0.5440 0.6269 0.6269 0.6269 0.6269 0.6269 0.6269 τr = 0.0146
0.5425 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 τpi = 0.02613
0.5124 0.5038 0.4952 0.4865 0.4779 0.4692 0.4606 τo = 0.4165
0.5379 0.5059 0.6266 0.6266 0.6266 0.6266 0.6266 τr = 0.0124
0.5366 0.5045 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 τpi = 0.02514
0.4781 0.4668 0.4563 0.4465 0.4375 0.4291 0.4213 τo = 0.5625
0.4873 0.5027 0.6263 0.6263 0.6263 0.6263 0.6263 τr = 0.0103
0.4863 0.5015 0.4667 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 τpi = 0.02235
0.4518 0.4389 0.4276 0.4178 0.4091 0.4013 0.3944 τo = 0.6316
0.4295 0.4083 0.4036 0.3691 0.6258 0.6258 0.6258 τr = 0.0066
0.4290 0.4077 0.4028 0.3682 0.6250 0.6250 0.6250 τpi = 0.01627
0.4139 0.4000 0.3888 0.3795 0.3719 0.3654 0.3598 τo = 0.7200
0.3962 0.3682 0.3382 0.3139 0.2939 0.6255 0.6255 τr = 0.0044
0.3959 0.3679 0.3494 0.3228 0.3120 0.2889 ∗ 0.6250 τpi = 0.01199∗∗
0.3880 0.3743 0.3637 0.3087 0.2915 0.2784 0.3386 τo = 0.7742
∗ k = n is also a stable cartel size which leads to an market price of 0.625.
∗∗ No stable cartel in the revenue based penalty regime for n= 9 and
γ ∈ (0.701218,0.735432)
defined as those with the same intrinsic difficulty of holding the cartel together. This
measure consolidates information about the cartels’ critical discount factor and market
size. In this paper, the level of deterrence is measured by the penalties’ ability to deter
products over the same range of product substitutability γ. In particular, consider all
the penalty regimes again and set the penalty for each market size n such that no cartels
can form over products with γ ≤ 0.3. This way, the penalties are equivalent in the sense
that they all deter a same group of cartels. Differences in average prices can then be
interpreted more easily. Table 9 shows the stable cartel sizes that follow under this
deterrence equivalence for each of the three discussed penalty regimes. Levels of γ ≤ 0.3
are not displayed, as for these values there are no cartels. All membership stable cartels
are also stable cartels. The marginal costs are equal to c = 0.25. All the cases where
k∗i = n, i= {r,pi,o} are highlighted in yellow. This is especially likely when products are
relatively homogeneous. For more differentiated goods, overcharge based penalties lead to
larger cartels than the other two regimes. Comparing the profits and the revenue based
regime, one can see that out of 15 cases in which k < n, 11 lead to the same industry size.
In the remaining 4 cases, revenue based penalties result in a smaller cartel. In all of these
cases, the stable cartel size under the overcharge based penalty regime are the largest.
The only case in which the overcharge based penalty regime has the smallest cartel is
(γ,n) = (0.8,9).
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Following the stable cartel sizes, it is possible to compute the average market prices.
These are depicted in Table 10. Again, the cases in which the full market colludes are
shown in yellow. If that is the case for all three penalty regimes, it is particularly easy
to compare the direct price effects. In all of these cases there is clear price ranking of
pcr > p
c
pi > p
c
o. This also follows directly from the direct price results established in the
forgone sections. Comparing the cases in which k < n for at least one of the penalty
regimes shows that mostly the overcharge based penalty leads to the smallest price. That
is true in 12 out of 16 of these cases. Taking into account that at the same time, overcharge
based penalties often lead to larger cartels, this demonstrates the penalty’s strong negative
direct price effect. Furthermore it can be observed that for most parameters, the revenue
based penalty regime leads to higher prices than the profit based regime. Out of the cases
in which n < k that is true for 12 out of 16 tuples and is only not true in those cases
in which k∗r < k∗pi. Therefore, apart from few exceptions, the order of the prices can be
observed as p¯r > p¯pi > p¯o. This would render the overcharge based penalties as the most
favourable of the three.
However, a comparison of the toughness levels required to achieve the desired deter-
rence effect shows that τo is by far the highest of the three for all market sizes. Assuming
a detection probability of β = 0.15, the penalty rate ranges from 278 to 516 percent of the
penalty base (pco−p∗)q∗. Under US law it is not possible to impose penalties of more than
200 percent of the illegal gains from collusion. As discussed in the section on overcharge
based penalties, the penalty base (pco−p∗)q∗ is strictly above these direct gains from col-
lusion. Therefore, a penalty rate of 278 or even 516 percent would not be possible under
the current sentencing guidelines. At the same time, the penalty rate under the revenue
based regime requires a penalty rate between 2.9 and 9.7 percent of revenues, a range
within the limits of maximum penalties in the EU of 10 percent of worldwide turnover.
Overall, this section has provided a first structured comparison of the profits, over-
charge and revenue based penalty regimes. It was seen that when the three systems
deter cartels over products with γ ≤ 0.3, the overcharge based penalty regime leads to the
lowest average prices.33 With few exceptions, the second lowest price is observed under
profit based penalties followed by revenue based penalties. This confirms the relative
order of prices under deterrence equivalence found by Katsoulacos et al. (2015). However,
as the deterrence effects of overcharge based penalties are weak compared to the other
33The results are expected to be robust, based on tests for random (γ,n)-tuples for other arbitrary
deterrence levels than γ ≤ 0.3.
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two regimes, it was observed that the penalty rate necessary to achieve the same level
of deterrence is significantly above those of the other regimes. They are also outside the
limits set under current US law.
4 Conclusion
This paper analyses how the imposition of three different penalty regimes (profits, over-
charge and revenue based penalties) affect the price setting of cartels differentiated goods
markets. In an infinitely repeated price setting game in which firms compete over true
substitutes, it is shown that membership stable and stable cartels can exists and that
some of them may not contain all firms in the market. A membership stable cartel is one
in which no firm has an incentive to either join or leave the cartel, given that the other
firms have the chance to adjust their prices. In a stable cartel no firm has an incentive to
cheat on the collusive agreement. It is shown that any cartel which is profitable compared
to the competitive equilibrium in the market is stable. This implies that any membership
stable cartel is also stable, given that firms value future profits high enough.
If there is no law enforcement, it is shown that every market as characterised by its
size and degree of product substitutability has some stable cartel size. Furthermore, it
was found that small cartels, i.e. those which consist of only a subgroup of all firms of the
market, can exist in some markets. This can be observed especially when either products
are relatively differentiated or when the number of firms in a market gets large. Full market
collusion is more likely to be observed when products are closer substitutes or the industry
is small. An additional finding is that, given the degree of product substitutability, the
prices and profits in the market are increasing in the cartel size. Thus, smaller cartels
charge lower prices.
In a second step, a CA which detects and fines cartels with some probability is intro-
duced. Fringe firms are not prosecuted. Given a cartel is detected, a penalty is imposed
on some pre-defined base. Three different bases are differentiated: profits, overcharge and
revenues. It is found that penalty regimes influence prices through two channels which
are compared in its relative strength. Firstly, the direct price effect is the price reaction
to the penalty for a given cartel size. Secondly, the indirect effect is the change in price
that is due to changes the stable cartel size incentivised by the penalty. Furthermore, it
is shown that all penalties can render collusion unprofitable when the penalty rate is high
enough. This means that all penalties have a deterrence effect.
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In the profit based penalty regime it is shown that the direct price effect is neutral.
As the maximisation problem of the cartel firms after the introduction of the penalties is
a positive monotonic transformation of the maximisation problem without penalties, the
optimal prices charged for any given cartel size do not change. However, the penalty has
a weakly negative indirect price effect because it decreases the incentive to stay inside the
cartel which can decrease the cartel size. As cartel and fringe price are decreasing in the
number of firms in the industry, this means that profit based penalties can decrease the
overall price charged in the industry.
When penalties are based on overcharge, the direct price effect is negative. The
penalty targets directly the price charged by the cartel relative to the competitive price
level. This disincentivises the cartel to raise the price by a large margin. The indirect
effect is ambiguous, compared to the no penalty case. The overall effect is found to be
negative when compared to the no penalty case. However, it is shown that there are some
cases in which increasing the penalty toughness can also increase the cartel price. This
effect does not elevate the prices above the no penalty cartel prices.
It is then shown that the revenue based penalty regime has a positive direct price
effect. That is because it increases the marginal revenue of raising the cartel price. To
counter this effect, the colluding firms set higher prices. At the same time, collusion
is made less attractive as firms outside of the cartel are able to secure some additional
demand. This leads to a weakly negative indirect price effect. Therefore, the total price
effect of revenue based penalties is ambiguous. In those cases in which the indirect effect
is neutral the penalty leads to higher prices. When the indirect effect is strictly negative,
the overall effect is negative too.
To compare the overall price effects of the penalty regimes, they are made equally
tough in the sense that they deter cartels over all products with γ ≤ 0.3. Under the
deterrence equivalent penalties, it is observed that the overcharge based penalties lead
to the lowest average prices. For most parameters tested, the revenue based penalty
regime leads to the highest prices. Some exceptions are found when the indirect effect
outweighs the direct effect of the revenue based penalties significantly. In these few cases,
the profit based penalty regime leads to the highest prices. It is furthermore found that
the deterrence effect of the overcharge based penalty regime is a lot smaller than that of
the other two regimes. Therefore, overcharge based penalties require much higher penalty
rates than are currently permitted under US law to achieve a level of deterrence that can
be reached with revenue based penalties in line with current sentencing guidelines.
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The comparison with the existing literature shows that this is the first paper which
analyses the price effect of different penalty regimes in differentiated markets, taking
into account endogenous cartel formation. Furthermore, some of the previously found
evidence on cartel behaviour was confirmed. As this paper uses the same underlying
model to Posada (2000), who doesn’t include penalties in the analysis, it is not surprising
that the results on comparative statics of prices and profits regarding cartel sizes carry
through. This is independent of the penalty regime in the market. Furthermore, in line
with the findings of Bos and Harrington (2015), who show that endogenous cartel size
may change when penalties are imposed, it was seen that cartel size is influenced by the
penalty regime under which firms operate and the direction of the penalty effect was
described.
Finally, while Katsoulacos et al. (2015) conduct the same general comparison of
penalty regimes, their model is based on perfectly homogeneous goods under Bertrand
competition which implies that any cartel that forms will consist of all firms in the market.
Therefore, indirect price effects are excluded from their analysis. In the comparison to this
paper, the results on direct price effect are confirmed. However, taking the indirect effects
into account it was seen in this paper that there are cases in which both profit based and
revenue based penalties can reduce the price charged in the market. This cannot happen
in their paper. When the penalties in this paper are deterrence equivalent, Katsoulacos
et al. (2015) ’s result that overcharge based penalties lead to the lowest prices, followed by
profits and revenue based penalties can be confirmed in most cases. However, there are
very few exceptions in which profit based penalties lead to the highest price in the market.
Furthermore, Katsoulacos et al. (2016) have undertaken the same analysis with a penalty
based on revenues but where the penalty rate is a function of the cartel’s overcharge. This
comparison is not included in this paper, but is a worthwhile subject of future research.
Another area of potential future research is to further compare the penalty regimes
under a different set of equivalence rule to make sure penalties are equally tough without
violating current penalty maxima.
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5 Appendix A: No Law Enforcement
5.1 Proof that denominator of pricing function is positive
The denominator is equal to
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
=4 + 2g(3n−k−5) + 2g2[(n−k−1)(n−3)−k] +γ2(n−k)k
(67)
which is a negatively signed quadratic function of k with a maximum at k = γ(4−n)−22γ < 0
∀n≥ 3 and hence is decreasing in k. Therefore, the function will be at its lowest when k
is the highest value possible. For k = (n−1), the denominator takes the value
4[1 +γ(n−2)]−γ2(n−1)> 0 ∀n≥ 2 and γ ∈ (0,1) (68)
5.2 Proof that prices increase in cartel size
The first order derivative of the cartel price with respect to the cartel size is given by
∂pc
∂k
= (1− c)(1−γ)γ[2 +γ(n+ 2k−4)][2 +γ(2n−3)](2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)2 > 0, (69)
where the denominator is always positive. As n ≥ k ≥ 2, and c as well as γ positive but
below one, the derivative is positive.
The first order derivative of the fringe price with respect to the cartel size is given by
∂pf
∂k
=
(1− c)(1−γ)γ2[4k−2 +γ
[
(4k−2)(n−1)−k2
]
(2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)2 > 0, (70)
where the denominator is always positive. The only way the numerator can be negative is,
when k grows and the negative squared cartel size outweighs the rest. The highest value
of k for which the function is defined is k = (n−1). For this cartel size, the numerator is
still positive. Hence, overall both cartel and fringe price are increasing in k.
5.3 Proof that profits increase in cartel size
The first order derivative of the cartel profits with respect to the cartel size is given by
∂pic
∂k
= (1− c)
2(1−γ)γ2[2 +γ(2n−3)]2[2(k−1) +γ(3k[n−k]−2[n−1])]
[1 +γ(n−1)](2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)3 > 0, (71)
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where the only term that could make this negative is the last term of the numerator
[2(k−1)+γ(3k[n−k]−2[n−1])]. This term is at its lowest when the second part of the
term is the most negative. That is when (3k[n−k]−2[n−1]) =−2[n−1]< 0, i.e. when
n= k. For this, the whole term is positive though [2(k−1)+γ(3k[n−k]−2[n−1])]|n=k=
(2n−1)−γ(2n−1)> 0 because γ ∈ (0,1). Therefore ∂pic∂k > 0 is true.
The first order derivative of the fringe profits with respect to the cartel size is given
by
∂pif
∂k
= 2(1− c)
2(1−γ)γ2[1 +γ(n−2)]{4(2k−1) +γ[4(k−1)(n−1) + 3k(n−k)−k(n−1)]
[1 +γ(n−1)](2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)3
+ 2(1− c)
2(1−γ)γ4[1 +γ(n−2)][(n−1)(6k2−2k[4n−3] + 4)−k3]
[1 +γ(n−1)](2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k)3
(72)
which is suggested to be positive by numerical tests.
5.4 Proof of ordering of prices
It is to be shown that pc(k) > pf (k) > p∗. Start with showing that pc(k) > pf (k). From
the prices it follows directly that
pc(k)−pf (k) = (1− c)(1−γ)γ(k−1)2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
> 0 ∀ 2≤ k ≤ (n−1)
(73)
because both numerator and denominator are always positive for these values of k and n.
Now show that pf (k)> p∗.
pf (k)−p∗ = (1− c)(1−γ)γ
2(k−1)k
[2 +γ(n−3)][2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k] > 0, (74)
because the numerator is clearly positive ∀k > 2 and the denominator is clearly positive
∀n≥ 2.
5.5 Proof of ordering of profits
The order of the profits is
pif (k)> pic(k)> pi∗. (75)
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Firstly, pic(k) > pi∗ is shown. As it is known that pic(k) is increasing in k, this inequality
only has to be shown for k = 2. For all k > 2 it will then also hold.
pic(2)−pi∗= (1− c)
2(1−γ)γ2[4 + 16γ(n−2) +γ2(17n2−70n+ 69) +γ3(5n3−33n2 + 67n−43)]
4[2 +γ(n−3)]2[1 +γ(n−1)][2 +γ(3n−7) +γ2(n2−5n+ 5)]2
(76)
Where all parts of this fraction are weakly positive for n≥ 2 apart from γ2(17n2−70n+69)
which is only positive for n≥ 3 and γ3(5n3−33n2 + 67n−43)] which is only positive for
n ≥ 4. This means that for all n ≥ 4, all parts of the fraction are positive and therefore
pic(k)−pi∗ > 0 for n≥ 4. It then has to be shown that pic(2)−pi∗ > 0 for n= 2 and n= 3.
For n= 2 and k = 2 it follows that
pic−pi∗ = (1− c)
2γ2
4(2−γ)2(1 +γ) > 0 (77)
For n= 3 and k = 2 it follows that
pic−pi∗ = (1− c)
2(1−γ)γ2[1−γ3 + 4γ+ 3γ2]
4[1 + 2γ][2(1−γ)−γ2]2 > 0 (78)
Hence, pic(k)> pi∗.
Secondly, pif (k)> pic(k) is shown.
pif (k)−pic(k) = (1− c)
2(1−γ)(k−1)[k+ 1 +γ(n−1 +k(n−2))]
[1 +γ(n−1)][2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k]2 > 0∀n≥ k≥ 2
(79)
Hence, pif (k)> pic(k) holds.
6 Appendix B: Overcharge Based Penalties
6.1 Proof that price effect of the penalty is negative
The direct price effect for cartel and fringe are given by [−τop˜i(k)], i ∈ {c,f} where
p˜co(k) = q∗
(1−γ)[2 +γ(n+k−3)][1 +γ(n−1)]
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
and
p˜fo (k) = q∗
kγ(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k .
(80)
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For both cases, the denominator is positive as shown in Appendix A. Therefore, the price
effects [−τop˜i(k)], i ∈ {c,f} are negative if the numerators are positive. In the cartel case,
(1−γ)[2 +γ(n+k−3)][1 +γ(n−1)]> 0 ∀2≤ k ≤ n (81)
is trivial. In the fringe case,
kγ(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]> 0 ∀2≤ k ≤ (n−1) (82)
is trivial too. Therefore, both direct price effects are strictly negative.
6.2 Proof that cartel price effect is stronger than fringe price effect
The claim is that | −τop˜co(k) |>| −τop˜fo (k) |. As both p˜co(k) and p˜fo (k) are positive as shown
in the above proof, the equation holds when p˜co(k)> p˜fo (k). Therefore
p˜co(k)> p˜fo (k)
⇐⇒ [2 +γ(n+k−3)]> kγ
⇐⇒ 2 +γ(n−3)> 0
(83)
which always holds. for n≥ 2.
6.3 Proof that cartel quantity effect is positive
q˜co =
(
p˜co
(1 +γ(n−k−1)
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)] − p˜
f
o
(n−k)γ
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
)
=
(1− c)[1 +γ(n−2)]
(
2 +γ(3n−k−5) +γ2[n2−4n−k(n−2) + 3]
)
[2 +γ(n−3)][1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2(1 +γ ∗ (n−k−1))(2 +γ(n+k−3))− (γ2)∗ (n−k)k
)
(84)
which is positive for all 2≤ k ≤ k and γ ∈ (0,1), c ∈ (0,1).
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6.4 Proof that fringe quantity effect is negative
The quantity effect −T q˜fo is negative if q˜fo > 0.
q˜fo =
(
kγp˜co
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)] −
[1 +γ(k−1)]p˜fo
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
)
= (1− c)γk[1 +γ(n−2)]
2
[2 +γ(n−3)][1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2(1 +γ ∗ (n−k−1))(2 +γ(n+k−3))− (γ2)∗ (n−k)k
)
> 0
(85)
6.5 Proof that fringe quantity exceeds cartel quantity
qfo (k)− qco(k) =
(1− c)
(
γ[k−1]− τo[1 +γ(n−2)]
)
(
2(1 +γ ∗ (n−k−1))(2 +γ(n+k−3))− (γ2)∗ (n−k)k
) (86)
Where the denominator is positive and hence the equation is positive as long as the
numerator is positive. Solving (1− c)
(
γ[k−1]− τo[1 +γ(n−2)]
)
> 0 for τo leads to
τo <
γ(k−1)
1 +γ(n−2) = τ
max
o . (87)
Therefore qfo (k)−qco(k)> 0 ∀ τo < τmaxo . For τo ≥ τmaxo , the cartel wouldn’t form. Hence,
for all cases in which a cartel forms, the fringe quantity is above the cartel quantity.
6.6 Proof that cartel profits are decreasing in penalty toughness
The cartel profits are given by
pico(k) = pic− τo
(
[pc−p∗]q∗+ q˜coqc− [pc− c]q˜cO
)
+ τ2o q˜co(q∗− q˜co), (88)
which is a U-shaped quadratic function of τo because the competitive quantity is larger
than the cartel’s quantity effect:
q∗− q˜co =
(1− c)[1 +γ(n−2)][2 +γ(3n−k−5)] +γ2[(n−k(n+k)−2(n−k)−2n+ 3]
[2 +γ(n−3)][1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2[1 +γ ∗ (n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2 ∗ (n−k)k
(89)
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where the denominator is positive and the numerator is strictly decreasing in k. For the
highest possible cartel size k = n, the expression becomes
q∗− q˜co =
(1− c)([1 +γ(n−2)]
2[2 +γ ∗ (n−3)][1 +γ(n−1)] > 0. (90)
This means that the profit function pico(k) is decreasing for low values of τo until the func-
tion is at a minimum after which it increases again. Evaluating ∂pi
c
o
∂τ0
for τo = τmaxo shows
that the derivative at this point is negative. Therefore, the function is also decreasing ∀
τo < τ
max
o :
∂pico
∂τ0
|τo=τmaxo =
(−1)(1− c)2(1−γ)γk[1 +γ(n−2)](n−k)
[2 +γ(n−3)][1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2[1 +γ ∗ (n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2 ∗ (n−k)k
) ,
(91)
which is clearly smaller than zero ∀2≤ k ≤ n.
7 Appendix C: Revenue Based Penalties
7.1 Proof that profits are decreasing penalty toughness
The revenue based penalties can be written as
picr = U
(A− τrB)2
(1− τr) , (92)
where
A= (1− c)(1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−3)] > 0
B =
(
(1−γ)[2 +γ(2n−3)] + cγ(n−k)[1 +γ(n−2)]
)
≥ A
U = 1 +γ(n−2)
(1−γ)[1 +γ(n−1)]
(
2[1 +γ(n−k−1)][2 +γ(n+k−3)]−γ2(n−k)k
)2 > 0
(93)
where A≤B follows from c∈ [0,1) and cg(n−k)[1+γ(n−2)]≥ 0. After some rearranging,
the first order partial derivative of picr w.r.t. τr gives
∂picr
∂τr
= U (A− τrB)
2−2B(A− τrB)(1− τr)
(1− τr)2
= U (A
2− τ2rB2)−2B(A− τrB)
(1− τr)2
(94)
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where the denominator of the fraction is always positive. This means, the derivative is
only negative when (A2− τ2rB2)− 2B(A− τrB) < 0. Taking into account that a cartel
only forms if τr < τmaxr = A/B.34 Therefore (A− τrB) > 0 ∀τr(0, τmaxr ). From this it
follows that
(A2− τ2rB2)< 2B(A− τrB)
⇐⇒ (A+ τrB)< 2B,
(95)
where the left hand side strictly increasing in τr. For the highest value of τr = τmaxr
the inequality becomes 2A < 2B which holds because A < B. Therefore, ∂pi
c
r
∂τr
< 0 ∀τr ∈
(0, τmaxr ).
34As defined in Eq. 58, the maximum penalty toughness is τmaxr =
(1−γ)(1−c)[2+γ(2n−3)]
(1−γ)[2+γ(2n−3)]+cγ(n−k)[1+γ(n−2)] =A/B.
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Abstract
The majority of traditional models analysing collusive stability take the number of
firms in the industry as given. The models which do allow for a change in the number of
firms mainly assume that this happens through entry. If free entry is possible a common
argument is that collusion is either unstable because any collusive equilibrium would be
broken up through additional entry (e.g. Ivaldi et al. (2003)), or that a cartel has to
play entry deterring strategies (e.g. Wenders (1971)). This paper contributes to the
existing literature by providing a structured analysis of how a cartel’s expectation about
the competitive dynamic forces of entry, exit, and merger affect the stability of collusive
agreements. Contrary to previous literature, it is found that even though entry is free,
stable cartels can form without the need for entry deterring actions. Furthermore, the
model mimics empirical evidence that the break up of cartels can be followed by mergers
and that mergers can lead to collusive equilibria. A further contribution of this paper is
a new notion of a long run sustainable market size under merger and entry, in which the
entry force is equal to the merger force.
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1 Introduction
Standard models on the collusive behaviour of firms are set in a static environment in
the sense that the number of firms in the market doesn’t change. In these industries,
firms make decisions about forming a cartel or colluding tacitly, which follow the basic
logic of a Prisoner’s Dilemma: while coordinated conduct would lead to high profits, each
participant has an individual incentive to deviate and secure high profits. As a result,
collusion is thought to be inherently unstable in a one-shot game. However, given that
interaction between firms is repeated and if firms value future profits high enough, it
is possible to sustain a collusive agreement as a Nash Equilibrium. Some examples for
literature showing this is Friedman (1971) for infinitely repeated games, and for finitely
repeated games Benoit and Krishna (1987) and Harrington (1987). A standard implication
from this is that because firms are better off colluding than competing against each other,
there will always be some valuation of future profits for which collusion can be sustained
for any given number of firms in the industry. However, the question of how the number
of firms in the industry is determined has received relatively little attention.
It has been acknowledged that increased industry profits through collusive conduct
may trigger entry, which would lessen the firms’ incentive or ability to collude. For
example, Ivaldi et al. (2003) argue that ”the prospect of future entry tends to (...) [limit]
the sustainability of collusion”(p.16). Therefore, models directly concerned with entry
and collusion often consider the question of how firms in the industry can stop firms from
the outside to enter, rather than analysing how a change in the number of firms would
alter collusive incentives, e.g. Wenders (1971) or MacLeod and Norman (1987). An
exception is given by Brander and Spencer (1985) who argue that partial tacit collusion
implies higher profits which may trigger entry of firms which are directly included into the
collusive equilibrium. In their model, entry occurs until all firms earn zero profits. A more
common way of modelling collusion is then to exclude the possibility of entry altogether by
either explicitly or implicitly focussing on industries which are characterised by barriers
to entry. This is reflected in Ivaldi et al. (2003) who argue that ”collusion cannot be
sustained in the absence of entry barriers”(p.19). At the same time, market entry and
cartelisation of an industry are not distinct phenomena, as described in Connor (2001)
who recount the entry of ADM into the lysine industry and the cartel which formed in it in
the early 1990s. Similarly, empirical evidence presented by Hyytinen et al. (2013) suggests
that cartels are concerned with entry. The authors analyse legal cartel agreements from a
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Finnish data set and shows that considerable parts of some of the contracts are dedicated
to the question of how to deal with firms who entered the market.
At the same time, it is an accepted notion that a decrease in the number of firms
either through exit or merger can facilitate collusion. There is a variety of arguments for
this. For example, Compte and Jehiel (2002) argue that it is harder to agree on a collusive
equilibrium when there are more firms to include. Additionally, Bos and Harrington (2015)
argue that smaller cartels face a lower probability of prosecution through a competition
authority. Finally, Katsoulacos et al. (2015) define the ’intrinsic difficulty of holding
the cartel together” (p.71) as a combination of the discount factor and the cartel size.
In this model, for a given discount factor the difficulty of sustaining collusion increases
in the number of firms. While none of these authors explicitly model a reduction of
the number of firms through exit or merger, the idea that few firms are more likely to
collude is a one of the main drivers in merger legislation. Therefore, a crucial part of the
analysis of a request to merge is to evaluate whether market consolidation may facilitate
collusion in the future. This is reflected in the horizontal merger guidelines of many
competition authorities. For example, the EU Commission say under section 22(b) that
”...horizontal mergers may significantly impede effective competition(...) by changing the
nature of competition in such a way that firms that previously were not coordinating their
behaviour, are now significantly more likely to coordinate and raise prices or otherwise
harm effective competition.”(EC (2004)). The DoJ in the USA states similar concerns.2
If collusion in the future is seen to be a likely result of a merger, it would be blocked,
which means that the empirical evidence linking the two phenomena is limited.3
An additional recurring topic in the discussion of industry dynamics and collusion is: is
a merger the result of failed attempts of collusion? The idea behind this is twofold. On the
one hand, both practices can be seen of serving the same purpose: to decrease competition
in a market and raise profits. If then firms in a given industry find collusion is too hard to
achieve, they might opt for a merger instead, thereby decreasing the competitive pressure
on firms and increasing profits. On the other hand, it is possible that firms attempt
to integrate one specific firm which broke up a collusive agreement. In this case too,
cartel break up would be followed by merger. Whichever explanation holds in a specific
2Compare, Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines 7.1 : ”The Agencies are likely to
challenge a merger if the (...) market shows signs of vulnerability to coordinated conduct (and) (...) the
Agencies have a credible basis on which to conclude that the merger may enhance that vulnerability.”
DOJ-FTC (2010)
3However, Miller and Weinberg (2015) find that a joint venture between two large American brewing
companies has lead to pricing behaviour in the beer industry best explained by tacit collusion.
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case, there is plenty of empirical evidence demonstrating that the break-up of cartels
increases merger activity. As an example, consider the introduction of the Sherman Act
of 1890 in the United States (US). While the Sherman Act forbade collusion amongst
firms, mergers remained unchallenged until the implementation of the Clayton Act of
1914. Between these two events, up to 50% of the US manufacturing industry took
part in mergers (Lamoreaux (1988)). One explanation for this observation is that the
introduction of the Sherman Act increased the costs of collusion relative to the costs
of merging (Bittlingmayer (1985)). For some firms collusion became unattractive, so in
an attempt to decrease the competitive forces in the industry they decided to merge to
lower the number of competing firms. Kumar et al. (2015) present evidence from the US
pipe industry of the time. They show that a year after being successfully prosecuted for
collusion, members of the Addyston4 cartel merged. Mehra (2008) suggests that merger
activity increased in the United Kingdom (UK) after the passing of The Restrictive Trade
Practices Act 1956. A more recent empirical study by Hu¨schelrath and Smuda (2013)
shows that cartel breakdown in an industry increases horizontal merger activity by up
to 83% in the three years following cartel breakdown. The dataset analysed comprises
mergers and cartel cases decided by the European Commission between 2000 and 2011.
Additional evidence that the break up of collusion is followed by mergers in Europe is
presented by Davies et al. (2015).
Although the empirical evidence suggests a dynamic relationship between collusive
break down and mergers, the theoretical literature linking the two practices is limited.
One view is that mergers and collusion can be interpreted as substitutes and that firms
choose between them. For example, Kumar et al. (2015) as well as Mehra (2008) take this
view and show that if mergers don’t lead to significant costs synergies, and if collusion is
costless, firms strictly prefer collusion over mergers. Both papers don’t consider industry
dynamics between merger and collusion or include entry into the model.
This gap in the academic literature is what motivates this paper. The model defined
aims to nest the analysis of collusive stability into a dynamic framework with competitive
forces of entry, exit and mergers. It adds to the existing literature in four ways. Firstly,
it provides an analytical framework to explain how the firms’ anticipation of long run
competitive equilibria influence the incentives to collude. Secondly, it defines market
characteristics under which stable, profitable collusion can be sustained in a market with
4US pipe makers were convicted of collusion under the US supreme court case Addyston Pipe and
Steel Company et al., Appts., v. United States, 175 U.S. 211
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free entry and without the cartel playing entry deterring strategies. Thirdly, it defines
a new notion of a competitive long run stability point under merger and entry. Finally,
it provides an analytical framework under which endogenous firm decisions can replicate
two observations: a) collusive breakdown is followed by mergers and b) mergers or firm
exit can make collusion possible.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 the basic model assumptions are
defined. In Section 2.1 the model is solved and analysed for the standard static case in
which the number of firms is given exogenously. In Section 2.2 entry and exit dynamics
are introduced and the implications of this for competitive and collusive equilibria are
discussed. In addition to this, mergers are introduced in Section 2.3. Section 3 provides
some discussion and concludes.
2 Model
The model described in this paper follows a three step set up. Firstly, the static base
model, in which the number of firms is exogenously given and doesn’t change is defined.
Secondly, the static model is transferred into a dynamic world with entry and exit forces,
which determine the number of firms endogenously. The implications on the industry
equilibrium resulting from these dynamics are discussed. Finally, mergers are introduced
into the dynamic case and equilibrium dynamics are characterised.
To begin with, the common assumptions of all three models are defined. Firstly,
assume an industry in which n≥ 2 symmetric, forward-looking firms compete in quantities
over homogeneous goods for infinitely repeated periods. Firms face the inverse demand
function P (Q) = a−Q, where Q = ∑ni=1 qi is the sum of quantities qi produced by the
firms i = 1,2, ...,n. Firms produce at constant marginal cost c and face per period fixed
costs f . One unit of profits in the next period has the value δ ∈ (0,1) in the current
period. If firms collude, they play a grim trigger strategy against firms that cheat on
the collusive agreement. This means that they play collusive strategies initially and then
continue doing so as long as no firm deviates from the collusive strategies. If at any point
some firm deviates from the collusive strategy, all firms return to playing competitive
strategies for all future periods.
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2.1 Static Industries
In the static case, the number of firms n≥ 2 is given exogenously. It is then straightforward
to derive functional forms for the competitive and collusive profits. To begin with, the case
in which firms compete against each other is considered. Each firm i maximises individual
profits by setting the optimal output qi, given its competitors output q−i = Q− qi. The
maximisation problem is of the form 5
max
qi
qi
[
P (Q)− c
]
−f = max
qi
qi
[
a− c− qi− q−i
]
−f. (1)
From the first order condition, individual best response functions to the competitors
output can be determined as
qRi =
a− c− q−i
2 . (2)
Taking the symmetry of all firms into account and substituting optimal quantities back
into the profit functions leads to the competitive per firm profits6
pi∗(n) =
(
a− c
n+ 1
)2
−f, (3)
which is a strictly decreasing function of n. This implies that for any given level of fixed
costs f there is some industry size n∗ above which profits in a competitive industry are
negative. Solving pi∗(n∗) = 0 for n∗ leads to
n∗ = a− c√
f
−1. (4)
For n < n∗ firms earn positive competitive profits pi∗(n)> 0, while for n > n∗ they occur
losses pi∗(n)< 0.
Consider now the case in which firms collude to form a cartel and maximise joint
profits. The collusive industry profits are given by Q[P (Q)− c]−nf and hence the max-
imisation problem for the cartel is
max
Q
Q
[
P (Q)− c
]
−nf = max
Q
Q
[
a− c−Q
]
−nf. (5)
5Profits derived step by step in Section 4.1
6As all firms are symmetric, the subscript i is omitted in the following
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The first order condition leads to the optimal total cartel quantity. After substituting
this back into the profit function, the total cartel profits follow.7 After dividing the total
profits by the number of firms inside the cartel, the individual collusive firm profits pic(n)
follow as
pic(n) = (a− c)
2
4n −f. (6)
Similarly to the competitive profits, the collusive profits are strictly decreasing in n and
hence, there is some industry size nc, for which collusive profits are equal to zero. Solving
pic(nc) = 0 results in
nc = (a− c)
2
4f . (7)
From ∂pi
c(n)
∂n < 0 it then follows immediately that for all n<n
c collusive profits are positive,
while for n > nc they are negative. Furthermore, from the direct comparison with n∗ it
follows that the number of firms that can profitably be in a collusive industry is higher
than that in a competitive industry: nc > n∗.8
From the two profit functions, an important standard result of traditional collusive
theory follows.
Standard result 1: Relative to competition, it is always profitable to be inside a cartel:
pic(n)−pi∗(n) = (a− c)
2
4n −
(
a− c
n+ 1
)2
= (a− c)2
( (n−1)2
4n(n+ 1)2
)
> 0 ∀n > 1. (8)
Hence, it follows that for any given industry size, firms prefer being in a cartel to being
in a competitive industry and will therefore always aim to form a cartel.
However, the issue that arises for firms in such a collusive industry is that no bind-
ing cartel contracts can be negotiated. Instead, firms merely agree to follow a collusive
strategy without any way for the other firms to enforce this action directly. It follows
then that any firm could have an incentive to deviate from this agreement and maximise
individual profits, given that all other (n−1) firms set the agreed on cartel quantity qc.
7All values are derived step for step in Section 4.1
8This inequality holds because a−cf > 1, which is true because n∗ ≥ 2 by assumption.
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The defecting firm’s maximisation problem is given as
max
qd
qd
[
P (Q)− c
]
−f = max
qd
qd
[
a− qd− (n−1)qc− c
]
−f. (9)
From the first order conditions and the optimal cartel quantities, it follows that
qd(n) = a− c− (n−1)q
c(n)
2 =
(n+ 1)(a− c)
4n . (10)
After determining the new market price given the deviation, the deviator’s profits follow
as9
pid(n) =
((n+ 1)(a− c)
4n
)2
−f. (11)
This shows that collusion is inherently unstable in any one shot game. That is because
firms earn more if they deviate than when they collude: pid(n) > pic(n). This follows
directly from
pid(n)−pic(n) = (a− c)
2
4n
[(n−1)2
4n
]
> 0 ∀ n > 1 (12)
Thus, although firms would benefit from collusion compared to competition, collusion
cannot be upheld because it cannot be supported as a Nash equilibrium. Each firm would
have an incentive to deviate from the agreement to secure higher profits.
However, it is assumed in this model that firms play a grim-trigger strategy against
defectors and that interaction is infinitely repeated. Collusion can then be stable if the
present value of being inside the cartel outweighs the value of earning deviator profits
in this period and then earning competitive equilibrium profits afterwards. This implies
that collusion is stable as long as
∞∑
t=0
pic(n)δt ≥ pid(n) +
∞∑
t=1
pi∗(n)δt, which simplifies to
pic(n)
1− δ ≥ pi
d(n) + δpi
∗(n)
1− δ .
(13)
This can be rewritten as the following condition
δ ≥ pi
d(n)−pic(n)
pid(n)−pi∗(n) =
1
1 + 4n(n+1)2
:= δ∗0(n). (14)
9Profit function as well as price and quantities derived in Section 4.1
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Call δ∗0(n) the critical discount factor. If the industry’s discount factor is above this
critical discount factor, firms value the profits of staying in the cartel more than the short
term profits of deviation followed by the competitive punishment profits. A cartel only
forms when that is given. When δ < δ∗0(n), firms anticipate that each cartel member has
an incentive to deviate and the cartel doesn’t form in the first place.
δ∗0(n) is increasing in n, which means that it is harder to sustain collusion when
the industry holds more firms. This notion is commonly referenced in the academic
literature.10
Furthermore, as it is assumed that δ ∈ (0,1), it must be that δ∗ < 1 for there to be
any chance that δ ≥ δ∗0(n). This means
δ∗0(n)< 1, which after some rearranging becomes
pic(n)> pi∗(n).
(15)
As shown above, this holds ∀n > 1 and therefore a second important standard result
follows.
Standard result 2: For every industry size n, there is some discount factor δ ∈ (0,1)
for which collusion can be sustained because δ ≥ δ∗0(n).
This standard result implies that even unprofitable cartels can be stable for some
discount factor. This follows directly from the fact that the number of firms in the
industry is expected to be fixed and exogenously given. When firms then make a decision
about collusion, they only take into account the relative pay off possible. This means that
even when a cartel earns negative profits, the firms know that under competition their
losses would be larger.
Overall, the results in this section then imply that it is possible to group market sizes
n into three different ranges depending on the profitability of competitive and collusive
firms:
1) n ∈ [2,n∗]. In this range, both collusive and competitive firms earn (weakly) positive
profits: pi∗(n)≥ 0 and pic(n)> 0.
2) n ∈ (n∗,nc]. For these market sizes, firms who compete against each other are unprof-
10Compare for example Katsoulacos et al. (2015) who define the intrinsic difficulty of holding a cartel
together as a combination of the discount factor and the cartel cartel size. In their model, larger cartels
increase the difficulty, while higher discount factors decrease it. This implies that a larger cartel requires
a higher discount factor to achieve any given level of intrinsic difficulty. In this sense, δ∗0(n) follows the
same logic.
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Figure 1: The graph shows the profitability of firms inside the market and stability of
collusive agreements depending on (n,δ)
itable, while those in collusive agreements earn weakly positive profits: pi∗(n)< 0 and
pic(n)≥ 0.
3) n > nc. In this range, any firm operating in the industry is unprofitable: pi∗(n) < 0
and pic(n)< 0.
For each of these industry sizes, firms will collude if their discount factor is above the
critical discount factor needed: δ ≥ δ∗0(n). This then means that for any {n,δ}-tuple,
it is possible to determine if a) the industry is competitive or collusive and b) if firms
are currently earning positive or negative profits. Fig. 1 gives a graphic example of
the possible outcomes. It maps the critical discount factor δ∗0(n) as a function of n, and
displays the maximum profitable industry sizes n∗ and nc. This results in 6 possible
outcomes that correspond to the outcomes defined above. The subscript a [b] denotes the
{n,δ}-tuples for which collusion is stable [unstable]. In areas Ii, i ∈ {a,b} both cartel and
competitive firms earn positive profits, for IIi, i ∈ {a,b} only collusive firms earn positive
profits and finally, for IIIi i ∈ {a,b} both cartels and competitive firms are unprofitable.
However, from an economical perspective, some of these outcomes don’t seem to be
sustainable over time. On the one hand, there are scenarios in which firms are making a
loss, which begs the question why they stay inside the industry. On the other hand, some
firms can earn big positive profits. This could incentivise firms from the outside to join
the industry. In the following section, these two forces are introduced into the framework.
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2.2 Dynamic Industries With Entry And Exit
This section aims to introduce some industry dynamics into the above defined framework.
This will be done by allowing firms to freely choose to enter or exit the industry. To begin
with, the dynamics at work in a competitive industry are considered:
• A competitive industry grows in size through entry. There is a potential group of
entrants who will join the industry as long as the profits of doing so are non-negative.
Analytically, this implies that an entry force is present as long as
pi∗(n)> 0 ⇐⇒ n < n∗. (16)
• A competitive industry reduces in size through exit. Any firm, which currently earns
negative profits have an incentive to leave the industry. Analytically, this implies
that there is an exit force present if
pi∗(n)< 0 ⇐⇒ n > n∗. (17)
Combining the entry and the exit force, it is clear that a competitive industry can only
be in equilibrium if n= n∗ and firms make zero profits. For any industry size n> n∗ firms
have an incentive to leave as defined in (17), while for any n < n∗ there is going to be
entry as defined in (16). Therefore, the equilibrium condition for competitive industries
is
pi∗(n) = 0 ⇐⇒ n= n∗. (18)
This means that the introduction of entry and exit forces imply a zero profit equilibrium
in competitive industries. Independent from the initial industry size, any competitive
industry will converge to this equilibrium. When there are too many firms to operate
profitably, some of them will leave. If there are only few, but profitable firms, additional
entry will occur.
For firms who aim to collude, this has important implications: it means that compared
to the static model discussed before, the outside option to collusion is now the zero profit
dynamic equilibrium. Therefore, define the realisable profits pire(n) as those profits a cartel
firm can earn when the collusive agreement with n members breaks up. Assume also that
all cartel firms are able to anticipate that the realisable profits are the outside option to
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colluding. From (18) it follows immediately that pire(n) = pire = 0 ∀n because competitive
entry and exit forces will move the market into equilibrium. For now the number of firms
in a collusive industry is assumed to be exogenously given. This leads to the first dynamic
result.
Dynamic Result 1: When competitive entry and exit dynamics are accounted for,
only strictly profitable cartels earn more than competitive firms. Cartels earn strictly
positive profits as long as n < nc.
This follows immediately from the idea that competitive industries converge to the
long run equilibrium profits pi∗(n∗) = 0. Therefore, as long as the pic(n)> 0 ⇐⇒ n < nc,
a cartel earns more than under the competitive equilibrium. To analyse how this influences
cartel stability, the stability condition is considered again.
A collusive agreement can be called stable when no firm has an incentive to cheat on
it, i.e. when the present value of staying inside the cartel outweighs that of deviating and
then earning the realisable profits for all future periods:
∞∑
t=0
pic(n)δt ≥ pid(n) +
∞∑
t=1
pire(n)δt, which simplifies to
pic(n)
1− δ ≥ pi
d(n) + δpi
r
e(n)
1− δ , and therefore
pic(n)
1− δ ≥ pi
d(n).
(19)
Intuitively, the introduction of the realisable profits concept has three implications.
Firstly, for those n≥ nc for which pic(n)≤ 0 collusion is expected to be unstable. That is
because the cartel’s outside option to collusion is the zero profit competitive equilibrium,
which is strictly better than negative profits. Secondly, for those industry sizes n ∈ [2,n∗)
for which competitive firms earned positive profits, they will now earn zero profits. This is
expected to increase cartel stability as a break up of collusion would result in a more severe
punishment. Finally, for industry sizes n ∈ (n∗,nc) for which cartel firms earn positive
profits but competitive firms earn negative profits, collusion is expected to be less stable.
That is because for these n, the realisable profits are above the static competitive profits
and therefore, the cartel’s ability to punish deviators has decreased.
To verify these intuitive expectations, the critical discount factor representation of the
Nash equilibrium condition is considered again. It follows from (19) as
δ ≥ pi
d(n)−pic(n)
pid(n) = 1−
pic(n)
pid(n) := δ
∗
e(n), (20)
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where δ∗e(n) is the new resulting critical discount factor above which collusion is stable
and the subscript e denotes that it is derived under the free entry and exit conditions.
Similarly to before, δ∗e(n) is increasing in n.11
However, as the intuitive analysis above has already indicated, there are crucial dif-
ferences to the static case. To begin with, the existence of any stable cartel requires that
for some δ ∈ (0,1), it holds that δ ≥ δ∗e(n). For this, it must be that
δ∗(n)< 1,which implies
pic(n)> 0,and therefore
n < nc.
(21)
Thus, a stable cartel can only exist as long as it earns positive profits, i.e. ∀ n < nc. One
way of interpreting this is that the application of competitive entry and exit forces has
a deterrence effect on large cartels. That is because in very large industries with n > nc,
cartel firms earn negative profits and would therefore rather be part of a competitive zero
profit industry or exit the market than to earn permanent losses. This is in contrast to
the static case, where the standard result was that there is some discount factor such that
collusion is stable for any cartel size.
Dynamic Result 2: When free entry and exit in competitive industries are taken
into account, only strictly profitable cartels can be sustained for some discount factor
δ ≥ δ∗e(n).
Additionally, there is a range of cartel sizes for which collusion is harder to sustain in
the dynamic, relative to the static case. That is when δ∗e(n) > δ∗0(n). Solving this leads
to
pi∗(n)< 0 ⇐⇒ n > n∗, (22)
This means that for those industry sizes for which a competitive firm in the static case
would make negative profits collusion is harder to sustain when accounting for entry and
exit dynamics in competitive industries. In these cases the cartel’s ability to punish a
deviating firm by returning to competition is lower in the dynamic framework. Instead
of being able to threaten negative future profits, their threat is to revert to a zero profit
equilibrium.
11Proof in Section 5
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Figure 2: The graph shows the two critical discount factors δ∗0(n)(in blue) and δ∗e(n) (in
red) as a function of the number of firms n
Similarly, a cartel is easier to sustain in the dynamic case when δ∗e(n) < δ∗0(n), i.e.
when
pi∗(n)> 0 ⇐⇒ n < n∗. (23)
For these industry sizes the competitive profits in the static framework are strictly positive
while those under the dynamic approach are equal to zero. Therefore, the cartel’s ability
to punish a deviator is increased when entry is taken into account. Fig. 2 gives a graphic
example of the difference between δ∗e(in red) and δ∗0 (in blue).
From the definition of the critical discount factor, the first directional results for
industry dynamics follow. By definition, when δ ≥ δ∗e(n), collusion is sustainable while
it isn’t for δ < δ∗e(n). Given that for now only competitive industries are dynamic, this
divides the (n,δ) plane into two areas: the one above δ∗e(n), where firms collude and
the one below it where firms compete against each other. Focussing on the latter area,
one can identify two opposing industry dynamics. Firstly, when n < n∗ firms will enter,
according to (16). Secondly, when n > n∗ firms earn negative profits and therefore, from
(17) it follows that they will leave. This latter case brings up one question: can it
be possible that competitive industry forces which decrease the number of firms make
collusion possible? As cartels are easier to sustain with less members, there can be cases
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Figure 3: The graph shows how the industry dynamics depend on the initial industry size
n and the industry’s discount factor δ.
in which the industry size decreases enough to enable collusion.
A graphic example of this is given in Fig. 3, which shows the industry dynamics.
Consider an industry with an initial (n,δ) like that in point A. For firms in this situation,
collusion is not sustainable because δ < δ∗e(n). Furthermore, n>n∗ implies that firms earn
negative profits. Thus, some firms will leave until n= n∗, i.e. when the industry is in point
A’. Here, no firm has an incentive to leave or to join, but firms are also not able to collude.
This shows that there are some industries which when they start off competitively, will
remain so in the long run equilibrium. However, consider now a {n,δ}-tuple like that in
B. Again, the competitive industry forces will decrease the number of firms. When n is
such that the industry arrives at the point B’ though, the industry’s discount factor is
equivalent to the critical discount factor δ∗e(n), which means that collusion is now possible.
Hence, the process of firms leaving the industry has led to a collusive equilibrium at B’.
The difference between the industries A and B is that B’s discount factor is high enough
to sustain collusion for some industry size n ≥ n∗. Given this, the firms can return to
collusion before the competitive equilibrium size is reached. This difference is represented
by the horizontal line which takes its origin on the intersection of n∗ and δ∗e(n). For all
competitive industries which have a discount factor above this line, the outcome will be
collusive, while the industries which start off below the line will remain competitive.
Formally, this implies that one can differentiate industries given on how their dis-
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count factor relates to the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion at the
competitive industry size n∗. Define δ∗e(n∗) := δ∗e . Then, assuming that industries start
off competitively in the initial period, those with δ < δ∗e will remain competitive but will
adjust the industry size to n = n∗, while those with δ ≥ δ∗e will be characterized by exit
until δ = δ∗e(n) and collusion is stable. What size will these stable cartels have?
Define nce as the maximum stable cartel size for a given discount factor δ. Formally, ∀
δ ≥ δ∗e(2) ∃ nce ≥ 2, such that δ = δ∗e(nce), where the functional form of nce is given by
nce =
(1 + δ)(a− c)2 + 2(a− c)
√
(a− c)2δ−4δ(1− δ)f
(1− δ)(a− c)2 + 16fδ . (24)
This is an increasing function of δ, because it the inverse function of the monotonically
increasing function δ∗e(n). By definition, δ→ δ∗e implies nce→n∗ and δ→ 1 implies nce→nc.
Furthermore, the formulation n>nce is equivalent to δ < δ∗e(n) and therefore collusion isn’t
stable for these sizes. Equivalently, n ≤ nce ⇐⇒ δ ≥ δ∗e(n), which implies that collusion
can be sustained. As δ < 1, it is always the case that nce < nc and hence, it is confirmed
again that any stable cartel earns strictly positive profits.
So far, it has been assumed that once firms reach a collusive agreement, the number
of firms in the industry is fixed. However, allowing for the number of firms to be en-
dogenously defined during competition but not during collusion is inconsistent. Therefore
assume in the following that colluding firms can make the same entry and exit decisions
as competing firms. As the analysis is now focussed on sustainable collusive agreements,
assume that n≤ nce. For any of these industry sizes it it has already been established that
pic(n) > 0 which directly implies that colluding firms will never exit. Therefore, the only
condition to be established is concerned with entry.
Consider for this purpose a firm outside an industry with n< nce firms, which observes
that firms inside the industry earn strictly positive profits. There are two possible out-
comes for an entrant. On the one hand, if after entry n ≤ nce, the firm can anticipate
that collusion is still stable after it joins and that therefore the profits of entering the
industry are strictly positive. Consequently, the firm will enter. On the other hand, if the
industry size grew to n > nce through entry, collusion would be unstable and therefore the
firm would expect negative competitive profits and would not enter. Thus, entry into the
collusive industry occurs as long as the post entry industry size is
n≤ nce ⇐⇒ δ ≥ δ∗e(n). (25)
115
2 MODEL 116
This means that any n < nce cannot be the equilibrium industry size, because additional
entry would increase n. At the same time, sizes of n>nce cannot be a collusive equilibrium
because no cartel can form for these n. Hence, the collusive equilibrium industry size is
given by
n= nce ⇐⇒ δ = δ∗e(n). (26)
For the most part, the dynamics that follow are similar to the ones discussed in the
competitive case. To show this, an industry which starts off with an {n,δ}-tuple strictly
above δ∗e(n) is considered. Furthermore, assume that the industry’s discount factor is such
that δ ≥ δ∗e . Given this initial configuration of parameters, firms in the industry collude
and earn strictly positive profits. However, additional entrants anticipate that after entry
the industry can still be collusive and profitable. Therefore they will enter until n = nce.
Fig. 3 gives a graphic example of this. The point C is strictly above δ∗e(n) and δ > δ∗e .
Therefore, the industry size grows until the point C’ which is on the δ∗e(n) line.
The combination of these industry forces for δ≥ δ∗e directly imply that in this model, an
industry’s discount factor determines a unique stable equilibrium size at n= nce. For any
n < nce additional entry increases n, while for n > nce exit decreases it. This is highlighted
in Fig. 3 by the the initial starting points B and B” which both have the same δ but B
is competitive to begin with while B” is collusive. Both industries converge towards B’
through exit or entry respectively.
The industry dynamics for the case of δ < δ∗e and therefore nc < n∗ are analysed now.
Those cases which start off competitively have been analysed above and have led to the
result that the industries converge towards the competitive equilibrium industry size and
remain competitive. When the industry starts off in a cartel, a potential entrant again
faces two possible outcomes. Firstly, if after entry the industry can remain collusive, i.e.
when n≤ nce, any entrant will join because it expects positive collusive profits. Secondly,
when after entry n > nce, collusion cannot be sustained any longer. In this case any
potential entrant expects to earn competitive profits. There are two possible arguments
to consider. On the one hand, the entrant could expect to earn the long run realisable
profits pire(n) if it anticipates that other firms will join the industry too. In this argument
firms would not enter. However, strictly speaking this would not be a Nash equilibrium
strategy because if all firms refrained from entering, it would pay off for each firm to
enter as long after entry n < n∗. On the other hand, it is therefore argued that any
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firm considering to enter only takes into account the direct profit implications of its own
actions. This then means, that if after entering the industry n > nce but also n < n∗, the
entrant expects positive profits and therefore joins the industry. This latter argument
implies that no collusive agreement is stable for δ < δ∗e . From an intuitive point of view,
this correlates with the general notion that collusion is more likely when the valuation of
future profits is high. Furthermore, it reflects the idea that in some industries cartel’s are
concerned by potential entry. Therefore, this second interpretation of outcomes is seen
preferable and will be used in the rest of this paper.
Concluding, this means that the model defined in this section predicts a unique in-
dustry size, depending solely on the industry’s discount factor δ. If δ < δ∗e the industry
will converge towards the competitive equilibrium size n= n∗ and will be in a zero profit
equilibrium. For δ ≥ δ∗e , the industry converges towards the collusive equilibrium size
n = nce and firms earn strictly positive collusive profits. Therefore, stable and profitable
cartels can form even in the presence of entry forces. In addition to these dynamics, two
major differences to the static result have been identified. Firstly, unprofitable cartels
are not sustainable any more. Secondly, collusion is harder to sustain for cartels that do
form, as the cartel’s ability to punish deviators has decreased. So far, the dynamic forces
in the industry have been limited to entry and exit. However, mergers can also decrease
the industry size. Therefore, the following section introduces them to the model.
2.3 Dynamic Industries With Entry, Exit And Merger
Assume now that, additionally to the entry and exit dynamics introduced before, firms in
a competitive industry can decide to engage in mergers. If two firms merge, the industry
size decreases from n to (n− 1) and the two firms utilise synergies by stripping out one
set of fixed costs.12 Therefore, a merger pays off when
pi∗(n−1)> 2pi∗(n), (27)
12This assumption is consistent with the existing literature on mergers (e.g. Salant et al. (1983), or
Davidson and Mukherjee (2007)) and greatly simplifies the following analysis. Nevertheless, the assump-
tion that merged firms do not differ from non-merged firms has been criticized in previous literature.
Most notably, Perry and Porter (1985) argue that a merger of ”two firms from a symmetric equilibrium
of (n + 1) firms should result in an equilibrium with (n -1) old firms and one new firm that is ”larger”
than the others” (p. 191). In their model, merged firms can increase their production above the level
of the other firms in the market. Similarly, Deneckere and Davidson (1985) allow for a distinction of
merged firms to other firms by modelling a differentiated goods Bertrand model in which firms require a
patent to produce their individual product. Thus, a merged entity owns a larger range of products and
can internalize the externalities of their pricing decisions.
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which trivially holds ∀ n≥ n∗, as for these values 2pi∗(n∗) = 0 by definition, and pi∗(n∗−
1) > 0 from the comparative statics of pi∗(n). Furthermore, it is intuitively reasonable
to expect any merger from n = 2 to n = 1 to be profitable, because these mergers cre-
ate a monopoly which leads to the highest producer surplus possible. Substituting the
competitive profit function into the the merger condition and rearranging leads to
(a− c)2
[ 1
n2
− 2(n+ 1)2
]
>−f, (28)
where the LHS is an asymmetric v-shaped function of n which is positive ∀ n < 2.414,
has a minimum at n= 3.847 and then converges towards zero as n goes to infinity. This
confirms the intuition that mergers from two firms to one firm always pay off. The RHS
is strictly decreasing in f , which implies that mergers are more likely to pay off when the
fixed costs are high. This makes sense as higher fixed costs imply a larger saving potential
through the merger. It is then possible that the fixed costs are high enough to render all
mergers profitable. If that was the case, firms would always want to engage in mergers.
However, empirical evidence suggests that mergers come in waves, which implies that
after some consolidation, further mergers are not attractive any more. To mimic this in
the model, it will be assumed that the fixed costs f are small enough that there is some
range for which mergers are not profitable. Formally, assume that f is such that
∃ nm0 ,nm1 where 2< nm0 < nm1 < n∗ s.t.
∀ n < nm0 , pi∗(n−1)> 2pi∗(n)
∀ n ∈ [nm0 ,nm1 ], pi∗(n−1)≤ 2pi∗(n)
∀ n > nm1 , pi∗(n−1)> 2pi∗(n).
(29)
This means that mergers are profitable in small and large markets (more specifically, those
with n < nm0 and n > nm1 ), but that there is some range of sizes n ∈ [nm0 ,nm1 ] for which
they are not.
Assume also that there is a CA which forbids mergers to take place in industries with
n≤ nm0 . This means that industry dynamics are only affected by mergers when n > nm1 .
Equivalently to the entry and exit dynamics, one can then formally define that a merger
force is present
∀n > nm0 s. t. pi∗(n−1)> 2pi∗(n) ⇐⇒ n > nm1 (30)
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Additionally, from the previous section it is known that firms enter as long as the post
entry industry size is n<n∗ and exit when n>n∗. It is also assumed that in their decision
to enter an industry, firms don’t take into account possible merger dynamics that could
have been triggered through their entry.13 This then allows to define three ranges for the
industry size:
• n ∈ [1,nm1 ], only the entry force is present, when
• n ∈ (nm1 ,n∗), a merger and an entry force are present,14 and when
• n > n∗, an exit and a merger force are present.
Hence, the introduction of mergers doesn’t influence the direction of industry dynamics
for small (n ≤ nm1 ) or large (n > n∗) markets. The only difference for these n is that a
reduction of firms in the large markets can now have its root in either exit or merger.
However, for values of n ∈ (nm1 ,n∗) the dynamic forces of merger and entry point in
opposing directions. Any entry would increase the number of firms, merger would decrease
it.
The question that arises for this area is: which force will outweigh the other? From the
comparative statics it is known that the net gains of merging increase with the number
of firms, while the profits from entry decrease. This implies that those n, for which
the incentives to merge are highest, are also those, for which the incentives for entry
are lowest, and vice versa. Specifically, consider a market in which n is close to n∗. Any
additional entrant would expect to earn profits close to zero after entry, while firms within
the market can expect relatively large gains from merging. In the long run, one would
then expect more firms to merge than to enter. Contrary, when n is close to nm1 , the
incentives to merge are small while those of entry are large. In this scenario, the long run
prediction would be that more firms enter than engage in merger.
Following this intuition, define the long run sustainable number of firms under entry,
exit and merger nm ∈ (nm1 ,n∗) as the industry size for which the net gains from merging
are equal to the profit of entering. A long run stability point is then defined by the
13This assumption excludes entry to merge strategies in which firms enter a currently unprofitable
industry under the assumption that consolidation after entry leaves them a non-zero probability of earning
positive profits in the future.
14When n = n∗, only the merger force is present, as this is a point and not a range though, it is not
included in the list. This distinction does not change the equilibrium results or dynamics.
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Figure 4: The graph shows profits of competitive and cartel firms as well as realisable
profits for firms inside a cartel after deviation.
condition
pi∗(nm−1)−2pi∗(nm) = pi∗(nm), (31)
where the LHS shows the net gains of merging and the RHS those of entry. For any
n<nm, the gains of entry outweigh those of merger which is assumed to result in relatively
more entries in the long run. Therefore, the industry size n is expected to increase
until n = nm. The opposite dynamic argument holds for n > nm. Thus, any strictly
competitive industry will converge towards the long run sustainable industry size nm and
earn long run competitive profits of pi∗(nm). To simplify notation define pi∗(nm) = pim.
From nm ∈ (nm1 ,n∗), it follows directly that pim > 0.
Similarly to the entry and exit case, define now pirm(n) as the realisable profits for a
firm inside a cartel, after the breakdown of collusion. As long as n≤ nm, each firm in the
cartel can expect to earn pim, should the collusive agreement break down. This changes
when n > nm, because the firms anticipate that there will be market consolidation under
competition, which not all firms are going to survive. As all firms are symmetrical, it
is assumed that each firm expects to remain in the industry with probability n
m
n . The
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expected realisable profits pir(n) then take the form
pirm(n) =

pim ∀n≤ nm
nm
n pim ∀n > nm,
(32)
where pir(n) > 0 holds ∀ n ≥ 2. This means that compared to the entry and exit case
discussed in the forgone section, the cartel’s outside option to collusion is strictly positive
profits instead of zero profits. Therefore, it can be expected that collusion is less stable
when mergers are taken into account because the cartel’s ability to punish deviators is
lower. Furthermore, it implies that for some industry size, the realisable profits are just
equal to the cartel profits. Formally, ∃ncm, s.t. pic(ncm) = pirm(ncm). The functional form of
ncm follows as
ncm =
(a− c)2−pimnm
4f <
(a− c)2
4f = n
c. (33)
Above this cartel size, firms are better off breaking up collusion and returning to compe-
tition and therefore it can be expected that collusion cannot be sustained.
To verify these intuitive results regarding collusive stability, a cartel firm’s incentive
to deviate is considered again. For any firm to not have an incentive to deviate from
the collusive agreement, it must be that earning pic(n) for all periods exceeds earning the
deviator profits pid(n) in one period and afterwards reverting to earn the realisable profits
pirm(n). Formally, collusion is stable when
∞∑
t=0
pic(n)δt ≥ pid(n) +
∞∑
t=1
pirm(n)δt, which simplifies to
pic(n)
1− δ ≥ pi
d(n) + δpi
r
m(n)
1− δ .
(34)
This then leads to the condition for Nash Equilibrium
δ ≥ pi
d(n)−pic(n)
pid(n)−pirm(n)
:= δ∗m(n), (35)
where δ∗m(n) is the critical discount factor necessary to sustain collusion for any given
industry size n, given that the cartel firms expect to revert to the competitive long run
sustainable industry size nm after deviation. Substituting the functional form of pirm into
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Figure 5: The graph shows the critical discount factors δ∗m(n), δ∗e(n), and δ∗0(n) as func-
tions of the industry size n.
this leads to
δ ≥ δ∗m(n) =

pid(n)−pic(n)
pid(n)−pim ∀n≤ nm
pid(n)−pic(n)
pid(n)−nmn pim
∀n > nm.
(36)
Now, as δ ∈ (0,1), the existence of a stable cartel requires that the critical discount
factor is below unity. Analytically this means
δ∗m(n)< 1, which solves for
pic(n)> pirm, and finally
n < ncm.
(37)
This confirms that collusion cannot be stable above the market size which equalises
cartel and realisable profits.
Dynamic Result 3: When cartel firms anticipate to return to the long run stability
point at which entry and merger forces are equivalent, every cartel has to be strictly
profitable, though there are some profitable cartel sizes which cannot be sustained for any
discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).
This result combines two forgone findings. Firstly, for δ∗m(n) < 1, it must be that
n< ncm and hence pic(n)> 0. Secondly, though ncm <nc implies that there are some cartel
122
2 MODEL 123
sizes n ∈ [ncm,nc) for which collusion would be profitable, but it cannot be sustained
because the cartel’s outside option has a higher expected pay off. Fig. 5 gives a graphic
representation of this. One can see that for any n≥ ncm the critical discount factor δ∗m(n)
(in black) is unity or greater which implies that collusion isn’t stable for these values.
This contrasts the results from the entry/merger case discussed in the previous section,
where in the range n ∈ [ncm,nce) collusion was possible.
In terms of magnitude, δ∗m(n) can be compared to both the critical discount factor
from the static and the dynamic entry and exit case. To begin with, the comparison with
δ∗e(n) shows clearly that
δ∗m(n)> δ∗e(n) ∀n≥ 2. (38)
This follows from pirm(n)>pire(n) = 0. Intuitively, this result shows that the cartel’s ability
to punish deviators is lower when mergers are taken into account because the punishment
profits are positive instead of equal to zero. Deviating is then attractive for a larger range
of discount factors.
Comparing δ∗m(n) to δ∗0 shows that
δ∗m(n)< δ∗0(n) ∀pirm(n)< pi∗(n) ⇐⇒ ∀n < nm
δ∗m(n) = δ∗0(n) ∀pirm(n) = pi∗(n) ⇐⇒ for n= nm
δ∗m(n)> δ∗0(n) ∀pirm(n)> pi∗(n) ⇐⇒ ∀n > nm.
(39)
Again, this demonstrates the cartel’s altered ability to punish deviators. When n < nm,
a cartel in the static case threatens to return to competitive profits of pi∗(n). Taking
the entry and merger dynamics into account then means that firms anticipate additional
entry after cartel break up, which decreases the punishment profits expected, compared
to the static case: pir(n)< pi∗(n) ∀n < nm. This makes staying in the collusive agreement
more attractive when dynamics are considered. The opposite is true for n > nm: firms
in the static case expect lower punishment profits than those anticipating mergers, i.e.
pir(n) > pi∗(n) ∀n > nm. A graphic example of the difference between δ∗m(n) and the
previously defined discount factors δ∗0(n) and δ∗e(n) is given in Fig. 5.
With the critical discount defined, it is now possible to determine the industry dy-
namics taking into account mergers. Similar to the entry/exit section, the competitive
dynamics are considered first, assuming that the number of firms in any collusive industry
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Figure 6: The graph shows the industry dynamics when mergers are taken into account.
is fixed. In principle, these dynamics have already been defined. When n< nm the indus-
try size will grow through entry, while for n ∈ (nm,n∗] it will decrease through mergers.
Whenever n > n∗ either merger or exit will lead to a reduction in n. In a world without
collusion, this would always lead to the long run sustainable market size n= nm. However,
given that firms can collude and that a cartel is easier to sustain for smaller industries, it
is possible that both merger and exit can make collusion stable for some discount factors.
To formalise this argument in the same way as in the previous section, two definitions are
necessary.
• Firstly, define δ∗m(nm) := δ∗m as the minimum critical discount factor needed to
sustain collusion at the long run stability point nm.
• Secondly, define δ∗m(n∗) := δ∗m as the minimum critical discount factor needed to
sustain collusion at the zero profit industry size n∗.
As nm < n∗ and δ∗m(n) is increasing in n, it follows immediately that δ∗m < δ∗m. This
makes it possible to split the analysis of competitive industry forces and outcomes into
three separate cases, depending on the discount factor δ.
1. Low discount factors of δ < δ∗m. For any n< nm, entry forces outweigh merger forces
and the industry size will increase until n = nm. For any n > nm, the industry
dynamics will decrease n either through entry and exit (when n > n∗), or because
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merger forces outweigh entry forces (when n ∈ (nm,n∗]). This implies that when
δ < δ∗m, any industry which starts off competitively will remain so in equilibrium.
The long run market size is then given by n= nm and firms earn positive long run
profits pi∗(nm).
2. High discount factors of δ ∈ [δ∗m,1). For these discount factors, any competitive
industry has at least n > n∗ firms in it. To see this, define the maximum number
of firms in a stable cartel, accounting for merger dynamics, as ncm. For this market
size, a cartel can just be sustained, which implies δ = δ∗m(ncm) and hence
ncm =
(1 + δ)(a− c)2−8δpim+ 2(a− c)
√
δ[(a− c)2−4(1− δ)f + (1 + δ)pim]
(1− δ)(a− c)2 + 16δf . (40)
For any n ≤ ncm, collusion can be sustained, while for any n > ncm, it cannot. As
ncm is the inverse of the monotonically increasing function δ∗m(n), it is increasing in
δ. Furthermore, by definition ncm(δ∗m) = n∗. In the interval δ ∈ [n∗m,1) this implies
that n∗ is a strict lower boundary for competitive industry sizes. From this, it then
follows that the competitive dynamics on this interval always decrease the number
of firms either through merger or exit. After some firms have left and n = ncm, the
remaining firms form a stable cartel and earn strictly positive profits.
3. Medium discount factors in the range δ ∈ [δ∗m, δ∗m). Following the same logic as above,
any competitive industry in this range has at least n > nm firms in it. Therefore,
the competitive industry forces reduce the number of firms. As long as the industry
is competitive and n > n∗, firms will either merge or exit. For all n ∈ (nm,n∗] the
merger force outweighs the entry force, decreasing n further until at some point
n= ncm. Because δ ∈ [δ∗m, δ∗m) it follows directly that ncm ∈ [nm,n∗).
To summarise, it was shown that any market which is initially competitive converges
towards either the clearly defined collusive industry size ncm when δ ≥ δ∗m, or towards the
competitive long run sustainable size nm when δ < δ∗m. These results take as a given the
assumption that when firms reach a collusive agreement, the number of firms is fixed and
further dynamic processes are excluded. It seems to be intuitively fine to assume that
firms currently colluding would not want to attract CA attention on their industry by
seeking clearance for a merger and it has been established in the forgone section that
no firm would want to exit a collusive industry in which it earns strictly positive profits.
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However, firms who are currently not in the industry might still have an incentive to enter
and participate in the market.
To determine how this affects the dynamics in the model, the three ranges of δ are
considered again, but this time it is assumed that industries start off colluding. Discount
factors of δ < δ∗m(2) are not considered, as for these values no stable cartel can form by
definition.
1. When δ ∈ [δ∗m(2), δ∗m) and the industry is currently collusive, it follows directly that
n ∈ (2,nm). There are then two possible outcomes for a potential entrant. On
the one hand, the post entry size could be such that the industry is still collusive.
That is the case when after entry n ≤ ncm. In this case, any entrant can expect to
earn positive profits of pic(n) > 0 and will therefore enter. On the other hand, it
is possible that after a firm has entered, n is too large for the industry to remain
collusive. That is the case when after entry n > ncm. In this case, any entrant
can expect to earn competitive profits of pi∗(n) > 0. As n ∈ (2,nm) the profits are
positive and hence the firm will enter.15 As a consequence, the collusive agreement
dissolves and the competitive industry dynamics as defined above lead to n= nm in
the long run. This shows that for any δ < δ∗m collusion cannot be sustained in the
long run and that any industry with such a discount factor will converge towards
the competitive long run stability point nm.
2. When δ ≥ δ∗m, the maximum stable cartel size is in the range of ncm ∈ [n∗,ncm).
Given that an industry is collusive, there are again two possible outcomes for a
potential entrant. If after entry collusion is still sustainable, i.e. when after entry
n≤ ncm, the entrant can expect to join the cartel and earn strictly positive profits of
pic(n). However, if entry pushes the industry size above the maximum stable cartel
size ncm, the firm has to expect competitive profits, which are negative because
ncm ≥ n∗. Therefore, entry will not happen. Combining the two arguments then
means that any industry with δ > δ∗m has entry until the maximum stable cartel
size ncm and no entry above this. Together with the competitive dynamics, this
implies that any industry which values future profits enough to sustain collusion
above the competitive zero profit number of firms will converge to some uniquely
15The competitive profits in this region are positive because it is assumed that entry is small and
the integer problem is assumed away. Therefore it is expected that industry size after entry is in the
immediate proximity of the n which solves δ = δ∗m(n). For the highest possible n in the given range, this
would be nm and for nm + ,  > 0 the competitive profits are positive.
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defined industry size ncm for which collusion can just be sustained.
3. When δ ∈ [δ∗m, δ∗m), the maximum stable cartel size is ncm ∈ [nm,n∗). Similarly to the
other two cases, any firm aiming to join the industry faces two outcomes. Firstly, it
is possible that the post entry size is n ≤ ncm, which allows for stable collusion. In
this case, any entrant expects to earn pic(n) > 0 and will therefore join. Secondly,
when the post entry size is such that n>ncm, entry renders collusion unstable and an
entrant has to expect competitive profits. For industry sizes in the direct proximity
of n ∈ (nm,n∗), these profits are positive pi∗(n)> 0 which means that entry pays off
and firms join the market. As a result, the firms revert to competing against each
other and thus, the competitive industry dynamics defined above hold. This means
that because n ∈ (nm,n∗), the merger force outweighs the entry force and therefore
it can be expected that the industry size will shrink over time. This can have either
of two consequences. On the one hand, it is possible to argue that firms anticipate
the instability of collusive agreements and therefore will not attempt to collude
again. This would mean that the competitive dynamics lead towards the long run
sustainable industry size nm and firms earn positive profit pi∗(nm) = pim. On the
other hand though, it is possible to argue that after the industry size has decreased,
there will be some point at which firms decide to attempt forming a cartel again. If
this was the case, additional entry over time would break collusion up again. This
would lead to some unstable equilibrium around the maximum stable cartel size ncm:
for some time, the industry will be collusive until excessive entry renders collusion
impossible. This would be followed by a period of consolidation, which could lead
to collusion emerging again. Both arguments are characterized by collusive periods
which are followed by periods of mergers.
This is a major novelty of this model specification. By taking into account the
competitive dynamics resulting of mergers and entry, endogenous breakdown of
collusion is followed by mergers.
Dynamic Result 4: When mergers are taken into account and δ ∈ [δ∗m, δ∗m) endoge-
nous breakdown of collusion leads to mergers.
A graphic representation of the collusive and competitive industry forces is given in
Fig. 6. The graph plots the critical discount factor δ∗m(n) as a function of the market size.
Tuples of (n,δ) which are above the critical discount factor show parameter combinations
for which collusion is stable, while those tuples below it show competitive markets. Red
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arrows highlight the areas in which either exit or merger decrease the number of firms.
Blue arrows show areas in which the merger force is stronger than the entry force and
green arrows areas where firms enter the industry.
To summarize, the dynamic model with entry, exit and merger predict outcomes de-
pending on an industry’s discount factor δ. When δ ∈ (0, δ∗m) the number of firms will
converge towards the long run sustainable number of firms in a competitive industry nm
and earn strictly positive profits pim. When δ ∈ [δ∗m, δ∗m), the prediction is unclear. One
possible outcome is that firms attempt collusion at the maximum stable cartel size nm,
which fails due to additional entry, after which firms return to competition and n con-
verges towards nm. The other possible outcome is that the number of firms cycles around
the maximum stable cartel size and the industry is characterised by periodical collusion
and competition. In both cases, endogenous collusive break down is followed by mergers.
Overall, it has been shown that taking mergers into account has profound implications
on the ability of cartels to reach stable agreements which all point into the same direction:
they make collusion harder to sustain than in the static model. To begin with, contrary
to the purely static case, it was shown that the dynamic entry force can deter collusion
for discount factors of δ ∈ [δ∗m(2), δ∗m). For these values of δ small cartels are stable in a
static environment. However, when entry is allowed for, collusive agreements cannot be
sustained and the industry size increases to the competitive long run sustainable size nm.
Additionally, when δ ≥ δ∗m, collusion is less stable in the merger model than in the static
model for two reasons. Firstly, firms require higher discount factors to sustain collusion
when merger dynamics are included. That is because firms inside the cartel take into
account their expected punishment profits in the case of defection are higher. This makes
defecting more attractive, which means that less firms can collude sustainably. It also
means that the maximum stable cartel size is smaller in the dynamic model. Secondly,
for discount factors in the range δ ∈ [δ∗m, δ∗m), cartels are either unstable, or the industries
cycle between collusive and competitive periods. That is because entry and merger forces
are active for those maximum stable cartel sizes which correspond to this range of discount
factors. Under competition, merger forces will decrease the number of firms until collusion
can be sustained. Under collusion, entry will increase the number of firms until the cartel
is rendered unstable.
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3 Conclusion
The model discussed in this paper nested the analysis of collusive equilibria into a com-
petitive environment with dynamic forces of entry, exit, and merger, allowing firms to
endogenously choose between the practices. Doing so allowed to consider how endoge-
nously determined industry sizes can affect collusion.
In a first step, a static framework was defined and two standard results of collusive
theory were replicated. Firstly, that relative to competition, it is always profitable to be
inside a cartel. It was shown that from this, it follows secondly, that there is some valu-
ation of future profits (discount factor) above which collusion is stable for each industry
size. This implies that overall unprofitable cartels can be sustained. However, standard
economic theory suggests that unprofitable firms have an incentive to leave a market in
the long run. As this cannot be modelled in the static framework, the paper then adds
industry dynamics into the analysis.
In a second step, entry and exit are therefore introduced into the model. The resulting
competitive zero profit equilibrium implies that any firm’s alternative to collusion are
not static competitive profits for a given number of firms, but zero long run profits.
Therefore, unprofitable cartels cannot be sustained any longer because the cartel firms
anticipate that they would be better off in the competitive equilibrium or by leaving
the industry. This leads to the first dynamic result that unprofitable cartels cannot be
sustained when competitive free entry and exit are taken into account. It is then shown
that entry renders collusion unstable when the industry’s discount factor is not high
enough to sustain collusion for the competitive equilibrium industry size. However, when
the discount factor is above this critical threshold profitable collusion can be sustained. In
terms of industry dynamics it is then shown that for each discount factor δ there is some
unique equilibrium market size and that the industry converges towards this size. From
this, one can identify two kinds of industries: firstly, the ones with relative low discount
factors in which collusion can never be sustained due to high competitive pressure through
entry. Secondly, the industries in which the valuation of future profits is high enough to
sustain stable and profitable collusion. In this latter industry, the size will be such that
no firm has an incentive to enter and break up the cartel as this would lead to negative
profits.
This is a drastically different result to much of the standard literature, as it implies
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that strictly profitable cartels can be sustained under the presence of free entry and exit.16
In the last step, the possibility of mergers between competitive firms is added into the
dynamic entry and exit model. It is argued that a long run stability point is given for the
industry size which equalises the gains of entry with those of mergers. This constitutes a
new definition of an entry-merger stability point. For this long run sustainable size, firms
earn strictly positive profits. A direct implication is that the expected future profits of
a firm inside a cartel, which expects the breakdown of the cartel, are strictly positive.
Therefore, any sustainable collusive agreement needs to earn profits exceeding a strictly
positive outside option. Hence, some profitable cartels, which were stable under the
entry/exit specification are not stable when mergers are taken into account because they
don’t earn profits above the outside option.
In this specification, three separate kinds of industry are identified. Firstly, those with
a discount factor below the one necessary to sustain collusion at the long run sustainable
industry size will always be competitive, because entrants can break up collusion and
still earn positive profits. Secondly, there are the discount factors just above this one, but
below the one necessary to sustain collusion at the competitive zero profit industry size. In
these industries firms from the outside always have an incentive to join a collusive industry,
even if it breaks up collusion. However, once an industry has become competitive, mergers
will decrease the number of firms again, thereby making collusion possible again. This
means two things: a) endogenous collusive breakdown is followed by mergers, and b)
endogenously motivated mergers lead to an industry structure under which collusion is
possible. The equilibrium for these industries is not stable, but characterised by cycles
of competitive and collusive periods. Finally, those industries with the highest discount
factors converge towards stable collusive equilibria at the maximum stable cartel size.
For the last model specification this means that, as long as the discount factor is high,
both exit and merger facilitate collusion. Furthermore, there are three ways in which
the breakdown of collusion can trigger mergers. Firstly, for the medium defined range of
discount factors, this dynamic is part of the endogenous processes as discussed. Secondly,
potential exogenous shocks could lead to cartel break up. Some examples of shocks could
include decreased discount factors, CA intervention into an industry or if key stakeholders
involved in the collusive process switch jobs and therefore cannot ensure adherence to the
collusive agreement any longer. Any breakdown of collusion for these industries would
16While the model defined here has recurring fixed costs of operating in the industry, entry and exit can
be interpreted as there are no one-time, irretrievable investment costs for entering the industry. Compare
for this, Baumol and Willig (1981): ”(...)fixed costs do not constitute barriers to entry”(p.405).
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be followed by either merger or exit. Thirdly, as real world processes aren’t as clearly
defined as theoretical models, one could argue that firms make mistakes. An example of
this could be that firms enter in too large numbers. If wrongly calculated entry broke up
collusion, mergers or exit would be the direct consequence.
Overall, the model presented in this paper combines the analysis of collusion with
the dynamic forces of entry, exit, and mergers. It is the first model to allow firms to
endogenously choose between all four of these options. The results imply that i) profitable
collusion can be sustained even under free entry, ii) endogenous mergers can facilitate
collusion and iii) endogenous breakdown can lead to mergers in an industry. Additionally,
the paper identifies a new definition of a competitive long run stability point under merger
and entry.
Further research into this area could involve a more active CA, analyse welfare im-
plications of the firm decisions, and setting out a more general form of the very specific
linear cost Cournot model analysed here.
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4 Appendix A
4.1 Derivation of profit functions
There are four profit functions which have to be derived in order for this model to work.
1. Competitive profits pi∗(n)
2. Collusive profits pic(n)
3. Deviator profits pid(n)
4. Profits of all other firms in the cartel, given that one firm deviated pi−d(n)
Firstly, derive the competitive profits pi∗(n). Each firm maximises profits, given the output
of other firms
max
qi
qi
[
P (Q)− c
]
−f = max
qi
qi
[
a− c− qi− q−i
]
−f (41)
From the first order condition, it follows for each firm that the optimal own output qi,
given competitors output q−i is equal to
qRi =
a− c− q−i
2 . (42)
All firms are symmetrical and hence will set the same output in equilibrium qi = q∗(n)
∀i= 1,2, ...,n. It follows that
q∗(n) = a− c− (n−1)q
∗(n)
2
= a− c(n+ 1) .
(43)
Plugging the equilibrium quantities back into the inverse demand function P (Q) = a−Q,
where Q= n∗ qi, the equilibrium price P ∗(n) = P (q∗(n)) follows as
P ∗(n) = a−nc
n+ 1 . (44)
Finally, equilibrium profits (P ∗(n)− c)q∗(n)−f follow as
pi∗(n) =
(
a− c
n+ 1
)2
−f (45)
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Secondly, derive the collusive profits. If there is a cartel, firms maximise joint profits
max
Q
Q
[
P (Q)− c
]
−nf = max
Q
Q
[
a− c−Q
]
−nf. (46)
The first order condition leads to the optimal total cartel quantity
Qc = a− c2 . (47)
Individual production targets are then qc(n) =Qc/n= a−c2n . The market price in a collusive
market is P c(Qc) = a+c2 which leads to per firms profits of
pic = (a− c)
2
4n −f (48)
Thirdly, derive deviator profits. A deviator takes as given that all other firms in the
cartel set the collusive quantities and responds optimally to this:
max
qi
qi
[
P (Q)−c
]
−f = max
qi
qi
[
a−c−qi−(n−1)qc(n)
]
−f = max
qi
qi
[(n+ 1)(a− c)
2n −qi
]
−f.
(49)
From the first order condition, optimal deviator quantities immediately follow as
qd(n) = (n+ 1)(a− c)4n . (50)
The market price, given deviation is then
P d(n) = (n+ 1)(a− c)4n + c, (51)
which leads directly to deviator profits of
pid(n) =
((n+ 1)(a− c)
4n
)2
−f (52)
Finally, the profits of other cartel members, given one firm deviated are derived. These
are important to evaluate if cartel members are actually worse off given that one firm
deviated. The market price given deviation and the per firm cartel output are defined
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above. It follows that
pi−d(n) = qc(P d− c)−f = qc(P c− c)n+ 12n −f < pi
c(n). (53)
5 Appendix B
5.1 Proof Critical Discount Factor Increasing In Number Of Firms
The derivative of the critical discount factor δ∗e(n) with respect to n is given by
∂δ∗e(n)
∂n
=
4(a− c)2(n−1)
[
(n+ 1)2(a− c)2−8nf
]
[
(n+ 1)2(a− c)2−16n2f
]2 , (54)
where the denominator is always positive. The numerator is positive iff
(n+ 1)2(a− c)2−8nf > 0
⇐⇒ (n+ 1)2 (a− c)
2
4f > 2n
⇐⇒ (n+ 1)2nc > 2n,
(55)
where the last step follows from the definition of nc = (a−c)
2
4f . As n
c > n∗ which in turn is
assumed to be such that n∗≥ 2, it will always hold that (n+1)2nc> 2n. Hence, ∂δ∗e (n)∂n > 0.
6 Appendix C
6.1 Discussion of Merger Condition
The merger condition is given by
pi∗(n−1)≥ 2pi∗(n),
⇐⇒
(
a− c
n
)2
−2
(
a− c
n+ 1
)2
≥−f,
(56)
where the RHS is strictly decreasing in f and therefore the function holds more likely for
large f . Furthermore, the analysis of the RHS shows two properties. Firstly, as the LHS
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is only positive ∀ n < 2.414. This follows directly from
(a− c)2
[
1/n2−2/(n+ 1)2
]
= 0
⇐⇒
[
(n+ 1)2−n2
]
= 0
n= 2.414
(57)
This implies a that any merger from 2 to 1 firms also pays off. Secondly, the LHS is
decreasing up to a minimum value at n = 3.847 after which it is strictly increasing in n.
This follows from
∂
(
a−c
n
)2
−2
(
a−c
n+1
)2
∂n
= 2(a− c)2[2/(n+ 1)3−1/n3], (58)
which is positive if the value in the brackets is positive, i.e. as long as 2n3− (n+ 1)3 > 0
which solves for n > 3.847. The second derivative is given by 2(a− c)2[2/n4−6/(n+ 1)4]
which is positive ∀ 0< n< 5.285. Hence, for n= 3.847 the LHS is at a minimum and the
function increases thereafter.
Assuming that the merger condition always holds implies
(
a− c
n
)2
−2
(
a− c
n+ 1
)2
≥−f. (59)
From the discussion above it follows that the LHS is minimal for n= 3.847. Plugging this
into the function leads to
0.01756(a− c)2 ≤ f. (60)
Hence for all f ≥ 0.01756(a− c)2 a merger always pays off.
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5 Conclusion
This thesis has addressed how endogenous size processes affect the stability and
price setting behaviour of cartels. In doing so, it has contributed to research by
expanding the existing industrial economics literature along two dimensions. Firstly,
in Chapters One and Two, the common assumption that all firms in an industry
have to be inside a cartel for it to be stable is relaxed and the consequences of
this on stability and price are discussed. Secondly, Chapter Three challenges the
assumption that a stable cartel requires the number of firms in an industry to be
fixed by presenting a model in which stable collusion can occur in a dynamic industry
with entry, exit and merger forces. In combination, the chapters have emphasized
the importance of taking into account possible endogenous size variations when
evaluating the stability or price setting of cartels.
Specifically, Chapter One discussed how collusive stability depends on two di-
mensions: the level of horizontal product differentiation and the level of costs asso-
ciated with collusion. Although there is a wide range of literature analysing both
of these dimensions, this is the first model to combine them under the assumption
that a cartel can consist of less than all firms in the industry. Three main results
are derived. Firstly, when collusion is costless, small cartels tend to become more
stable as products become closer substitutes, while large cartels tend to become less
stable. Secondly, although smaller collusive agreements are more stable than larger
ones when collusion is costless, this result does not apply when costs of collusion
are strictly positive. When that is the case, cartel stability needs to be compared
on a case by case basis. Finally, it is shown that when the cartel size is determined
endogenously, there are cases in which larger costs of collusion can result in more
stable cartels. This finding contrasts the standard result that collusion is always
harder to sustain when it is more costly. However, the costs modelled in this frame-
work are assumed to be fixed and further insight may be gained by considering
more elaborate cost functions. For example, costs of collusion could vary with the
degree of product differentiation or be linked to the number of firms in the cartel.
Additionally, it is possible to model the costs of collusion as the expected penalties
that are imposed on cartels by a CA.
This latter topic is what motivated Chapter Two, which compares the effect that
three different penalty regimes have on the price setting of cartels, given that the
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size of a cartel is determined endogenously. The regimes considered are penalties
based on profits, overcharges and revenues. In an infinitely repeated Bertrand com-
petition model over true substitutes, it is shown that the penalty regime influences
price setting in two ways. Firstly, they directly affect the price set by a cartel for
a given size. Secondly, they affect the endogenous cartel size and thereby indirectly
influence price setting. The direct effect for all these penalty regimes has been stud-
ied previously by Katsoulacos et al. (2015). However, in their model all firms in an
industry have to be part of the cartel and thus the indirect effect of a penalty is
not taken into account. At the same time, Bos and Harrington (2015) compare the
indirect and direct effect for profits based penalties in a capacity constraint Bertrand
model, but do not undertake a comparison of different penalty regimes. The model
presented in Chapter Two is thus the first paper to compare the direct and indi-
rect effects for multiple penalty regimes. The results show that the profits based
penalties have a weakly negative overall price effect. For overcharge based penalties
it is found that imposing a penalty will always decrease the price compared to a
situation without a penalty. However, it is also possible that an increase in the
penalty rate increases the prices charged in the industry. Revenue based penalties
are shown to have an ambiguous overall price effect. When comparing the penalty
regimes on the basis that they all deter cartels over the same group of products, it is
shown that overcharge based penalties always lead to the lowest prices, followed in
the most cases by profits based penalties and then revenue based penalties, though
it is possible that in some cases revenue based penalties lead to lower prices than
profits based penalties. While this methodology of comparing the penalty regimes
provides a first intuition about how the prices under different penalty regimes com-
pare to one another, it is also possible to use further methodologies to gain a deeper
understanding. More specifically, a next step in the analysis could be to equalize
the penalties such that the expected penalty is equal for firms who create the same
harm to the economy.
Chapter Three then analysed the interdependencies between collusion and the
dynamic processes of entry, exit and merger, which determine the number of firms
in an industry. In much of the literature on cartels these dynamic processes are
excluded and the industry size is fixed. Some authors argue that entry into collusive
industries would either break up collusion (e.g. Ivaldi et al. (2003)) or that no firm
would enter a collusive industry because the incumbent firms play entry deterring
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strategies. The research presented in this chapter adds to the existing literature
by challenging this idea and establishing a framework in which stable collusion can
be achieved in an industry in which entry, exit and merger forces are present. It
is shown that these dynamic forces are not distinct phenomena to collusion, rather
they can all occur sequentially in the same industry, potentially leading it to a
collusive equilibrium in which no entry deterring strategies are played. This is in
contrast to the previous literature. In arriving at this long run equilibrium, the
model also mimics two empirical observations. Firstly, the observation that the
breakdown of collusive agreements can be followed by increased merger activity.
Secondly, that mergers may make collusion more likely to be sustainable. Finally,
the model presents a new notion of a long run competitive stability point under
merger and entry forces in which firms earn long run positive profits. A next step
for future research into this area could be to add an active competition authority
into the framework to analyse in a more elaborate setting how mergers and cartels
are connected.
Overall, this PhD thesis has researched how the size of a cartel affects its stability
and price setting. While the first two chapters have addressed this question in an
industry with a fixed number of firms but endogenous cartel size, the third chapter
has focussed on dynamics which altered the number of firms in the industry. It was
shown that endogenous cartel size can be an important dimension to consider when
making predictions about cartel behaviour.
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